Towards a harmonized framework for high reliability organisations by Agwu, Agwu
 Towards a Harmonized Framework for 
High Reliability Organisations 
 
 
A Ph.D. Thesis 
 
By 
 
Agwu Emele Agwu 
 
 
The thesis is submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the award of the 
degree of Doctor of Philosophy of the University of Portsmouth 
 
 
Department of Operations and Systems Management 
Faculty of Business and Law 
 
January 2018 
 Abstract 
Within the last few decades, there has been an exponential growth in technologies and 
process interdependencies within organisations. The period has additionally witnessed 
accelerated incidences of disasters. Despite operating with tightly interdependent 
processes and complex technologies where failures could potentially result in disasters, 
high reliability organisations have continued to record high levels of performance in 
organisational reliability and safety. Given the increasing havoc wrecked by disasters on 
organisations, people, and the environment, a framework is required to transfer 
learnings from high reliability organisations to diverse organisations. This research 
investigates the extent to which the reliability of organisations can be measured, and the 
extent to which this measurement can be applied to diverse organisations. Research on 
high reliability organisations have been mostly conducted through theoretical 
abstraction and mostly performed in single organisations, with little empirical evidence 
to support the generalizability of the conclusions. They have been mostly reactive, 
analysing incidents after the fact, often with retrospective predictability. This research 
used a mixed methods approach to study eight organisations, in three industries. It 
combined the objectivity of the survey strategy with the subjectivity of in-depth 
interviews to obtain balanced data sets that best serves its exploratory nature. It 
proposed the organisational reliability maturity model that defines baseline 
measurements and tracks the progression of organisations through different maturity 
levels. It developed a framework for organisational reliability maturity to identify 
organisational maturity levels, predict improvement or regressive potentials, benchmark 
organisations, and develop processes for organisational learning and performance 
improvement. This research expands existing knowledge in organisational research and 
opens up new areas of knowledge. It enhances the standardisation and generalisability 
of the high reliability organisation theory. It enables benchmarking, organisational 
learning and performance improvement. Finally, it eliminates the retrospective 
predictability of incidents causative factors and enhances the ability of organisations to 
predict the potential for incidents. It is hoped that these would help to make 
organisations more resilient, reduce incidents and disasters, and ultimately safeguard 
humanity.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
Introduction 
1.1 Research Background 
There is an old English saying “don’t spoil the ship for a ha'p'orth of tar”, which means 
that one should not risk the failure of a large project by trying to make savings on trivial 
things. Before ships made of steel and metal alloys became common, they were made of 
wood. Sailors used tar to prevent water from getting in the gaps between the planks and 
the wood, and would normally keep some tar in the ship. A half penny worth of tar 
could plug a gap that could potentially sink the ship if left unattended to. This saying 
also suggests therefore that catastrophic failures could be prevented by implementing 
minor but timely activities. Studies have shown that most catastrophic failures have 
been caused by series of seemingly minor individual, technical, and lack of 
organisational mindfulness (Gilbertson et al; 2011; Labib & Read, 2013; Labib & Read, 
2015; Labib, 2014; Savioja et al, 2014; Waring, 2015; Harvey et al, 2016; Li, 2016). 
These incidents could perhaps have been avoided had the organisations mindfully 
invested in “a ha'p'orth of tar”.  
 
Perrow (1984) had argued in favour of the inevitability of disasters no matter the efforts 
individuals and organisations would devote to prevent them. To him, as long as an 
organisation is characterized by complex technologies and a tight coupling, where a 
problem in one part of the process will impact other parts of the process, the 
inevitability of disasters are unavoidable.  Some other researchers contrasted this rather 
pessimistic point of view, with the consideration that some organisations have 
continued to operate at top quartile levels in organisational reliability and safety despite 
operating with complex technologies and with tightly coupled processes. These 
organisations operate in highly hazardous environments, where minor lapse in judgment 
or process failure could potentially result in catastrophic failures; yet continue to record 
consistent high level performance in organisational reliability and safety. They 
continuously avoid failures, and are mostly designed such that eventual failures do not 
result in catastrophe. Should catastrophic failures eventually occur, these organisations 
2 
 
are well equipped to withstand the consequences and are able to re-engineer themselves 
for future competitiveness. Weick & Sutcliffe (2007) called them High Reliability 
Organisations (HROs).  
 
This research leverages on the HRO theory to propose how organisations could operate 
in ways to make their processes more reliable and with potentially less incidents.  
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1.2 Summary of Current HRO Research 
Most of the work on HROs has been concentrated on understanding the concept as it 
relates to specific industries or organisations. The industries have included 
transportation, aviation and military (Roberts et al, 1994; La Porte & Consolini, 1998; 
Busby, 2006; Jeffcott et al, 2006; O’Neil, 2011), space (Schulman, 2008), energy 
(Hoffmann et al, 1995; Miller, 2009; Hopkins, 2009; Lekka & Sugden, 2011), nuclear 
(Bierly & Spender, 1995; Ashley et al, 2009), and fire and disasters (Keller, 2004; 
Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007; Berardi, 2010). A lot of research has gone into the application 
of the HRO theory in the healthcare industry (Baker et al, 2006; Frankel et al 2006; 
Madsen et al, 2006; Roberts et al 2005; Stralen et al 2006; Tamuz & Harrison, 2006; 
Costella et al, 2009; Riley, 2009; Samuels, 2010; Sutcliffe, 2011). Other industries 
where attempts have been made to apply the HRO theory include  education 
(Stringfield, 1995; Taylor & Angelle, 2000; Azzaro, 2005; Bellamy et al, 2005; 
Stringfield et al, 2008), food retail (Ciravenga & Brenes, 2016), and virtual 
organisations (Grabowski & Roberts, 2016). Some research has aimed at comparative 
analyses with other concepts such as resilient engineering (Aven & Krohn, 2014; Righi 
et al, 2015; Bergstrom et al, 2015; Haavik et al, 2016; Harvey et al, 2016; Le Coze, 
2016).  
 
Bundy et al (2017) in their work on crisis management noted that some HRO research 
have also focused narrowly on organisational reliability limiting factors. Such limiting 
factors according to Bundy et al (2017), include the emotional and cognitive limitations 
of managers (Kahn et al., 2013; Roux-Dufort, 2007); the number of organisational 
disruptions (Rudolph & Repenning, 2002); the availability and use of organisational 
resources (Marcus & Nichols, 1999); and the roles of practices and structures used to 
promote reliability (Lin et al, 2006; Vogus & Welbourne, 2003). All these research 
were mostly theoretical exercises that were not backed by empirical data. Some other 
researchers have attempted to implement the HRO theory in specific organisations such 
as healthcare (Hines et al, 2008; Hales, 2013). Hales & Chakravorty (2016) attempted to 
implement the HRO theory using a soft research method approach, moderated with 
mindfulness techniques. This was also in a single organisation within the health care 
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sector, and therein lies the gaps. First, these mostly case based researches have 
concentrated on certain organisations, thereby limiting their generalisability. Secondly, 
there is no evidence of a generalizable empirical research that studies diverse 
organisations with respect to organising for reliability. Bundy et al (2017), Levenson et 
al (2009), and Bigley & Roberts (2001), noted this gap in their respective studies. They 
noted the lack of specificity of existing research in the HRO theory, the abstract nature 
of the theory, and the need for a “comprehensive and detailed treatment” of high 
reliability organisations. This research hopes to close these gaps. The next section 
explores these gaps in more detail and lays the groundwork for the steps the research 
has taken towards closing them. 
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1.3 Gaps in Current HRO Research 
One of the gaps identified with current research in the HRO theory is the lack of 
evidence of a research conducted across different types of organisations to test the HRO 
theory. Such research would not only provide a balanced perspective about the HRO 
theory, but would also show the extent to which the theory could be standardized across 
organisations with diverse characteristics. Another gap is that most HRO researches 
have been reactive, mostly studying how the theory could have helped avoid 
catastrophic events retrospectively from a theoretical perspective. There is no research 
directed at understanding how reliable organisations are and predicting the potential 
behaviour of the organisations given prevailing conditions. The ability to predict the 
potential behaviour of an organisation would assist the organisation to develop 
improvement processes and actions to mitigate potential incidents. Furthermore, 
research has been limited to the traditional large HROs with complex technologies and 
potential for far reaching catastrophic failures such as the nuclear industry (Labaka et al, 
2015). Traditional HROs here refers to those organisations conventionally regarded as 
HRO by the initial HRO researchers. Some may argue that implementing the HRO 
theory in non-traditional HRO related industries does not make financial sense. They 
however forget that most of the catastrophic failures in recent history have come from 
organisations not considered as traditional HROs. These have included the oil and gas 
industry, transportation industry, mining, chemical process industry, and buildings. A 
brewery or restaurant chain for instance might not be as technologically complex as a 
nuclear energy organisation, neither are their processes as hazardous nor tightly wound 
as the nuclear organisation. However, certain failures in the process of a brewery or a 
restaurant chain could potentially lead to (and as will be shown in chapter three, have 
actually led to) multiple mass fatalities. The same could be said of public utility systems 
such as electricity and water. They would therefore require high levels of reliability to 
sustain their operation more efficiently, yet no effort has been made by previous 
research to use the HRO theory to improve their reliability.   
 
The final gap stems from the fact that no research available has shown how to measure 
the mindfulness of the organisations, or how the organisations can sustain their levels of 
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mindfulness or progress through the stages of maturing towards a higher level of 
reliability. The world stands to gain from the extension of the theory to diverse 
organisations, especially given recent vagaries in the world economy. Organisations 
would become better assured of their ability to deliver their targets and goals with 
minimal incidents. 
 
To fill the gap of lack of evidence of a research conducted across different types of 
organisations to test the HRO theory, this research has conducted research in 8 different 
organisations in 3 different industries. Given that these organisations have different and 
often contrasting characteristics, the research set out to obtain a wide range of data upon 
which to develop a robust framework. In addition to expanding the scope of current 
HRO research, this study has developed an organisational reliability maturity model 
(ORM
2
) and the framework for organisational reliability maturity (FORM) that would 
identify the level of reliability of an organisation and predict the potential for incidents 
based on reliability trends. This would fill the gap of the retrospective nature of most 
HRO research. The model and framework would also close the final gap of inability of 
current research to proffer a methodical approach improving the reliability of 
organisations. The framework leverages on the model to develop a step wise approach 
to assess the current organisational reliability maturity levels of organisations, identify 
their potentials to improve or retrogress, and recommend improvement or sustainability 
behaviours. This step wise approach would be beneficial to organisations both for self-
auditing and for external benchmarking, as well as to facilitate continuous improvement 
initiatives.   
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1.4 Research Questions 
Given the gaps identified in the previous section, the research has proposed two 
research questions, the answers of which are expected to help to close the identified 
gaps. 
 
 To what extent can the reliability of organisations be measured? 
 Can these measurements help diverse organisations become more mature? 
 
According to often quoted conventional wisdom, “you can’t manage what you can’t 
measure”, or as some others choose to put it, “you can’t improve what you can’t 
measure”. To understand the reliability of organisations, there must first be some 
measurement criteria that will define what is being measured and the scope to which the 
measurement is expected to cover. The first research question, “to what extent can the 
reliability of organisations be measured” aims to investigate the possibility of 
developing a measurement framework for high reliability organisations.  Such 
measurement would establish the baseline from which improvement and sustainability 
initiatives could be developed for the organisations. The framework will assess the 
degree of reliability of individual organisations and create a platform from which 
improvement opportunities could be explored. 
 
The measurement will thereafter set the stage to answer the second research question: 
“can these measurements help diverse organisations become more mature?” This 
question aims to evaluate the applicability and usability of the measurements to improve 
the behaviour of the organisations. The framework establishes the best practices 
expected from highly reliable organisations. These best practices become the 
benchmark to help organisations assess their variance from the desired.  Furthermore, 
effective measurement assures the potential of the framework to predict the degree to 
which the reliability of organisations could potentially improve or retrogress. In 
answering the second research question, the research establishes the ability of the 
measurements to suggest possible specific improvement actions the organisations could 
adopt to improve its maturity.  
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Both questions together, help the research close the identified standardization gap by 
making the framework objective and repeatable. Diverse organisations could therefore 
replicate the research, ascertain their maturity level, benchmark themselves against 
desired standards, implement continuous improvement actions, and adopt further 
actions to enhance the sustainability of achieved maturity levels.  
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1.5 Research Aim and Objectives 
This section leverages on the discussions surrounding the research questions and 
identifies what the research aims to archive, as well as the objectives it has set out. 
 
The aim of the research is to develop a harmonized framework for organisational 
reliability measurement and apply the high reliability organisation theory to improve the 
maturity of organisations.  
 
To achieve this aim, the research sets out the following objectives: 
 Collect a balanced data set: The research would collect objective and subjective 
data from different organisations in different industries and with diverse 
characteristics to help establish a wide range of data to base its assumptions on. 
The wide range of data would help increase the validity of the assumptions and 
the conclusions the research would make.  
 Develop a model to map the maturity behaviour of organisations: The research 
would develop an organisational maturity model (ORM
2
) that will identify 
specific reliability enhancing behaviours in organisations for each of the 5 high 
reliability organisation principles. The model will map these behaviours into 5 
maturity levels and propose what behaviours would be expected from 
organisations in different maturity levels. These behaviours would progress 
incrementally as the maturity level improves. The model will comprise of 25 
boxes that corresponds to the 5 HRO principles against the 5 maturity levels. It 
will map the 5 HRO principles on the x - axis against the 5 maturity levels on 
the y – axis. It will show the position of each organisation at any given time, as 
well as the position of the organisation against its peers.  
 Develop a standardized framework to assess the reliability of organisations: 
The framework for organisational reliability maturity (FORM) would identify 
the maturity level of the organisations with respect to the 5 high reliability 
organisations principles using the behaviours identified in the organisational 
reliability maturity model (ORM
2
). The framework would be replicable and 
applicable across different organisations with diverse characteristics and in 
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different industries. Measuring and assessing an organisation’s current status is a 
vital input into the continuous improvement cycle planning stage. To plan for 
improvement, the organisation needs to assess its current status and understand 
the current behaviours that are impeding or enhancing its progress towards their 
desired maturity level. The framework will would be comprehensive enough to 
measure the reliability enhancing behaviour in each of the 5 HRO principles, 
and propose a generalized organisational maturity level based on these 
individual behaviour.    
 Benchmark organisations against desired behaviours: Blackstool et al. (2012) 
consider benchmarking as “the process of self-evaluation and self-improvement 
through the systematic and collaborative comparison of practice and 
performance with similar organisations in order to identify strengths and 
weaknesses, to learn to adapt and to set new targets to improve performance” 
The framework would establish the maturity enhancing behaviour that is most 
desirous and considered best in class. These would form the standard behaviour 
with which organisations would benchmark themselves against. Benchmarking 
could be against the desired best in class behaviours, or against peers. It could 
also be used within the same organisation to track behaviours between different 
units or departments and it sets the stage for organisational reliability continuous 
improvement exercises.   
 Predict future maturity levels of organisations: The framework would be 
robust enough to have the ability to predict potential future organisational 
maturity levels given current behaviours. It would achieve this in two ways. 
First, as soon as the initial baseline measurements are obtained, subsequent 
measurements will be compared with the baseline to assess the degree of 
progress or regression recorded within the period under review. Subsequent 
measurements would be compared with the preceding measurement to track 
progress. The second way the framework would predict future maturity of an 
organisation would be to establish the behaviours that are highly prevalent next 
to the maturity level. The severity of these behaviours could indicate that the 
organisation is improving or retrogressing with regards the principle being 
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reviewed or in general. The research called this the “pull” and has developed a 
mathematical function to calculate the pull for each individual principle and the 
organisation in general. Results of the pull from subsequent measurements 
would indicate more clearly if the organisation is progressing or retrogressing. It 
would also show the maturity level towards which the organisation is being 
“pulled”, an indication of where the organisation would potentially fall into 
should current behavioural trend persist.  
 Develop a standardized framework to help organisations create reliability 
maturity improvement initiatives: Based on the current maturity levels and the 
pulls, the framework would develop a set of behaviours that would help improve 
the organisational reliability maturity level of the organisation towards the next 
level.  
  
The research expects that developing a framework for measuring the maturity levels of 
organisations with respect to their reliability will not only enhance the knowledge area, 
but will also form a foundation for organisations to build upon and improve their 
reliability.  
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1.6 Theoretical Framework and Research Methods 
The research attempts to make a case that those organisations that implement and 
entrench mindful behaviours into their consciousness would stand better chances of 
enhanced reliability. It adopts a pragmatist philosophy, combining the positivism of the 
objective ontological assumptions with the interpretivism of the subjective ontological 
assumptions to collect and analyse data. It does this because of the multidisciplinary 
epistemological background of the research, which would require objective and 
subjective facts to be valid. The objective facts would offer more credibility, would be 
less open to bias, and would easily be verifiable and replicable. The subjective data on 
the other hand would be necessary to incorporate a rich and complex view of 
organisational realities. It would also account for the differences in individual contexts 
and experiences of the members of the organisation and its members, and would 
therefore be better equipped to explore the social realties surrounding these social 
actors.  
 
The research adopts questionnaires as its strategy for obtaining quantitative data. It does 
so with the assumption that questionnaires are best suited to answer exploratory 
questions as proposed by the research:  
 To what extent can the reliability of organisations be measured? 
 Can these measurements help diverse organisations become more mature? 
The research also assumed that questionnaires would offer the best cost effective and 
least logically burdensome strategy to adopt in its attempt to administer to over 500 
proposed respondents across different locations. Finally, the research utilized the 
narrative inquiry of in-depth interviews as its research strategy to obtain qualitative 
data. This is with the view to obtaining, complementary data about the underling details 
behind the objective data. These details would include the experiences, value systems, 
and biases of the respondents, as well as details of the deeper realities linked with social 
relationships that define the organisational behaviours.  
 
The research studied eight organisations in three industries, and across two continents 
between July 2016 and January 2017, using the same research methods. It started with a 
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pilot study to test the proposed data collection methods. The pilot study was done 
through purposive sampling, and the respondents were demographically stratified to 
reflect the expected demographic composition of the expected research sample 
population.  
 
The industries were also purposely selected due to their potential for catastrophic 
failures, as well as their being different from the available research into high reliability 
organisations. The organisations were selected to contrast with each other. The selection 
was based on size, age, organisational spread. For a large organisation selected, a 
smaller one was identified and included; and for a multinational organisation selected, 
an organisation with a localized spread will be selected and included. The aim of this 
was to generate a data set that would show the diversity of the expected behaviours and 
hopefully help to answer the research questions and address the research objectives.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.7 Expected results and Research Limitations 
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The research obtained data from 441 respondents from different and contrasting 
organisations. It started out with the expectation that 10% to 20% of the respondents 
would be within the management function; 20% to 40% would be within the 
supervisory function, and 40% to 60% would be frontline staff. This is in line with the 
conventional wisdom of employee – supervisor – manager ratio. The research also 
designed the survey instrument with the expectation of a stratified demographic in terms 
of years of experience in the industry ranging from below 3 years, between 3 to 7 years, 
above 7 years and below 15 years, 15 to 25 years, and above 25 years. This 
demographic distribution is based on a 5 level stratification and assumes that new 
employees in an industry would spend the first 3 years trying to understand the nuances 
within and between the different aspects of the industry. Their experience and 
motivation level is expected to change over their employment life cycle, so will their 
perceptions and attitudes. After 25 years, most employees would be past their mid-
career, as which point, opinions and perceptions would also be different. This 
stratification therefore has been designed to obtain data from people at different career 
levels and with diverse perspectives on the social realities within the organisation. This 
would hopefully provide both depth and balance to the results and the results thereafter. 
In addition to experience, the research also designed the survey instruments with the 
hopes of obtaining data from different gender to add more depth. The research expects 
that different perspectives and biases of the social realities within the organisation could 
be influenced by gender, and therefore made provisions to analyse the responses with 
respect to gender. Finally, the research tried to enhance diversity of respondents and 
depth of results as previously stated by purposively selecting organisations with 
contrasting characteristics. These choices and assumptions together are expected to 
generate a rich and well-balanced data grounded in diversity. This would hopefully 
form the foundation to propose the standardized model and framework to help deepen 
the studies in the high reliability organisation theory, as well as help organisations tend 
improve or sustain their organisational reliability maturity.  
 
The framework and the model developed from the results would be called the 
Framework for Organisational Reliability Maturity (FORM) and the Organisational 
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Reliability Maturity Model (ORM
2
) respectively. The model would map organisations 
into various stages of mindfulness, and identify clear strategies that would help 
organisations progress through the various organisational reliability maturity levels. It is 
hoped that the ORM
2
 would become a proactive framework to help organisations 
sustain and improve their mindfulness, prevent catastrophic events, and remain 
competitive, while providing a platform for diverse organisations outside the traditional 
HROs to learn and adopt the HRO principles. By adopting the strategies outlined in this 
research, diverse organisations, including smaller organisations with simple and 
seemingly less hazardous technologies and processes could operate mindfully and avoid 
certain pitfalls that have led to the demise of many organisations. 
 
The key limitation of this research would be the sample size. It was conducted in only 3 
industries and 8 organisations, and although the research has a high confidence level, it 
cannot claim that these industries and organisations are accurate representation of all 
industries and organisations. In addition, the research would not completely guarantee 
that it could be seamlessly implemented in other industries; neither would it guarantee 
that the results would be a reflection of the results from other industries and 
organisations not yet researched.  
 
Furthermore, the research purposely selected an organisation in Canada within one of 
the 3 industries being researched for triangulation. Although the behaviour expected 
from this organisation was expected to be similar to what was expected from a 
traditional high reliability organisation, it is still not considered a traditional high 
reliability organisation in the sense of previously published works on the HRO theory. 
There is the possibility that the assumptions made about HROs might not work when 
actually tested in a high reliability organisation. These limitations would therefore 
present gaps in this study that could potentially open up opportunities for further 
research.  
 
 
1.8 Structure of Chapters 
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This thesis is laid out in 6 chapters. Chapter 1 has introduced the research. It has 
identified some potential gaps and described the how closing the gaps will expand 
existing knowledge. It outlined the aims and objectives of the research, and outlined 
how the research will contribute to existing knowledge, open up a new area of 
knowledge, as well as help organisations begin to develop mindful behaviour that 
would help improve their organisational reliability maturity. It introduced the research 
methods and methodology and described the expected results and limitations of the 
research. 
 
Chapter 2 will review some relevant literature and describe related concepts. It will 
introduce the concepts of reliability and disasters, and describe some perspectives 
surrounding safety around disasters. It will also introduce the concepts of mindfulness, 
the high reliability theory and maturity models.   
 
Chapter 3 will review the methods of data collection and analysis, as well as describe 
the methodologies behind the methods. Chapter 4 will discuss the results. It will discuss 
the demographic data and its implications on the research. It will also discuss the results 
from the perspectives of the HRO theory, and from the perspectives of the 
organisations.  
 
Chapter 5 will use the results to describe the organisational reliability maturity model 
(ORM
2
) and the framework for organisational reliability maturity (FORM). It will 
assess each organisation based the organisational reliability maturity model (ORM
2
), 
and the framework for organisational reliability maturity. It will compare the 
organisations using the framework, and show how the framework could be used for 
benchmarking. It will finally describe how the organisational reliability maturity model 
(ORM
2
) and the framework for organisational reliability maturity (FORM) could be 
combined to improve organisations.  
 
Chapter 6 will conclude the thesis. It will summarise the proposed organisational 
reliability maturity model (ORM
2
) and the framework for organisational reliability 
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maturity (FORM) and highlight the contributions of this research to the knowledge and 
to organisational improvements. Finally, it will show some limitations of the research 
and highlight some scope for future study. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.9 Chapter Summary 
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This chapter has introduced the research. It highlighted the aim of the research to apply 
the high reliability organisation theory to improve the maturity of organisations. It 
outlined the objectives of the research to include collection of a balanced data set; 
development of a model to map the maturity behaviour of organisations; and 
development of a standardized framework to assess the reliability of organisations. It 
also includes benchmark marking organisations against desired behaviours; predicting 
future maturity levels of organisations; and the development of maturity improvement 
plans for organisations.  
 
In addition, the chapter has described existing research within the subject area, and 
identified some potential gaps within the existing research. The gaps include the lack of 
research that transcends diverse organisations and industries. Most of the research has 
been limited to certain types of organisations, including aviation, military, space, and 
fire departments with nothing to provide a balanced perspective about the HRO theory. 
Furthermore, most research has been carried out in single organisations with no attempt 
at organisational comparisons and benchmarking. In addition, most of the researches 
have been theoretical exercises with no empirical data to back them up. Another gap 
described is the reactive and retrospective nature of most existing research, with no 
research aimed at developing a framework to predict future behaviour of the 
organisations. The final gap lies in the inability of existing research to show how to 
measure organisational reliability, or how organisations can improve or sustain their 
levels of mindfulness. The chapter introduced how the research intends to close these 
gaps, as well as the benefits of closing the gaps.  
 
Furthermore, the chapter introduced the research methods and theoretical framework 
that informed the choice of the each research method. It also described the expected 
results and limitations of the research, the chief of which is the acknowledgement that 
research sample size may not be a true representation of all organisations in all 
industries, and as such the result might not be applicable across all industries and 
organisations despite the research’s high confidence level. Secondly, the research 
acknowledged that although it purposely selected an organisation where the expected 
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behaviour was expected to mirror a high reliability organisation, the result from it could 
potentially be different as it was not a traditional high reliability organisation.  
 
Finally, the chapter reviewed some opportunities for future study, including a possible 
research that could seek to test how applicable the organisational reliability maturity 
model (ORM
2
) and the framework for organisational reliability maturity (FORM) 
would be in traditional high reliability organisations. Such a research would either 
reinforce or dispel the myth of traditional high reliability organisations. In addition to 
high reliability organisations, a future research could also enhance the diversity and 
expand the study further into more industries and organisations with varying degrees of 
complexity, coupling, size, and age. This would help to further validate or debunk the 
standardization claims of this research. 
 
The next chapter will discuss some literature related to this study and explain some 
concepts mentioned in this research. These would include reliability, mindfulness, 
disasters, high reliability organisations and maturity models.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER TWO 
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Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
Chapter one introduced and outlined the background and rationale for the research. It 
identified two research questions: “to what extent can the mindfulness of organisations 
be measured?” and “can these measurements help diverse organisations become more 
mature?” It highlighted the aim and objectives of the research, as well as how each 
objective would help to answer the research questions. The chapter introduced some 
existing literature that supports the application of the high reliability theory to improve 
the maturity of organisations. It identified some gaps and highlighted how the research 
intends to fill the gaps. Chapter two will discuss the literature further and describe how 
they relate to the research, as well as how they will help to answer the research 
questions. 
 
The chapter will begin with existing literature on disasters and what disasters mean with 
respect to the research. It will argue that most disasters are as a result of some actions 
and (or) inactions of individuals and organisations and as such could be avoided 
through series of reliability improving behaviours. It will present some case studies 
about disasters, the reports of which will support this argument and show 
retrospectively that the disasters could have been avoided through the adoption of 
certain behaviour by the people and organisations at the time. 
 
The chapter will discuss the different perspectives about disasters and safety incidents 
and what constitutes the causative factors of incidents. It will show the similarities and 
contrasts between some of these perspectives and indicate which of the perspectives 
support the arguments of this research. Some of these perspectives will include the 
normal accident theory, the man-made disaster model, the energy barrier model, the 
conflicting objectives perspectives, resilient engineering, and the high reliability 
organisations theory.  
 
The chapter will also discuss literature on mindfulness. It will argue on the premise that 
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mindful organisations are learning organisations; and that the more the mindfulness and 
organisational learning culture, the more reliable the organisation, and consequently the 
less the probability of disasters. It will make a case for organisations to design processes 
that would help to create a culture of mindfulness and let that culture become part of 
their organisational genetic composition. 
 
The chapter will furthermore discuss literature about the high reliability organisation 
theory and the different perspectives surrounding the theory. It will thereafter leverage 
on the works of Weick & Sutcliffe (2015), and describe the five principles of high 
reliability organisations. The chapter will end with literatures on maturity models and 
benchmarking. It will argue in favour of the usefulness of maturity models, and attempt 
to show how the maturity models would help in benchmarking and continuous 
organisational improvement. It will discuss the existing maturity models and how the 
maturity models fit into this research. It is hoped that this would set the stage for 
discussions surrounding the methods and methodologies adopted in conducting the 
research.  
 
In this chapter, the words failure, incidents, near misses, accidents, and disasters would 
be used very often, and their definitions may vary in various contexts. For better clarity, 
it would therefore be appropriate to start with their definitions in the context of their use 
in this study.  The next section shall define these terms 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.2 Definition of Terms 
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This section defines the key terms used in this research and the context in which they 
are used.  
 
2.2.1 Failure 
The British Standard (BS EN 13306:2010) defines a failure as the “termination of the 
ability of an item to perform a required function” It is the loss of a function under 
earlier defined conditions. Reason (2016) characterised failures as active and latent. 
Active failures are the losses of functions resulting from the actions or inactions of the 
responsible people with direct impact on processes, systems, or organisations. This 
could be in the form of slips, lapses, mistakes, errors, or violations by the responsible 
people in diverse job types. Job types could range from as pilots, manufacturing 
industry field operators, air traffic controllers, military, police officers, insurance 
brokers, safety supervisors, engineers, financial traders, maintenance personnel, and so 
many other types of personnel across diverse industries.  
 
As shall be seen throughout this thesis, active failures, as characterised by Reason 
(2016), are not root causes, but merely consequences and symptoms. Latent failures on 
the hand define the root causes. They stem from lapses in organisational mindfulness as 
shall be discussed further in section 2.3. These could be in terms of inadequate 
procedure, gaps in communication, inadequate training, gaps in supervision, inadequate 
employee motivation, and inadequate tools and materials.  They often arise from 
organisational decisions (or lack of), and may remain unnoticed for long periods until 
local factors and/or active failures combines with the latent conditions to cause a 
significant observable failure. Every aspect of a system or organisation has its failure 
mode(s): the way(s) the failure(s) could potential occur.  
 
A failure mode and effect analysis FMEA (Labib, 2014) is a step-by-step approach for 
identifying all possible failure modes and the potential consequences of each failure 
mode. This is often combined with a criticality analysis to prioritize the severity of the 
consequences, their frequencies, and ease of detection. When combined, it is called a 
failure mode effect and criticality analysis FMECA. The focus of these analyses is to 
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reduce failures to as low as reasonably practicable, starting with the potential failures 
with the highest priority in terms of severity, probability of occurrence and ease of 
detection. In some cases, the focus will not be to reduce or prevent failures, but to 
assure that potentials failures would not disrupt the process. This mind-set presupposes 
that failures could occur despite all best intentions to prevent it. The focus therefore 
centres on initiatives to ensure the potential failure do not lead to process failure, 
organisational failure, or catastrophe. This later mind-set forms the basis for reliability 
centred maintenance.  
 
2.2.2 Incidents and Near Misses 
The British Standard (BS 11200: 2014) defines an incident as “an adverse event that 
might cause disruption, loss or emergency, but which does not meet the organisation’s 
criteria for, or definition of, a crisis”. An incident therefore is an unexpected, 
undesired, and retrospectively avoidable event that causes, or has the potential to cause 
interruption of processes or tasks; injury, illness or fatality to a person or people; 
physical or virtual asset damage; environmental pollution; or negative financial or 
reputational impact. The key here is retrospective prevention: if all appropriate actions 
that led to the incident were taken, the incident might not have happened. Where the 
incidents lead to negative consequences, those consequences are referred to in this 
research as top events. This is in contrast with an accident, which presupposes that in 
retrospect, the event could still have happened despite the human or organisational 
actions to prevent the occurrence.  
 
A near miss on the other hand is an incident that did not result in any top event. The 
Institution of Engineering and Technology glossary of safety terminology (IET 2017) 
defines a near miss as “an incident, which did not show a visible result, but had the 
potential to do so”. The focus on near misses is the potential to result in a top event. It 
is sometimes referred to as a close call or near hit. As will be show in section 3.7.3: 
assessing preoccupation with failure, research has shown a relationship between near 
misses and actual top events. Frank Bird (Morrish, 2017) demonstrated from a study of 
more than one million incidents, that every incident that involves asset damage is 
24 
 
usually preceded by about twenty near misses. His research also shows that for every 
one serious injury or fatality, there would have been about ten minor injuries, 30 asset 
damage, and 600 near misses. This is described in more details in section 3.7.3. Near 
misses therefore are early warning signs about the state of processes, systems, or 
organisations.  
 
The UK Airprox Board (Airproxboard, 2017) collects near miss data from all flights 
within the UK airspace. Near miss in their instance is a situation in which, in the 
opinion of the pilot or air traffic services personnel, the safety of the aircraft, in terms of 
distance, speed, and relative position, may have been compromised, but with no obvious 
harm to the aircraft, passengers, or crew. Their 2015 showed that 217 near misses with 
49% of them categorized as Risk category A and B. The risk categories range from A to 
E with A being the most severe near miss and E the least severe. Category A near 
misses are the serious incidents where serious risk of collision existed, and where 
collision avoidance was only left to chance. Categories B near misses are the major 
incidents where serious risk of collision existed, and where collision avoidance was as a 
result of a last minute but timely intervention. Category C near misses are significant 
incidents where there were no risks of collision due to early effective and timely 
actions. Categories D and E are the least serious incidents. The near misses are often the 
risk of collision with flying objects such as balloons, drones, and birds. The 
organisation mindfully records and analyses all these near misses with the view to 
understanding the pattern and preventing collisions. Their ten year report below 
indicates an increasing number of near misses in the last few years, the investigation of 
which showed the increase was as a result of increasing drone activities. 6 near misses 
in 2014 were as a result of drone activities, against 29 of such in 2015, all of which 
were either category A or category B. This report, in conjunction with other similar 
reports, has led to the establishment of the CAA Skyway Code (CAA, 2017) that 
regulates the use of airspace. Recording and analysing near misses are therefore key to 
disaster prevention and management, and organisational improvement.   
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Table 2.1 – 10-Year Airprox notifications and risk assessment statistics showing the 
near misses recorded over the last 10 years. Adapted from Airproxboard.org.uk 
 
 
In summary, consider a slippery stair at home resulting from a water tap that was 
mistakenly left running. The owner rushes in to quickly pick up something, routinely 
assuming to know every inch of the house, takes the stairs 2 steps at time, slips and 
falls, with severe injuries. This event is an incident, and the severe injury is the top 
event. Suppose the owner, just before falling, grabs the rails; or just before taking the 
flight of stairs gets a phone call and stops. This becomes a near miss as the potential for 
a top event was there.  
 
2.2.3 Emergency, Crisis and Disaster 
The words emergency, crisis, and disasters are often interchangeably misused and their 
meanings as used in this research are therefore highlighted here. Borodzicz (2005) 
defined emergencies as “situations requiring a rapid and highly structured response 
where the risks for critical decision makers can, to a relative degree, be defined”. 
Emergencies are basic potentially disruptive events that individuals or organisations 
could plan for and provide known and predefined responses to minimize or prevent 
injuries, fatalities, asset damage, financial loss or reputational loss. If emergences are 
not well managed, they could result in crises. A  crisis on the other hand is a “global, 
regional or local natural or human-caused event or business interruption that runs the 
risk of intensifying or causing damage to an organisation not only financially but also 
with its reputation”(ASIS, 2005). This definition is closely related to the British 
Standard’s (BS 11200: 2014) definition of crisis as “abnormal and unstable situation 
that threatens the organisation’s strategic objectives, reputation or viability” It is 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
10-year 
Average
Category A 15 9 13 11 12 23 18 22 28 41 19
Category B 40 39 38 36 33 36 27 43 68 66 43
Category C 103 106 100 97 116 88 97 72 86 78 94
Category D 1 0 4 3 6 2 5 9 9 12 6
Category E 12 14 26 33 20 21
Annual Totals 159 154 155 147 167 161 161 172 224 217 217
Risk Bearing 35% 31% 33% 32% 27% 37% 28% 38% 43% 49% 36%
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worthy to note at this point that both definitions refer to a crisis as a threat to the 
organisation. If this threat is not managed correctly, it could easily become a disaster.  
 
A disaster is an event, both retrospectively preventable or not, that “inflicts widespread 
destruction and distress” (Labib, 2014). They are sudden unforeseen events with 
natural, technological, or social causes that lead to destruction, loss and damage (Al-
Dahash et al, 2016). It is usually a resultant effect of a poorly handled emergency or 
crisis. Labib & Read (2015) considered disasters as black swans with the distinct 
attributes of rarity, extreme impact, and retrospective predictability. Taleb (2010) had 
defined a black swan as an event that lies outside the realm of normal expectations, but 
carries extreme impact when it does occur. Disasters could be natural or man-made, and 
the occurrence, like a black swan, would always lead to a scramble for retrospective 
explanations with the outcome that the event could seem predictable. This research runs 
on a common theme that disasters could be prevented, or its effects minimized through 
the mindfulness behaviours of organisations. As would be shown in later sections, even 
natural disasters are actually “man-made” disasters and could therefore be prevented or 
its effects minimized through acts of organisational mindfulness. The next section shall 
discus the principle of mindfulness and its context as it applies to this research.  
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2.3 Principle of Mindfulness 
The principle of mindfulness progressed from Buddhism, an Eastern religion that 
suggests means of enhancing attentional stability and clarity, and of then using these 
abilities in the introspective examination of conscious states to pursue the fundamental 
issues concerning consciousness itself (Weick & Putnam, 2006). To the practitioners of 
Buddhism, mindfulness is built on the foundations of introspective awareness of the 
body, feelings, consciousness, and mental objects and focuses on mental discipline. It 
means having the ability to focus; to hang onto current objects; remember them; and not 
lose sight of them through distraction, wandering attention, associative thinking, 
explaining away or rejection (Weick & Putnam, 2006).   
 
Mindfulness becomes fully developed when the three qualities of “impermanence”, 
“unsatisfactoriness”, and “selflessness” becomes an ongoing awareness. Impermanence 
refers to the feeling that things are changing or slowly dissolving, especially when 
concepts related with positive mental fabrications have been accepted, concepts 
associated with negative feeling tones rejected and concepts associated with neutral 
feelings ignored. When people become attached to impermanent things, negative 
changes to those things would lead to unsatisfactoriness: a sense of fearfulness leading 
to suffering (Weick & Putnam, 2006). Selflessness on the other hand refers to the 
nonexistence of an unchanging self: a gap between reality and the individual awareness 
of that reality. 
 
Recent researchers consider the Buddhist perspective on mindfulness as being negative: 
a focus that Langer (2000) referred to as being on mindlessness rather than on 
mindfulness. To her, mindfulness should be studied from the perspective of a flexible 
state of mind in which people are actively engaged in the present, noticing new things, 
and being sensitive to the context of things. People do not act mindfully when they rely 
on past categories and get fixated on long held perspectives irrespective of the changes 
taking place around them. She advocates stirring the cognitive pot instead of engaging 
in a quiet meditation. The resultant disruptions would induce some moments of concept 
free mindfulness. People would become more sensitive to their environments, become 
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more open to new information, create new categories for structuring perception, and 
there would be an enhanced awareness of multiple perspectives in problem solving 
(Weick & Putnam, 2006). Taylor & Millear (2016), citing Brown & Ryan (2003), 
described mindful individuals as individuals that perceive their internal thoughts and 
external sensations without attempting to avoid them, or mentally labelling them as 
‘good’ or ‘bad’.  It is a particular state of consciousness, one in which the individual 
focuses on present moment events (Sutcliffe et al, 2016). The individual understands the 
present moment events and their implications and interrelationships with other events 
around.  Langer (2014) expands this further  by defining mindfulness as “an active state 
of mind characterized by novel distinction drawing that results in being (1) situated in 
the present, (2) sensitive to context and perspectives, (3) guided (but not governed) by 
rules and routines”. Sutcliffe et al (2016) calls this collective mindfulness or 
organisational mindfulness. 
 
Mindfulness within the organisational context refers to the ability of an organisation to 
be aware of and to understand the context of the current situational realities, the 
relationships between current realities and expected objectives, and is able to act 
collectively in ways that safeguards and enhances its long term goals. Weick & Sutcliffe 
(2007) described mindfulness as a rich awareness of discriminatory detail – a big 
picture view that is situationally aware, continuously scrutinizing, differentiating and 
refining expectations based on newer experiences. To them, mindful organisations are 
consistently concerned about the quality of their attention, and are conscious of the 
potential vulnerability to error occasioned by distracted and unstable attention, 
dominated by abstractions.  
 
Organisational mindfulness is concerned with a focus on a ‘clear and detailed 
comprehension of emerging threats, and on factors that interfere with such 
comprehension’ (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007). It results in early failure detection, and 
avoids the fallacy of hasty generalization and oversimplification. Mindfulness ensures 
everyone works collectively with a common purpose, and with clear communication 
among staff and between staff and management. It ensures everyone is aware of 
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operational requirements and is collectively committed to early detection and cascade of 
symptoms of failure. Should a failure occur, a mindful organisation works collectively 
to recover from it and progress to the next stage of its evolution. The principle of 
mindfulness is therefore the key to keeping the organisation focussed on what really 
matters based on current situational realities, and it prevents the ‘mind’ of the 
organisation from ‘wandering off’. It is the key to preventing catastrophic accidents and 
helping organisations to remain resilient should disasters occur. Organisational 
mindfulness comprises of five interrelated behaviours at multiple organisational levels. 
These are preoccupation with failure, reluctance to simplify, sensitivity to operations, 
commitment to resilience, and deference to expertise (Sutcliffe et al., 2016; Weick & 
Sutcliffe 2001, 2007, 2015; Weick et al., 1999). The first three deal with the ability of 
organisations to avoid failures, while the last two deal with the ability of the 
organisation to withstand the negative effects of failure when they occur. Preoccupation 
with failure is an active consideration and ongoing wariness of the potential for failure 
(Sutcliffe et al., 2016). Reluctance to simplify questions received wisdoms and 
assumptions and encourages scepticism avoid oversimplification and uncover blind 
spots. Sensitivity to operations is an active consideration of current operating 
parameters and indications and the integrated understanding of their relationships with 
interconnected processes. A commitment to resilience involves developing the 
organisational capacity to adapt, improvise and recover from unexpected events, and be 
able to learn from the experience. Finally deference to expertise occurs when the most 
experienced people are empowered to take decision and solve problems irrespective of 
hierarchical positions within the organisation (Weick & Sutcliffe 2001, 2007, 2015).  
 
Awareness of the moment means that organisations with mindfulness continuously 
learn from themselves and from others. A mindful organisation is a learning 
organisation. The next section shall discus organisational learning in the context of this 
research and shall highlight its relationship with organisational mindfulness. 
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2.4 Principle of Organisational Learning 
Learning is the process of acquiring new or modifying existing knowledge, behaviours, 
skills, values, or preferences (Gross, 2015). Research into organisational learning has 
evolved over the years and a general consensus on a concise definition been difficult to 
achieve, primarily due to the multidisciplinary nature of organisational learning (Saadat 
& Saadat, 2016). Marquardt (2011) and Crossan et al (1999) studied organisational 
learning from the perspective of organisational continuous improvement. Mayo (1994) 
viewed organisational learning from the perspective of the methods, mechanisms and 
processes used by organisations to achieve learning. Argyris (1977) and Alvani (2008) 
viewed organisational learning as the process of discovering and correcting errors and 
mistakes. In all these perspectives, one concept was common: the that applying the 
process of creating or acquiring new or modifying existing knowledge, behaviours, 
skills, values, or preferences; retaining the knowledge; and transferring the knowledge 
among the components of an organisation; forms the background of organisational 
learning.   
 
An organisation could learn from itself, from others, or a combination of both. It occurs 
at different levels of an organisation: organisational, sectional, group and individual 
levels (Saadat & Saadat, 2016). Marquardt (2002) grouped organisational learning into 
adaptive, forward looking, and practical learning. Adaptive learning happens when an 
individual, a group or an organisation learns through experience and evaluation of 
previous experiences. Forward looking learning occurs when the organisation learns 
through the identification of prospective future opportunities and explores ways to 
achieve them. Practical learning consists on working on real issues and actual 
performance of solutions (Saadat & Saadat, 2016). Dawes (2003) classified 
organisational learning in terms of hereditary learning, experimental learning, and 
vicarious learning. To him, hereditary learning is handed down by the founders of the 
organisation, while experimental learning is obtained through first-hand experience of 
the organisation and the social actors within the organisation. Vicarious learning on the 
hand is obtained through the second-hand experience of others in the organisation or 
outside the organisation, but has been adopted for learning.  
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Argyris and Schon (Lukic et al, 2012) studied organisational learning from the 
perspective of behavioural psychology and organisational development. They described 
learning as comprising of two modes: the single-loop learning and the double-loop 
learning. In single-loop learning, the organisation corrects a mistake by adopting a 
different strategy or method that is expected to yield a different result to achieve the set 
goal. The organisation would reflect on the mistake and develop learning from mistake 
that would recommend different sets of actions to achieve the same goal. This often 
considered a “quick fix” approach. The double-loop approach on the other hand 
considers the process of rethinking the initial goal to change the organisational factors 
and that often cause incidents. It is based on open inquiry into deep rooted causes, 
system failures and organisational values, and questions the underlying assumptions of 
organisational work (Lukic et al, 2012). In single-loop organisational learning, the 
organisation identifies a mistake, analyses the mistake, takes corrections and proceeds 
with existing goals and policies. In double-loop organisational learning, the organisation 
identifies a mistake, analyses the mistake, analyses its goals and policies, and changes 
the goals and policies before implementing corrective actions.  
 
As the organisation continues to perform improvement actions it accumulates 
experience which becomes embedded within the organisation. These experiences 
become the repositories for organisational learning. These repositories could be in the 
form of explicit or tacit knowledge (Virtanen, 2015). Explicit knowledge includes the 
processes, procedures, standards, and instructions that the organisations would develop 
and enforce. It is declarative, factual and relatively easy to transfer through written 
verbal or codified media. Tacit knowledge on the other hand is not easily documented, 
and as such is not shared simply through verbal and written communication modes. It 
includes the behaviours learned through experience over time. It is mostly achieved 
through on-the-job learning, coaching, and continuous practice. Lukic et al (2012) 
further classified knowledge into four: conceptual, procedural, dispositional, and 
locomotive. To them, conceptual knowledge is concerned with the knowledge of the 
“facts, concepts, information and propositions”; as well as the knowledge of what things 
are, and why things operate the way they do. Procedural knowledge on the other hand is 
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concerned with the knowledge of “how”: the techniques and skills that enable the 
development of conceptual knowledge. Locomotive knowledge helps identify the 
locations and sources of relevant knowledge. This is acquired through networking, 
interactions, and trainings. Finally dispositional knowledge consists of attitudes, values, 
emotions, interests and personal motivations that support the development of all the 
other knowledge types. These are the mindfulness behaviours that drive the 
organisation.  
 
Mindfulness is a key component of organisational learning. As stated earlier, 
mindfulness requires a “clear and detailed comprehension of emerging threats and on 
factors that interfere with such comprehension’ (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007). It also 
requires the ability the organisation to be resilient and react to unexpected threats and 
changes. For this rapid response to happen, then a degree of deliberative computation 
must be taking place. In reality, no classical cognitive process of representation or 
deliberative calculation is taking place. Levinthal & Rerup (2006) suggests the response 
to be as a result of one or a combination of an existing repertoire of initiatives available 
to the organisation, and a possible recombination of existing routines. The actors within 
the organisations are able to choose or combine solution from an inventory of 
established routines. The inventory of established routines must first be developed in 
form of explicit or tacit knowledge. A ball player instinctively and instantaneously uses 
a variety of skills within his repertoire to perform on the field, either when defending, 
attacking, or just entertaining. These mindfulness behaviours must first be developed 
and are indeed developed over the years. He reads instruction manuals and watches 
instructional materials (explicit knowledge). He also listens to coaches, learns from 
team mates and continuously practices (tacit knowledge). All these together help to 
build the repertoire of skills he would require to perform mindfully at top level on the 
field.  In a similar manner, organisational mindfulness would require a combination 
explicit and tacit knowledge to build the repertoire of initiatives required by the 
organisation to be aware of and to understand the context of its current situational 
realities, and act to safeguards and enhances its long term goals. A mindful organisation 
therefore has organisational learning embedded at its core. In organising for 
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mindfulness, the organisation would utilize existing prototypes from its repertoire as 
foundations to develop new processes, procedures and solutions to current problems. 
The organisation recognises patterns and dips from its repertoire of existing knowledge 
to link the patterns with possible sets of solutions. According to Levinthal & Rerup 
(2006), mindfulness in action is local and situated and involves spontaneous 
recombination of knowledge from existing organisational repertoires. It is therefore safe 
to say that a mindful organisation is a learning organisation.  
 
Mindful organisations learn from their successes, as well as from their failures. 
According to the attribution theory (Ross & Nisbett, 1991; Gilbert & Malone, 1995), 
there is always the tendency to neglect the roles of the actions of internal forces in 
failures, and instead attribute the failures to external factors; while attributing the 
successes to the internal forces. Mindful organisations understand the negative impact 
of attribution on incidents and therefore take proactive steps to achieve learning root 
cause analyses of successes and failures. They not only learn from their own 
experiences, but also from the incidents and experiences of others (Huber, 1991; Kim & 
Miner, 2007). According to the behavioural theory of the firm, organisations learn 
differently from successes and failures. A failure is often perceived as an indication of a 
flawed process and an incorrectness or inappropriateness of existing assumptions 
(Sitkin, 1992). The organisation therefore mostly begins a number of learning from 
failure or learning from incident initiatives.  
 
Effective learning from incidents is critical to safety (Lukic et al, 2012) as it allows the 
knowledge to be applied and embedded in work environments to prevent future 
incidents (Littlejohn et al, 2017). This research hopes to help organisations tend towards 
more mindfulness. This means they will become more aware of their current realities 
and inter-dependencies between their current realities and the situations around them. It 
also means that they will begin to create knowledge and utilize the knowledge towards 
organisational learning; they will begin to adopt learning from successes and learning 
from incidents strategies.   
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It is one thing to create knowledge, and another to retain the knowledge. An 
organisation could easily jump from organisational learning to organisational forgetting 
through a succession of unchecked behaviours. Knowledge retention could be achieved 
through the use of people as repositories. As people gain experience and improve their 
mindfulness behaviours, they are expected to transfer the knowledge. This potentially 
poses some challenges as the viability of people as repositories is highly limited. 
Attrition, layoff, retirements, ineffective motivation, and individual inability to transfer 
knowledge could potentially increase the vulnerability of organisations to knowledge 
retention. Organising for mindfulness therefore considers the knowledge creation, 
retention and utilisation holistically through its preoccupation with failure, reluctance to 
simplify, sensitivity to operations, commitment to resilience, and deference to expertise. 
These mindfulness behaviours form the foundation for the high reliability organisation 
theory that has helped organisations develop and sustain high performances in 
reliability and safety. This shall be discussed further in the next section, but to 
understand this concept, and why this concept is important to this research, the next 
section shall begin with the description of the different perspectives on incident 
causation. It will thereafter describe the high reliability organisation theory and as well 
as justify why this theory was selected above others for this research. 
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2.5       Perspectives on Safety Incidents and Causative Factors 
2.5.1 Introduction 
Over the years, researchers have tried to identify the causative factors of incidents and 
disasters with a view to preventing catastrophes, saving lives, preserving assets, 
organisations, and the environment. Different researchers have arrived at different 
conclusions and propounded different theories, with different perspectives on the causes 
and prevention of these incidents. Some of the perspectives have included the normal 
accident theory, the black swan theory, inherent safety, defence-in-depth model, the 
high reliability organisation theory, the man-made disaster model, energy barrier 
models, the conflicting objectives theory, and resilient engineering. Some of these will 
be discussed below. The aim is that by understanding causative factors, this research 
could identify commonalities that would guide it towards the development of a 
reliability improvement framework. 
 
2.5.2 Normal Accident Theory 
Perrow (1984) proposed the Normal Accident Theory, which presupposes the 
inevitability of accidents in complex organisations where high risk technologies are 
deployed. He proposed this theory following the Three Mile Island accident of 1979 in 
Pennsylvania, where a nuclear power plant had a meltdown (Saleh et al, 2010; 2012). 
He argued that no matter how well a system is managed, accidents are inevitable, as 
long as the system is characterised by complexity and tight coupling. Whereas coupling 
refers to the degree of interdependence among the components of a system such as the 
people, materials, equipment, procedures, for example in highly automated systems; 
complexity on the other hand refers to the degree of unpredictability and invincibility of 
the interactions between the components of the system.  Since the systems are coupled, 
he argued, a failure in one part is quickly translated to other parts, creating an avalanche 
reaction that could lead to catastrophe. To him, the Three Mile Island incident was 
“unexpected, incomprehensible, uncontrollable, and unavoidable: such accidents had 
occurred before in nuclear plants, and would occur again, regardless of how well they 
are run” (Saleh et al, 2010; 2012). 
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Most researchers consider this theory as defeatist and pessimistic as it does not give 
room for continuous improvement (Saleh et al, 2010; Kim et al, 2016).  Perrow agreed 
in another work (1994) that personnel negligence and incompetence is a major causative 
factor of major accidents, but argued that these human incompetence and negligence 
should be expected given pressures imposed on the system directly or indirectly by the 
management, production, and market forces. This theory appears defeatist and does not 
identify how to prevent accidents in complex systems, which can only get more 
complex given the rapidity of today’s technological advancement. In his review of 
petrochemical accidents, Perrow seemed to gradually veer away from the normal 
accident theory by asserting that organisational ineptitude, inadequate skill levels, 
inability to get expert advice, inadequate supervision, and strong production pressures 
were the major causes of industrial accidents (Perrow, 1994; Hopkins, 2014)  
 
Perrow’s perspectives may have been heavily influenced by his background in 
Sociology as he tried to shift the blames away from the operators, who were mostly 
blamed for most industrial incidents. It showed gross oversimplification or lack of 
understanding of engineering and technological processes and operations. Its critics 
leverage on its pessimism and its lack of contributions to stakeholder decisions in 
design and operation of processes.  The next perspective, the Turner’s made-made 
disaster model, also takes a sociological perspective, but veers away from the 
inevitability of these events.  
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2.5.3 Turner’s Man-made Disaster Model 
Turner’s man-made disaster model (Turner, 1978; Turner, 1994; Turner & Pidgeon, 
1997; Pidgeon & O’Leary, 2000; Rousness et al, 2010; Kim et al, 2016) argues that 
disasters and major incidents are results of series of actions and inactions of individuals 
and organisations. It proposes that disasters would always develop through a long chain 
of events that leads back to root causes such as lack of information flow and 
misperception among individuals.  Turner’s man-made disaster model traces typical 
catastrophic events back to initial beliefs and norms that run contrary to existing 
regulations. This would normally happen over time – “the incubation period” – a period 
where these discrepancies would quietly develop and accumulate. Actions taken within 
this period may lead to a “decoy phenomena” (Turner 1978), a condition where the 
perceived solution to the perceived problem would retrospectively be found to have 
distracted attention from the real causative factors.  
 
Turner (1987) described six stages that he believed disasters progress through. It starts 
with the “notionally normal starting point”, a stage characterized by culturally accepted 
beliefs about the world and hazards, as well as precautionary norms in laws, codes of 
practice, or traditional folkways. The second stage is the “incubation period”, a period 
characterized by the accumulation of unnoticed events that contradicts the notionally 
normal starting points. The third stage is the “precipitating event”, a period where the 
general perceptions are transformed, and the norms, cultures, and beliefs are disrupted. 
The fourth stage is the “onset”, a stage in which the consequences become obvious. The 
fifth stage is the “rescue and salvage”, a stage characterized by people scrambling to 
deal with the immediate problems. The final stage is the “full cultural readjustment”, a 
stage characterized by investigations and lessons learned. Here, the beliefs and cultures 
are adjusted in line with the lessons learned from the incident.  
 
The man-made disaster model asserts that in every industrial incident, there would 
always be some level of culpability by someone within the organisation, who has some 
knowledge of the hazardous circumstances leading to that disaster, but fails to take 
action; or whose action would be ignored by the organisation leading to the disasters. 
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Such errors could either be of Type 1 or Type 2. Type 1 errors occur when the 
personnel or the organisation rejects the correct interpretation of the events, cues or 
triggers leading to the disaster; while type 2 errors occur when the individual or 
organisation accepts a false interpretation of those events, cues, or triggers. In both 
cases, there is a misrepresentation of the facts. In some cases, there could be a correct 
representation and interpretation of the events, cues, or triggers, but the response 
required to mitigate the problem could be faulty. Additionally, the disaster could be as a 
result of type 3 errors, where the strategies designed to reduce the risk actually 
exacerbates it. In all cases, according to Turner’s model, the incidents would be a 
resultant effect of the actions or inactions of individuals and organisations.  
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2.5.4 Inherently Safer Design Model 
Most conventional safety systems enhance safety by reducing potential hazards through 
the use of additional safety features. These additional safety features mostly provide 
additional safety layers to limit the interactions between the hazard and the people, 
organisation, environment, and assets (see section 2.5.6). Risk reduction in conventional 
safety systems is achieved by the reduction of the potential likelihood of incident 
occurrence, or by the reduction of the magnitude of impact. Bollinger et al (1996) and 
Hendershot (1998) described four strategies aimed at risk reduction: inherent, passive, 
active, and procedural strategies. According to Khan & Amyotte (2003) inherent 
strategies involve the use of less hazardous materials and process conditions, while 
passive strategies involve the reduction of either incident frequencies or consequences 
without the active functioning of devices. Active strategies on the other hand involve 
the use of engineered features such as controls, and shutdown systems to detect, control 
or mitigate potentially hazardous conditions. Procedural strategies use management and 
administrative approaches to prevent incidents or minimize their effects.   
 
Inherently safer design methods leverage on the inherent strategies to develop designs 
that model the properties of the system or process, rather than the timely operation or 
intervention of the devices or people tasked with the responsibility. The model works on 
the premise that the conventional safety techniques cannot reduce or eliminate the 
conditions that creates the hazards (Pasha et al, 2017; Khan & Amyotte, 2003). The 
inherently safer design therefore concentrates effort to reduce or eliminate the hazard. 
According to the concept originator Trevor Kletz (1978), “what you don’t have, can’t 
leak”, which translates that if the hazards are not there in the first instance, there will be 
no need to deploy additional safety layers to control them or mitigate their effects.  
Inherently safer designs therefore avoid hazards instead of controlling them; they are 
inherently “safer”, not inherently “safe” as the hazards may not be realistically 
completely removed (Kletz & Amyotte, 2010).  
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Hendershoot (1999) and Khan & Amyotte (2003) summarized the basic principles 
behind the inherently safer design model in four basic building blocks. These are to 
minimize, to substitute, to moderate, and to simplify. 
 
Minimize: This principle involves the reduction of the amounts of hazardous conditions 
or materials present at any given time. This could be through inventory reduction, 
increased efficiency of processes and process equipment, and reduced or reused process 
bye products 
 
Substitute: This involves the replacement of materials, processes, and systems with less 
hazardous ones. For instance, flammable solvents used as cleaning agents could be 
replaced with water based and less hazardous cleaning agents. 
 
Moderate: Kletz (1978) had originally used the term intensification to describe this 
principle. It involves the reduction in the strength of an effect through the use of less 
hazardous conditions or less hazardous forms of a material. It could also be through the 
use of facilities that minimize the impact of a release of hazardous conditions or 
materials. An example would be the use of cold liquid in place of pressurized gas in a 
manufacturing process. Other examples are the use of diluted solutions in place of more 
concentrated ones; and the refrigeration of volatile hazardous substances.   
 
Simplify: Kletz (1978) had used the term attenuation to describe this principle. It 
involves the elimination of potential safety issues through design instead of dealing with 
the issues through the addition of additional equipment or features. The design is such 
that unnecessary complexity is eliminated, making operating errors less likely.  
 
Inherent safety has been described as common sense design (Edwards, 2005). In simple 
terms, bungalows are inherently safer than two-storey buildings due to the absence of 
stairs, considered a major hazard in homes. The stairs are made safer by the addition of 
extra safety features such as handrails, less slippery surfaces, and lighting. Designing a 
home without stairs therefore makes the home inherently safer.  
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2.5.5 Defence-in-depth Model 
The target of the defence in depth safety model is to protect both the workers and the 
public from the consequences of process failures. It is used widely in the nuclear 
industry. In nuclear power plants, “all safety activities, whether organisational, 
behavioural, or equipment related are subject to layers of overlapping provisions, so 
that if a failure should occur it would be compensated for or corrected without causing 
harm to individuals or the public at large. This idea of multiple levels of protection is 
the central feature of defence in depth..." (INSAG-10, 1996). Defence in depth in its 
simplest form involves the design and implementation of multiple safety barriers: 
technical, procedural, and organisational; with the objective to prevent incidents, or 
block the incident sequences from escalating, or to mitigate the adverse effects of the 
incidents should the first two barriers fail (Favaro & Saleh, 2014).    
 
Different organisations deploy different levels of barriers to suit their process. The 
International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group (INSAG-10) generally structured defence 
in depth in five hierarchical levels of deployment such that one level activates as soon 
as the preceding barrier level fails. The first level prevents abnormal operations and 
system failures. If the first level fails, the abnormal operation is detected by the second 
level and controlled. Level two seeks to control the abnormal operation and detect 
failures. Its functions include controlling, limiting and surveillance of the systems. The 
third level activates specific safety systems and other safety features to ensure that 
safety functions are further performed and the abnormal operation brought under 
control, in the event of failure of the second level. Should the third level fail, the fourth 
level: an incident management process that seeks to limits the progression of the 
incident is activated. The objective of level four is to control severe plant conditions, 
including the prevention of incident progression and mitigation of the consequences of 
the severe accidents. The fifth and final level is the off-site emergency response process 
that is activated should the fourth level fail. These progression levels are geared towards 
ensuring that the hazardous situations or substances are contained, and does not 
propagate to the workers or to the public.  
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Defence in depth compensates for uncertainties, inadequacies or incompleteness in risk 
analysis and protects the assets, the employees, and the public from hazardous 
consequences of process failures (Favaro & Saleh, 2014).   Despite its obvious 
usefulness in incident prevention and mitigation, defence in depth has been criticized 
for some of its drawbacks (Favaro & Saleh, 2015). The multiple layers of barriers may 
hide from the operator, a potentially hazardous situation that are currently occurring, but 
is being mitigated by one of the levels. The operator might be blindsided with a false 
sense of safety, despite the fact that the level three might have been activated, thereby 
shortening the operator’s intervention or response time. According to Favaro & Saleh 
(2014), “defence-in-depth may create safety blind spots and decrease situational 
awareness, which in turn (could) translate into a shrinking of the time window available 
for operators and decision-makers to identify an unfolding hazardous condition or 
situation and intervene to abate it” 
 
Despite this drawback, highly hazardous industries such as the nuclear industry have 
adopted this model in one form or another. They consistently refine the process as new 
threats are discovered. 
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2.5.6 Energy-Barrier Model 
The energy barrier model seeks to understand the sources of the energies that create 
hazardous conditions within a process; the routes those energy sources can escalate to a 
top event; and the potential means by such escalations could be prevented or mitigated. 
Haddon (1970, 1980) popularized the energy and barrier perspective. He identified 10 
rules to help avoid, control, and mitigate incidents, and grouped them into 3: energy 
source, barrier, and vulnerable target (Table 2.2).  
 
Table 2.2 – Energy and Barrier Model showing the 10 energy barrier rules arranged in 
three groups. Adapted from Haddon (1980) 
 
 
The more to the left the efforts are concentrated, the higher the likelihood of incident 
prevention. The efforts on the right hand side are mostly mitigation factors, or factors to 
protect the target from potential impact.  The barriers are the physical (hardware 
barriers) and non-physical (software barriers) means designed to prevent, control, or 
mitigate incidents. The hardware barriers are the equipment, including humans, while 
the software barriers include the processes, procedures, and routines required to 
implement the barrier functions under specific conditions (Rossness et al 2010). Sklet 
(2006) and Kim et al (2016) further classified barriers into barrier systems or barrier 
functions. According to them, a barrier function is ‘‘a function planned to prevent, 
control, or mitigate undesired events or accidents”, while a barrier system is ‘‘a system 
that has been designed and implemented to perform one or more barrier functions”. 
Taking a functional view is useful as it helps to focus attention on activities that are 
necessary to control or mitigate a specific hazard. It also helps users to consider 
alternative scenarios in case of a failure of the barrier.   
 
Energy Source
Barrier Vulnerable Target
Prevent build-up of energy
Reduce the amount of energy
Prevent uncontrolled release of energyModify rate or distribution of the released 
energy Limit the development of damage
Modify the qualities of the energy Rehabilitate the victims
Separate in space and time, the victims from 
the energy being released
Separate the victims from the energy by 
physical barriers
Make the vulnerable target more resistant to 
damage from the energy flow
44 
 
The energy barrier model could be likened to the tiger in a cage. As long as the cage 
(hardware barrier) is secure, and the safe process of feeding and caring for the tiger 
(software barriers) are adhered to, the tiger (the energy source) will not harm the people 
around (vulnerable target). Optimizing the number and quality of barriers is one method 
to reduce the probability of hazard escalation. In the Swiss cheese model (Reason, 
2016), each barrier is expected to have holes: potential flaws through which the energy 
source might be released. Focus will therefore be on “defence-in-depth”: increasing and 
optimizing the quality and quantity of barriers so that the holes do not align to cause 
catastrophic events.  Figure 2.1 shows the Swiss cheese model with four barriers. Each 
barrier (slice of cheese) has holes, and the holes have aligned to allow the hazard to be 
released.  
 
Figure 2.1 – Swiss cheese model showing the alignment of holes to release the hazard. 
Illustration by Davidmack licensed under CC BY-SA 3.0 
 
The energy-barrier model is exemplified by the bow-tie risk model (Figure 2.2). On the 
left hand side are the preventive barriers that work to ensure the incidents do not occur. 
When the holes align, the incidents will occur as shown in the middle part of the bow 
tie. Latent failures could occur within the barriers but as long as the holes do not align, 
there will be no catastrophic event. A mindful organisation will have a process in place 
to monitor the barriers for latent failures and rectify the failures before or as soon as 
they occur. The right hand side shows the mitigation barriers: recovery barriers put in 
place to mitigate the incident, or to protect the intended targets from the harmful effects 
of the incidents. All the disasters discussed in section 2.6 were either as a result of the 
alignment of holes within the barriers, or the use of inadequate barriers (a hole within 
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the management process itself). Better results would be obtained when the right 
combination of hardware and software barriers are used.  
 
 
Figure 2.2 – Bow-Tie energy risk assessment model showing the prevention barriers, 
the top events, and recovery barriers. 
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2.5.7 Conflicting Objectives Perspective 
With increasing pressure from stakeholders, including business owners, governments, 
regulators, the press, host communities, non-governmental organisations, and so many 
others, individuals and organisations are exposed to conflicting organisational priorities: 
profits, cost savings, production increase, safety, diversity and inclusiveness, 
environmental protection, reputation, and so many others. A production manager in one 
of the researcher’s previous organisation once tried to seek clarifications if his 
organisation was an oil company interested in safety or a safety company interested in 
oil. According to Rasmussen (1994; 1997) and Kim et al (2016), such confusion in 
parallel objectives has the potential to change the boundary of acceptable risk in one of 
the competing objectives, creating a hazardous situation. The Bhopal disaster (Section 
2.6.3) clearly demonstrates the conflicting objectives perspective. Union Carbide 
continued operations despite the attrition rate that depleted their experienced personnel. 
They did not update their designs in line with international industry standards, and 
allowed their safety processes to be downgraded. The authorities were informed of the 
possibility of an incident given the organisation’s operating conditions, but they needed 
to keep people employed, as well as the community and government revenues intact. 
The conflicting objectives were quality, safety, revenue, keeping the jobs, and public 
image. Their choice to keep production despite all warnings and indications to failure 
resulted to the one of the world’s worst industrial disasters.   
 
The conflicting objective perspective is especially pronounced in complex systems 
where many concurrent activities take place. This would be characterized by distributed 
decision making due in part to the incomplete or inaccurate instantaneous knowledge 
about the process by the actors in each concurrent operation; and the interactions 
between the concurrent operations (Rasmussen 1997; Rousness et al, 2010; Kim, 2016). 
Decisions in one concurrent operation may therefore change the boundaries of 
acceptable performance in another operation (Figure 2.3).  
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Figure 2.3 - The Migration Model showing changes in the boundaries of acceptable 
performance. Adapted from Rasmussen, 1994 
 
Organisations develop administrative process such as permit to work system and 
various enterprise resource management processes to combat the effects of distributed 
decision making on conflicting objectives. These could still however fail, as in the case 
of Piper Alpha incident (Section 2.6.6), resulting in catastrophic incidents.  
 
In addition to conflicting objectives based on concurrent operations, levels of decision 
making could result in conflicting objectives. The employee on the shop floor may have 
a different perspective from the manager. The chief financial executive would be 
interested in the return on investment, the production manager on the production 
figures, while the chief safety officer would be in interested in enhancing personal and 
process safety. These objectives would often conflict. Finally, the different stakeholders 
may also have conflicting perspectives. Whereas the business owner maybe interested 
in revenues, the regulators, the government, the host communities, and the investors 
may all have different and often conflicting objectives. The ability to manage these 
conflicting objectives is key in keeping organisations safe from disasters.  
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2.5.8 Resilient Engineering 
The seventh perspective about disasters to be discussed is Resilient Engineering. Foster 
(1993) defined resilience as “an ability to accommodate change without catastrophic 
failure, or a capacity to absorb shocks gracefully”. It suggests elasticity – an ability to 
withstand stress and return to original state. It comes from the Latin word “resilire”, 
meaning “to leap back” and denotes a system property characterized by an ability to 
recover from challenges or disrupting events (Woods, 2006). Resilience is an endowed 
or enriched property of a system that is capable of effectively combating (absorbing, 
adapting to or rapidly recovery from) disruptive events (Francis & Bekera, 2014). The 
concept of resilience is viewed from different perspectives by different disciplines.  
 
Francis & Bekera (2014) discussed the various perspectives of resilience viewed from 
the lens of different subject areas. In infrastructure systems, resilience is viewed as “an 
ability to reduce the magnitude and/or duration of disruptive events”. It is the ability of 
the resilient infrastructure to “anticipate, absorb, adapt to, and/or rapidly recover from 
a potentially disruptive event”, and “return to its original state or an adjusted state 
based on new requirements”. From the perspective of safety management systems, 
resilience is the “ability of an organisation to anticipate, circumvent threats to its 
existence & primary goals and rapidly recover”.  
 
From a social-ecological system, Francis & Bekera (2014) described resilience as the 
ability of the system to maintain its identity in the face of changes and adverse external 
shocks and disturbances. It is a measure of the persistence of the systems and their 
capacity to absorb disturbances and reorganise so as to retain the same functions, 
structure, identity and feedbacks. They had a similar definition for economic systems, 
where they defined resilience as the inherent & adaptive responses to hazards that 
enable individuals and communities to avoid some potential losses. It is ability of the 
economic system to withstand market or environmental shocks while retaining their 
capacity for efficient resource allocations.   
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For social systems, they defined resilience as the “ability of groups or communities to 
cope with external stresses and disturbances as a result of social, political, and 
environmental change” Finally from the perspective of organisational systems, Francis 
& Bekera (2014) defined resilience as the “ability to recognize & adapt to handle 
unanticipated perturbations that call into question the model of competence, and 
demand a shift of process, strategies and coordination”. To them, resilient 
organisations balance between stability and flexibility and adapt themselves in the face 
of uncertainties, without surrendering control to the uncertainties. They recognize 
threats to their organisations and make adjustments that will guard against the threats.  
 
Grabowski & Roberts (2016) described resilience from an organisational perspective, as 
an organisation’s ability to respond or bounce back from untoward, surprising or 
disruptive events, a move toward an adaptive approach to ensuring operational 
continuity during a crisis. It reflects the ability of a system to absorb and recover from 
shocks, while transforming its structures and means for functioning in the face of long-
term stresses, change and uncertainty (Van der Vegt et al., 2015). Hurricane Katrina 
was probably unavoidable given today’s technology, but the impact of the hurricane on 
the city could have been reduced with resilience. Resilience also indicates the city’s 
ability to return to normalcy after the disaster. Resilience therefore is the ability of a 
system, a process, an organisation, or an entity, to adjust and adapt itself before, after, 
or during an expected or unexpected upset, in order to retain its intended functionality.  
 
Woods (2015) considered resilience from four perspectives: rebound, robustness, 
graceful extensibility, and sustained adaptability. The concept of resilience as rebound 
considers the ability of individuals, communities, organisations, or groups to recover 
from traumatic disrupting events better than others to resume normal functionalities that 
existed before the disruption. It considers existing capacities that are present before the 
disruptions, and can be deployed or mobilized to mitigate the effects of the disruptions 
and return the status quo that existed before the disruption. It also considers how the 
disruptive events challenges the models instantiated in the base capabilities of the 
system and triggers learning and model revision. Robustness as a concept of resilience 
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considers the extent to which the system confounds to the worst case scenarios possible 
in the disrupting event. It considers how brittle the system is at its boundaries – its 
ability to withstand to a wide variety disturbances and perturbations outside its 
boundaries, sometimes occasioned by unaccounted changes in scope. Graceful 
extensibility as a concept of resilience considers how the adaptability of a system 
extends or stretches during a disruption. Finally, sustained adaptability as a concept of 
resilience refers to the ability to manage “the adaptive capacities of systems that are 
layered networks, and are also parts of larger layered networks, so as to achieve 
adaptability over longer scales” (Woods, 2015)    
  
The focus of Resilient Engineering is to enhance the ability of organisations to create 
processes that are robust, yet flexible, to monitor and revise risk models, and to use 
resources proactively in the face of disruptions or pressures from conflicting objectives 
(Hollnagel et al, 2008; 2013). It explains the mechanisms of both failures and successes 
in terms of variability and functional resonance, and particularly encourages studies of 
normal operations. (Haavik et al 2016). It assesses changes in the adaptive capacity of 
an organisation as it confronts disruptions, changes, and pressures (Woods; 2006).  
 
Breakdown and normal system malfunctions do not represent failures in resilience 
engineering, but the focus is more on the adapting to the complexities of processes and 
their external relationships. In simpler terms, traditional safety has always focused on 
things that could go wrong as shown in the bottom half of Figure 2.4. Resilient 
Engineering focuses more holistically on both things that could go wrong, and things 
that could go right, perhaps with the exception of the top left hand regions of 
serendipity and good luck that are beyond anybody.  Mishap on the bottom right section 
refers to unwanted outcomes that in practice have been eliminated (Eurocontrol, 2009). 
They occur despite best efforts to prevent them and could be said to be the opposite of 
good luck on the top left section. The argument here is that for a 0.05% probability of 
failure, there is 99.95% probability of a normal outcome, and as such, focus should be 
evenly distributed. This way, things are not only prevented from going wrong, but 
normal outcomes are facilitated. 
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Figure 2.4 – An illustration of Resilient Engineering showing a set of possible outcomes 
Illustration adapted from Eurocontrol (2009) 
 
Resilient Engineering tries to view accident causation from a systemic perspective, in 
which accidents result from the complexity of people’s activities in an organisational 
and technical context. With its holistic perspective, these activities in addition to 
helping to prevent accidents, also helps achieve other goals such as throughput, 
production, efficiency, and cost control (Dekker et al, 2008). Together with the High 
Reliability Organisation Theory (Section 2.5.9), Resilience Engineering has emerged as 
a key concept in safety management due to its perspective that moves away from 
bureaucracy and a means to manage safety without sacrificing performance (Harvey et 
al., 2016).  
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2.5.9 High Reliability Organisations (HRO) Theory  
The HRO theory is the focus of the research and as such, more time will be devoted to 
discussing it than was spent with the seven earlier perspectives discussed. Before 
proceeding, it would be proper to define the term “reliability” with respect to this 
research. Reliability is the probability that a system, process, a product, a person, an 
organisation, or an entity will perform as specified, under the specified conditions, and 
for the specified period of time (Blank, 2004; Stapelberg, 2009). The British Standard 
(BS EN 13306) defines reliability as “a measure of the ability of an item to be in a state 
to perform a required function under given conditions at a given instant of time or 
during a given time interval, assuming that the required external resources are 
provided”.  
 
From these reliability definitions, one can therefore say that reliability from an 
organisational standpoint describes the probability that an organisation will perform the 
functions it was established to perform, or achieve its organisational goals, within its 
defined operating envelops and boundaries, and within the time frame set out to achieve 
those goals.   
 
Research into organisational reliability began in the 1980s at the University of 
California, Berkeley (Weick 1987; Roberts, 1990). Prior to this, research had been 
concentrated on organisations that experienced disasters. Perrow (1984), in his Normal 
Accident Theory, had described the inevitability of accidents in complex organisations 
with high risk technologies. The HRO researchers argued that some other complex 
organisations with high risk technologies have consistently prevented and contained 
catastrophic failures (Roberts, 1990; LaPorte & Consolini, 1998) by creating and 
reinforcing certain behaviours (Weick & Roberts, 1993). Perrow (1984) had also 
classified industries into high risk and low risk industries. To him, organisations in the 
aviation industry, nuclear industry, and military were high risk organisations, while 
organisations in manufacturing industry, oil and gas industry, and chemical plants were 
low risk organisations. HRO researchers such as Weick et al (1999), Hopkins (2007), 
Leveson et al (2009), and Lekka (2011) argued that this classification does not 
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accurately reflect the accident rates experienced in these industries. Despite its ‘high 
risk’ classification, the nuclear industry has not experienced more catastrophic failures 
than the manufacturing industry that are supposed to be ‘low risk’, neither have the 
recorded failures in the ‘high risk’ organisations resulted in greater catastrophe than 
failures recorded in the ‘low risk’ organisations.  
 
HRO theory posits that despite inherent complex technologies and tight coupling, 
organisations could avoid or mitigate the effects of accidents by mindfully adopting and 
reinforcing certain principles and behavioural patterns. They enhance mindfulness by 
developing a positive culture that reinforces safety related behaviour and attitudes 
(Weick & Roberts, 1993). Accidents in complex systems are not inevitable because 
mindful organisations install processes within their system to prevent and contain 
catastrophic failures, effectively reduce the probability of serious error, and sustain a 
consistent safety record over time (Roberts, 1990; LaPorte & Consolini, 1998; Lekka, 
2011).  
 
Since the first research in the 1980s, Roberts (1990; 1993), Brown (1993), Schulman 
(1993), Rochlin (1993), Roux-Dufour (2000), (Weick & Sutcliffe (2001; 2007; 2015), 
Roberts & Bea (2001), Hollnagel et al (2006), Hopkins (2007), and Sutcliffe (2011) and 
many others have studied HROs from different theoretical lenses. Despite their diverse 
views, their point of commonality considers HROs as organisations that are able to 
sustain themselves despite operating in highly hazardous conditions where failure could 
have far reaching and potentially catastrophic consequences. HROs are resilient, and 
able to deal with and react to adverse conditions (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007; Hollnagel et 
al, 2006). They are reliability-seeking rather than reliability achieving (Rochlin, 1993; 
Vogus & Welbourne, 2003), intervening, both to prevent errors and failures as well as 
to cope with and recover quickly should errors become manifest (Sutcliffe, 2011).  
 
The original research at Berkeley had defined HROs through the lens of an 
organisation’s ability to sustain almost error-free performances over long time periods, 
as well as the degree to which the organisation could have failed resulting in 
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catastrophic consequences that it did not (Roberts, 1990, Sutcliffe, 2011). These 
perspectives relied on safety statistics determine an organisation’s reliability level. 
Based on this assumption, an organisation could prevent 99.9% of failures and still be 
considered as highly reliable. It does not consider that 0.1% chance of failure could lead 
to catastrophic consequence on the environment, a large population of people, and 
financial damage that could collapse the organisation. Rochlin (1993) therefore argued 
in favour of another characterisation of HROs in terms of how effective they are able to 
manage the ‘innately risky technologies through organisational control of both hazard 
and probability’, rather than a reliance on accident statistics.  
 
Another perspective on HROs tried to identify key characteristics that an organisation 
must have to be considered an HRO. Roberts & Rousseau (1989) identified five 
characteristics: complexity and tight coupling as described by Perrow (1984); existence 
of extremely hierarchical structures with clear roles and responsibilities; redundancy of 
responsibilities and different persons with the authorization to make similar decisions; 
strong accountability, high performance, and strict use of procedures; and a limited time 
for major decision making (Lekka, 2011). This school of thought contends that having 
some of these characteristics does not make an organisation an HRO, but that to be 
considered an HRO; the organisation must exhibit all the characteristics. Hopkins 
(2007) notes that adopting this school of thought, drastically limits the possible 
candidates for high reliability organisations. Recent focus has rather shifted to studying 
the types of processes and behaviour that could enable organisations to attain reliability. 
 
Weick & Sutcliffe (2001; 2007; 2015) leveraged on the early research at Berkeley to 
develop five behaviours that enhance the reliability of an organisation. The initial 
research had studied US Navy’s nuclear powered aircraft carriers, nuclear power 
operations at Pacific Gas and Electric’s Diablo Canyon nuclear reactor, and Federal 
Aviation Administration’s an air traffic control. All three were considered to be tightly 
coupled organisations with complex technologies, and where a minor lapse in judgment 
could have catastrophic consequences (Weick, 1987; Roberts, 1990; 1993). This early 
research had identified five characteristics they believed HROs must have (Roberts, 
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1990; 1993; Roberts & Bea, 2001; Lekka, 2011).  These include:                                                                                                                                        
1. Deferring decision making to expertise during emergencies and to 
hierarchy during normal operations. 
2. Management by exception, where managers do not intervene on day to 
day activities except when absolutely necessary. 
3. A climate of continuous training 
4. An environment where several communication channels are adopted for 
safety critical information. 
5. In-built redundancy in both human decision making process and in 
equipment such that safety critical decisions are not left to one person, 
equipment, or system 
 
Weick & Sutcliffe (2001; 2007; 2015) considered all these and previous research and 
concluded that the infrastructure of highly reliable organisations was firmly rooted in 
collective mindfulness. The organisations were seen to make collective efforts to 
organise themselves and increase the quality of attention across the organisation. This 
enhanced the people’s alertness and awareness to little details, increasing their ability to 
detect subtle ways in which contexts may vary, while addressing contingencies. The 
five HRO principles include:  
1. Preoccupation with failure 
2. Reluctance to simplify 
3. Sensitivity to operations 
4. Commitment to resilience 
5. Deference to expertise 
 
The first three reliability enhancing behaviours: preoccupation with failure, reluctance 
to simplify, and sensitivity to operations, deal with the capacity of the organisations to 
anticipate unexpected problems. The last two reliability enhancing behaviours: 
Commitment to resilience and deference to expertise are concerned with the capacity of 
the organisations to contain the unanticipated problems when they occur. The next 
section describes these five reliability enhancing behaviours in more details.   
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Preoccupation with Failure 
This heading at first glance suggests that people in HROs are paralyzed by worries of 
failure. It however means that the organisation is actively seeking signals within the 
system that could indicate a potential for failure. A preoccupation with failure is an 
ongoing caution that drives proactive and pre-emptive analysis of possible 
vulnerabilities and treats any failure or near-miss as an indicator of potentially larger 
problems (Sutcliffe, 2011). The organisations continuously seek learning and 
continuous improvement, and are mindful of the potential for a near miss, unsafe 
condition, minor failure, unsafe acts, or lack of mindfulness to result in catastrophic 
failure. They are focused on predicting and eliminating catastrophes, not reacting to 
them. They focus on points of failure by increasing alertness, fighting inertia, looking 
for new alternatives, identifying errors, and developing processes to prevent failures 
(Hales & Chakravorty, 2016).  
 
Weick & Sutcliffe (2015) identified five component of preoccupation with failure. The 
first, which they referred at as “anomaly”, refers to the cues that would suggest a 
system or a process has departed from its common order, form, or rule. Cues tend to be 
weak, mixed and routine and as such could be easily taken for granted. These cues over 
time develop into clues: hunches about what the cues portend. The progression of cues 
into clues provides emerging evidence that the anomaly could be potentially significant. 
Weick & Sutcliffe (2015) called this component “cues of evolving failure” In some 
cases, this may not be apparent until a failure occurs. HROs are mindful of this and are 
organised to watch out for the cues and clues, avoid a single interpretation of the cues 
and clues and apply good judgment before they result in a failure. The third component 
is “normalizing”: a redefinition of acceptable risks when the clues become evident. 
HROs are reluctant to treat unexpected events as normal events, and are wary of 
adjusting the accepted operating envelopes to normalize an anomaly. The fourth 
component is “institutionalized wariness”: scepticism of quiet periods.  Long incident 
free periods often leave organisations with an air of invincibility and a false impression 
about their reliability. HROs realize that the quiet periods could become incubation 
periods for disasters and mindfully continue their processes without any form of 
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complacency. The final component is “doubt as a mind-set”: an understanding that 
existing insights must be doubted as it is impossible to know and understand everything 
in advance in a dynamically complex environment. It does not presuppose lack of 
confidence, but a realization that an organised spirit of contradiction is invaluable to 
analyse diverse view points, and all options. They encourage the use of what if 
scenarios, argumentation, constructive criticism, and scepticism, as they all enhance the 
variety required to prevent catastrophic failures. 
 
From all the texts reviewed so far, a summary of some preoccupation with failure 
behaviours expected from highly reliable organisations include the following: 
 They identify, document, and categorize all near misses, incidents, and failures 
 They identify the root causes of the near misses, accidents and failures 
 They painstakingly resolve the root causes with no blame or punitive culture 
against people that report the incidents, near misses or failures 
 They review lessons learned periodically and feeds the lessons back to update 
their processes 
 They actively reward individuals that report near misses, incidents, and failures 
 The superiors actively seek out bad news 
 There is clear and open communication between superiors and front line staff, 
and among the staff 
 Their plans consider worst case scenarios 
 There is a continuous review of processes and procedures to identify potential 
areas of improvement 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
58 
 
Reluctance to Simplify 
As shall be seen in section 2.6, oversimplification is probably one of the major causes 
of incidents. The management at NASA (section 2.6.5) had known for over 11 years 
prior to the Challenger crash, that the design of the O-rings in the solid rocket booster 
had a potentially catastrophic flaw. The disregarded several warnings from their 
engineers about the potential catastrophic implication of launching the rocket at low 
temperatures. They waived 6 launch constraints related to O-rings that could have 
prevented the launch, and by extension, the disaster from happening. They 
oversimplified the problem and wrongly defined it as an acceptable risk. Similarly, the 
management at NASA was aware, prior to the Columbia crash, of previous similar 
problems with the foam, but since those similar problems did not lead to mission 
compromising conditions, they accepted it as a norm. They were aware that foam 
formation was a deviation from the design criteria, but once again, they oversimplified 
and considered this as an acceptable risk. With time, it became a norm – a norm that 
would lead to another catastrophic. Vaughan (1997) in her review and analysis of the 
Challenger crash called this oversimplification a “normalization of deviance”,  a 
situation where “people within the organisation become so much accustomed to a 
deviant behaviour that they don't consider it as deviant, despite the fact that they far 
exceed their own rules for the elementary safety” 
 
In her analysis of the normalizing of deviance that occurred in the case of the 
Challenger disaster, Vaughan (1997)  noted that  during the developmental phase, the 
group that assessed the joints on the solid rocket boosters to investigate the limits and 
capabilities of joints performance initially interpreted their findings as deviations. The 
more tests they conducted, the more reinterpreted the results as within the boundaries 
acceptable risk, gradually normalizing the deviations. This normalization, or 
oversimplification, would eventually lead to the crash of the shuttle.  
 
The other disasters discussed each had elements of oversimplification at the root of its 
causation.  The operator at the Chernobyl plant (section 2.6.4) disabled the automatic 
shutdown systems to perform the test to establish the length of spin of the turbines 
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while supplying power to the main circulating pumps should there be a loss of the 
mains electricity power supply. They had “successfully” done this in the past, and 
therefore accepted this norm. Bypassing or disabling safety systems could potentially 
lead to an incident as the management should have known, but they oversimplified and 
accepted this as a tolerable risk. Before the BP Texas City incident (section 2.6.7), there 
had been previous events such as leaks, vapour releases, and fires involving the 
isomerization process unit in the past, but these events were oversimplified as 
acceptable risks. The zone classification for the isomerization unit was oversimplified 
and considered non-hazardous in earlier designs. The Titanic (section 2.6.2) had 
received 6 warnings from other ships about drifting ice, yet the ship continued to move 
at near the ship’s maximum speed of 44 kilometres per hour. To them, it was an 
accepted risk and there was no need to reduce speed. The lookouts also noticed some 
haze within the horizon ahead of them but failed to report it despite earlier instructions 
to keep a sharp look out for small ice and growlers. It was also an acceptable risk to 
them. These were acts of oversimplification would lead to the eventual sinking of the 
titanic.  
 
Highly reliability organisations continuously balance simplification and standardization 
of processes, with actively seeking to avoid undue generalisations on how and why 
things work or fail. Highly reliable organisations have standardized processes. They 
however put a lot of emphasis on probing deeper, and asking more questions to get to 
root causes of failures or potential failures. They take nothing for granted. They 
understand that scepticism helps to refine processes, and they encourage people to think 
outside the box and challenge the norm.  
 
A reluctance to simplify interpretations promotes a thoughtful, data-driven process that 
considers the uniqueness of a problem before applying a solution (Hales & 
Chakravorty, 2016). It  focuses on HROs’ ability to collect, analyse and prioritise all 
warning signs that something may be wrong and avoid making any assumptions 
regarding the causes of failure (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007; Lekka, 2011). It involves 
actively seeking divergent viewpoints that question received wisdom, uncover blind 
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spots and detect changing demands (Sutcliffe, 2011), and discourages the form-fitting 
application or popular ‘best practice’ solutions to problems without thorough 
consideration of the problem's unique context (Hales & Chakravorty, 2016).  
 
From the literature reviewed, some reluctance to simplify behaviours includes the 
following: 
 They value and reward scepticism and “outside the box thinking” 
 People in different strata of the organisation actively walk the process to identify 
potential flaws. 
 They create sessions for people to critique and challenge the process 
 They take decisions as soon as potential loopholes in the process are established.  
 
HROs realize the dangers of simplification, which gives the people a false sense of 
knowledge, potentially causing them to limit their perspectives and the precautions they 
could normally take, as well as the level of undesired consequences they could imagine. 
They take nothing for granted (Sutcliffe, 2011). Before the Columbia crash (section 
2.6.5) that had multiple fatalities with huge negative financial and reputational impact, 
NASA oversimplified the Columbia shuttle’s foam that shed 82 seconds into the flight, 
insisting that it was a maintenance issue which was normal and could be fixed back on 
the ground (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2015). This had been a recurring issue at NASA for 
over 22 years and they failed to investigate why the foam continued to be shed despite 
that the occurrence was outside the design and operating envelopes. Sutcliffe (2011) 
therefore concludes that prevailing norms in HROs should convey such messages as, 
‘take nothing for granted’, ‘don’t get into something without a way out’, ‘we know that 
we do not know, but we do not even know what we do not know’ 
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Sensitivity to Operations 
Highly reliable organisations are constantly responsive to the details of their operations, 
with the right staffing, competence levels, and motivation. They are able to detect and 
competently react to slight changes in their process. Sensitivity to operations refers to 
the mixture of awareness and alertness that organisations have with respect to the 
expected interactions with complicated and often opaque systems, and the actions that 
unfold in real time (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2015). It means creating and maintaining an 
integrated big picture of current situations through ongoing attention to real-time 
information (Sutcliffe, 2011). It recognizes that a solution to one problem may create 
another and therefore considers process-wide measurement to be essential (Hales & 
Chakravorty, 2016).  They therefore equip the frontline team members to be mindful of 
current operational realities and to make small adjustments required to keep the process 
within the operating limits. In a process plant, small adjustments could be tightening of 
bolts to stop a vibration. Inability to make this small adjustment could result in 
equipment failure or loss of containment, which could combine with other forces with 
the operating environment to lead to further catastrophic failures. The frontline is 
equipped with trainings and encouraged to promptly identify hazards and communicate 
variations and understand communications from the process automations, share real 
time data, and shift issues to experts that better equipped to address the problem. 
Some sensitivity to operations behaviours includes the following: 
 Meetings are regular with defined terms of reference, and people consider 
meetings as a part of their duties. 
 Individual roles and responsibilities are well defined and everyone understands 
their roles and performs their roles to the best of their abilities without any 
coercion 
 It is very clear how everyone’s roles and responsibilities fits into the big 
organisational picture 
 Frontline staff and leaders are generally free with one another and interact freely 
in the day to day activities 
 People generally get involved in jobs outside their competencies without 
coercion 
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 People are rewarded for getting involved in jobs outside their competencies 
 People actively seek and receive feedback. They perceive feedback as 
constructive exercises 
 Leaders continuously work with staff to monitor workloads and would 
collectively determine need for additional resources.  
 
Commitment to Resilience 
This is the first of the two HRO principles that deal with the capacity of the 
organisations to contain or recover from the unanticipated problems after they occur. It 
is concerned with the ability of organisations to not only effectively anticipate errors but 
also to cope with and bounce back from errors and ‘unexpected events’ (Weick et al., 
1999; Weick and Sutcliffe, 2007; Lekka, 2011).  
Leaders and employees in highly reliable organisations are competent and prepared to 
respond to failures despite the vagaries of external influences. They are able to quickly 
recover from the effects of failure, and apply the learnings from the failure. 
Commitment to resilience relies on soft skill such as improvisation, learning, 
multitasking, adapting, communication, and network building. Highly reliable 
organisations with commitment to resilience first of all spend time to improve their 
ability and capability to anticipate. They create, improve and revise plans and 
procedures and incorporate the lessons from their experience. They thereafter develop 
the capacity to contain and recover from the failures should they occur. 
 
HROs commit to resilience through competence development, clear emergency 
response processes, emergency drills, contingency plans, awareness of key contacts in 
case of emergencies, and building shared trust among the staff and management. 
Resilience is the difference between an organisation that faces a disaster and recovers 
from it and another organisation that faces a similar disaster and goes into extinction. 
Some behaviour of organisations with commitment to resilience includes: 
 Leaders and staff work together to identify learning and development gaps and 
close them. 
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 People generally have more than enough skills for their jobs and to act during 
emergencies. 
 Emergency response and contingency plans are robust and implementation is a 
shared responsibility among all staff. 
 Everyone trusts one another and relies on one another during emergencies. 
 
Deference to Expertise 
This is the second of the two HRO principles that deal with the capacity of the 
organisations to contain or recover from the unanticipated problems after they occur. It 
shows a clear separation of responsibilities during normal operations and during 
emergencies. HROs rely on a hierarchical structure with clearly defined reporting 
structure, where roles and responsibilities are clearly defined during normal operations. 
Everyone knows who the boss is and everyone functions based on the clear cut roles 
and responsibilities matrix. During emergencies however, decision making is deferred 
to people with the most subject matter knowledge and experience to resolve the 
emergency, irrespective of their rank with the organisation (Weick, 1999; Weick & 
Sutcliffe, 2015; Hales & Chakravorty, 2016). The chief executive of an organisation 
will receive instructions from a security person, who will assume leadership during a 
security related emergency irrespective of rank.  
 
Deference does not equate to submission (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2015), but includes a 
pattern of respectful yielding, with full consideration and awareness of the limits and 
boundaries of each individual’s experience and expertise. Deference includes a pattern 
of domain-specific knowledge: knowledge gained through first-hand experience in a 
particular domain, rather than book knowledge. It also includes a compressed and 
generalizable experience, as well as relative expertise. The organisation or team reverts 
back to the hierarchical structure once the emergency is over. 
Organisations that defer to expertise during emergencies exhibit the following 
behaviours: 
 There is a mutual respect for one another’s jobs. 
 No job is considered more important than the other. 
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 People are encouraged to take expert decisions during emergencies. 
 Most senior persons yield responsibilities to persons with most expertise during 
emergencies. 
 The experts accept responsibilities professionally, and yield back after the 
emergency. 
 Expertise for all emergencies is generally available. 
 People feel responsible until emergencies are resolved. 
 
The following case study summarizes the five HRO principles. Andrews (2012) and 
Shell (2012) both made references to the incident. The research obtained details of the 
incident in the course of the interviews, as well as in internal process safety training 
slides designed for their employees in the aftermath of the incident. A multinational oil 
company in Nigeria was engaged in remediation and crude oil pipeline leak repair, 
when the site exploded, leading to seven fatalities, multiple injuries, months of lost 
production, hundreds of job losses, environmental concerns and organisational 
reputation damage. 
 
Investigations revealed the following. Oil was reported seeping out along the right of 
way of a crude and condensate trunk line at a previously clamped site. Access to the site 
was achieved after 6 days, the delay being mostly due to constraints with the terrain and 
coordination of stakeholders. The source of the leak was confirmed to be a pipe line 
clamp installed on the pipeline as a result of previous oil theft activities. Initial repair 
efforts commenced without the pipeline being shut-in or depressurized. During the 
repair, the leak got substantially larger, resulting in a loss of containment, and forcing 
the team to withdraw from site. Shutdown of some upstream facilities was initiated but 
as the downstream facilities were still producing, backflow to the site continued. Local 
community issues reportedly prevented access to leak site for two days, increasing the 
size of the spill. Efforts to recover the spill finally restarted using two water pumps and 
a swamp buggy. The explosion and the fire occurred during this process of spill oil 
recovery.  
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Further investigations revealed that the attempted repair work on the pipeline happened 
while the pipeline was pressurized. Secondly, a portable spark generating crude 
evacuation pump was used at the site contrary to the procedure. Thirdly, the work 
permit was signed by someone in the office, a long distance away from the remote field 
location. In addition, the site supervisor, and the site HSE supervisor were reluctant to 
shut down the site when the lapse was spotted, neither were they able to get 
confirmation from the responsible manager in the office to shut down the site. A site 
shutdown would have meant the shutdown of all the fields flowing through that trunk 
line, a potential loss of several thousands of barrels of oil per day. The superiors were 
reluctant to take such decision despite advice from the frontline. Just before the disaster, 
the frontline tried to contact their superiors, but it was close to lunchtime and the 
approval was not obtained. The date is still remembered annually as a dark day in that 
organisation’s history, and a day to reinforce safety.  
 
There was some evidence of failure of preoccupation with failure. The potential for 
disaster could have been identified during a toolbox or kick-off meeting. Such a 
meeting could have identified the hazards and planned for control and recovery 
measures. Even if the hazards were identified, was there an adequate management 
support to ensure the proposed recommendations from hazard and effect management 
process is effected? There may have been oversimplification by everyone involved and 
some operating envelopes eroded. One may ask: was this the first time of violating such 
procedure? Were people punished? Should they have been punished? Did the 
organisation over simply, and accept the violations as acceptable risks? Why were the 
superiors reluctant to take action? Could that be an indication of the organisation’s 
reliability? There are also some questions around sensitivity to operations: Should the 
site supervisors be on site without some level of leeway to make field decisions? Should 
such decision making responsibility be left in the office? How effective was the 
communication between the field and the office? Did the responsible person have 
enough expertise to know the effect of the hazardous condition created? Additionally, 
the team deferred to hierarchy instead of deferring to expertise in the face of an 
imminent disaster. To have noticed the danger and made a push to shut down the site, 
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there was obviously some level of expertise onsite. They however relied on hierarchy 
and paid for it with their lives. Finally, the organisation showed a strong commitment to 
resilience by immediately understanding the impact such a disaster could have on its 
existence and embarked on an elaborate incident review process, sensitization 
campaign, and implementation of learning from the incident. Till date, the organisation 
has adopted a day each year to remember their commitment towards avoiding a repeat 
of the disaster.  
 
It is therefore clear that organisations that want to remain competitive must begin to 
develop HRO mind-sets irrespective of the complexity of their systems or the coupling 
of their processes. The HRO theory is not just another theory that seeks to prevent 
incidents, but an application of the principle of mindfulness to everyday organisational 
processes and activities. Embedded within this is the mindful application of different 
safety enhancement, organisational improvement, and incident prevention strategies. 
This means that all of the seven perspectives discussed from section 2.5.2 to section 
2.5.8 are all or could all be embedded within the HRO theory. An organisation adopting 
the HRO theory would have within its processes one or more of these perspectives; as 
well as any other initiatives it would consider useful and practical to achieve its 
objectives. For instance, most nuclear organisations are generally considered as high 
reliability organisations. They have a combination of these perspectives, including 
defence in depth, inherently safer design, energy barrier model, resilient engineering, as 
well as may other initiatives to enhance reliability. For this reason, this research has 
adopted the high reliability organisation theory as the perspective of choice for this 
research. The research hopes to examine organisations and identify the behaviours that 
enhance or limit reliability and hopefully adopt these behaviours to improve diverse 
organisations. The research shall also discuss some incidents that have occurred in the 
past and attempt to identify the mindfulness behaviours, if any that led to the incidents. 
It argues from the background that most incidents are mostly due to the lack of 
mindfulness of the organisations and the actors involved. This argument forms the 
background for the next section.  
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2.6 Research Perspectives on Disasters 
2.6.1 Introduction 
Within the late twentieth and the twenty first centuries, the incidence of disasters has 
accelerated, most of which could not be predicted, but became subjects of retrospective 
predictability after the fact. This increase is due in part to the increasing complexity of 
the world and its technologies (Taleb, 2010), and the increasing rate of natural hazards 
as a result of increasing populations and environmental changes (Rougier et al, 2010). 
Between 1900 and 2017, there have been 8,437 disasters linked to technology with over 
100,000 fatalities (Emdat.be, 2017). According to data from Emdat.be (2017), the 
number of disasters, the total fatalities recorded, the total persons affected, and the total 
asset damage, have all been on the increase since the 1970s and have continued to 
increase exponentially. The graph below shows the number of disasters per continent 
within this period. The period between 1999 and 2006 recorded the most number of 
disasters with an average of about 340 disasters every year. Apart from Oceania that 
had relatively few numbers of disasters within the years under review, all other 
continents recorded large increase in the number of disasters.  
 
 
 
Figure 2.5 – A graph of technology related disasters from 1900 to 2017 showing 
exponential increase in disasters from the 1980s. Source Emdat.be (2017) 
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Similarly, figure 2.6 shows the disaster trends in terms of the total fatalities. There was 
an exponential increase in the number of fatalities from the 1980s, peaking at over 
12,000 fatalities in 2002. The lowest number of total fatalities due to technology in a 
year has been about 6,000 in 2008 – 2013, and in 2016. 11,000 fatalities were recorded 
in each of 1987, 2000, and 2005.  
 
 
 
Figure 2.6 – A graph of fatalities from technology related disasters from 1900 to 2017 
showing exponential increase in fatalities from the 1980s. Source Emdat.be (2017) 
 
Figure 2.7 shows the total financial value of the asset damage in US dollars, scaled to 
the 2016 value of the US dollars. As expected, the values increase exponentially from 
the 1980s. US$1 billion was lost in 1984, US$6 billion in 1986, US$13 billion in 2002, 
and US$22 billion in 2010.  
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Figure 2.7 – A graph of economic damages from technology related disasters from 1900 
to 2017 showing exponential increase from the 1980s. Source Emdat.be (2017) 
 
Considering the same period, natural disasters have also followed the same trend as 
technology related disasters. Figures 2.8, 2.9, and 2.10 show the number of natural 
disasters, the total persons affected (not fatalities), and the total damage in US dollars 
recorded from the disasters between 1900 and 2017. Between 1900 and 1950, the 
largest number of natural disasters recorded worldwide was 13. The occurrence of 
natural disasters increased exponentially also from the 1960 and have remained so till 
date. In the year 2000 alone, about 530 cases of natural disasters were recorded 
worldwide. Since 1997, the lowest number of natural disasters recorded has been 330. 
Similarly, before 1965, apart from a few odd years where about 25 million people were 
impacted by natural disasters, the impacts were minimal relative to the scale and 
magnitude recorded after 1965. In 1965, over 130 million people were impacted by 
different forms of natural disasters. The trend has continued to increase till date with a 
peak at about at about 630 million people in 2002. Finally in terms of asset damage 
scaled to 2016 US dollar value, the total economic damage also increased exponentially 
to a peak of about US$390 billion in 2011. Before 1976, the maximum economic 
damage was US$20 billion.  
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Figure 2.8– A graph of number of natural disasters from 1900 to 2017 showing 
exponential increase from the 1960s. Source Emdat.be (2017) 
 
 
 
Figure 2.9 – A graph of number of persons affected by natural disasters from 1900 to 
2017 showing exponential increase from the 1970s. Source Emdat.be (2017) 
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Figure 2.10 – A graph of economic damages from natural disasters from 1900 to 2017 
showing exponential increase from the 1970s. Source Emdat.be (2017) 
 
Table 2.3 shows a timeline of some major industrial disasters between 1906 and 2013. It 
is not a comprehensive list, but has been gleaned from the Sandbox (2017) statistics to 
show the scale and increasing frequency of industrial disasters over the years. Table 2.4, 
also gleaned from Sandbox (2017), show a timeline of some major oil spills between 
1967 and 2010. It is also not a comprehensive list, but has been extracted to highlight 
the increasing frequency and severity as the years have progressed. There were a 
number of spills recorded between 1992 and 2010, but these were excluded here to 
highlight the 2010 deep water horizon that recorded heavy fatalities, very huge volume 
of oil spilled, huge financial impact, and posed a massive public relations nightmare for 
the organisation.  
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Table 2.3 – A table showing some major industrial disasters timeline arranged 
chronologically between 1906 and 2013. Source Sandbox (2017) 
 
 
Table 2.4 – A table showing some major oil spill timeline arranged chronologically 
between 1967 and 2010. Source Sandbox (2017) 
 
 
With increasing stakeholder demands, organisations are increasingly improving 
their technologies and processes to enhance productivity and competitiveness. This has 
had the unintentional consequence of increasing the hazards associated with these 
processes, and as such, organisations must evolve their processes to mitigate these 
hazards. A trend of major safety incidents over the years ties the causative factors to 
Year Day Incident Location Impact
1906 10-Mar Coal dust explosion Courrieres, France 1099 fatalities
1942 26-Apr A coal dust and gas explosion in a mine  Benxi Liaoning, China 1549 fatalities
1947 16-Apr
Fire near 2,300 tons of ammonium nitrate on S.S. 
Grandcamp causes explosion
Texas City, Texas, 
USA
581 fatalities
1976 10-Jul Seveso, Italy 3,300 farm animals killed
1976 10-Jul Seveso, Italy 80,000 animals are later slaughtered
1984 2-Dec 42 tons of lethal methyl isocyanate Bhopal, Madhya 2,259 (immediate fatalities)
1984
2-Dec
leak from the Union Carbide pesticide plant
An estimated 2,500 are believed to 
have died since from the exposure
1984 19-Nov Explosions at a Liquid Petroleum Gas tank farm San Juanico, Mexico 500 fatalities
1986 26-Apr Prypiat, Ukraine 50 fatalities due to radiation
1986
26-Apr
3,940 fatalities due to radiation 
induced cancer and leukemia
1989 24-Mar
Exxon Valdez, an oil tanker, spills 260,000 to 750,000 
barrels of crude oil into the sea
Prince William Sounds, 
Alaska, USA
100,000 to 250,000 seabirds
2000 13-May Explosion at a fireworks storage depot Enschede, Netherlands 23 fatalities
2013 24-Apr Rana Plaza, a building containing several factories, collapses Savar, Bangladesh more than 1,100 fatalities
SOME MAJOR INDUSTRIAL DISASTERS TIMELINE
Explosion during an unauthorized test at the Chernobyl 
nuclear power plant
ICMESA, a chemical manufacturing plant, releases dioxins 
(TCDD)
Year Day Incident Location Impact
1967 18-Mar Torrey Canyon ran aground Scilly Islands 38 million gallons of crude oil
1977 Blowout of well in Ekofisk oil field North Sea 81 million gallons of oil
1978 16-Mar Amoco Cadiz wreck Portsfall, France 68 million gallons of oil
1979 3-Jun Exploratory oil well Ixtoc 1 blew out Gulf of Mexico 140 million gallons of crude oil 
1980 30-Mar Floating hotel in North Sea collapsed Stavanger, Norway 123 Fatalities
1983 4-Feb Nowruz Field platform spill Persian Gulf, Iran 80 million gallons of oil.
1983 6-Aug Spanish tanker Castillo de Bellver caught fire South Africa 78 million gallons of oil
1988 6-Jul Piper Alpha explosion North sea 166 fatalities
1988 10-Nov Odyssey spilled Newfoundland, Canada  43 million gallons of oil.
1989 24-Mar Exxon Valdez, an oil tanker, spills crude oil into the sea  Alaska, USA 11 million to 32 million gallons of oil
1991 23-Jan Deliberate release Kuwait 460 million gallons of crude oil 
1991 11-Apr Haven spill Genoa, Italy 42 million gallons of oil
1991 28-May ABT Summer explosion Angola 78 million gallons of oil 
1992 2-Mar Well spill Uzbekistan 88 million gallons of oil
2010 24-Apr Deep Water Horizon Gulf of Mexico 11 fatalities, 210 million gallons of oil
SOME MAJOR OIL SPILLS BETWEEN 1967 AND 2010
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mostly organisational and individual errors. Moura et al (2015) considered 
organisational contributions to be the major cause of industrial incidents. To them, 
recent major safety incidents in complex industrial systems were deeply connected to 
human and organisational factors, leading to catastrophic consequences. This research 
has studied some major disasters within the last century to understand the relationship 
between the disasters and organisational causative factors. It tried to question if these 
disasters could have been prevented through organisational mindfulness. This research 
believes that by understanding the contributions of lack of organisational mindfulness, 
if any, on these disasters, it could potentially develop a framework to help eliminate 
disasters and their effects. This research will present seven of the disasters studied. 
These seven disasters have been selected as they all have lack of organisational 
mindfulness at the core of their causative factors.  These seven disasters were selected 
due to the abundance of literature on them. To select cases with little literature 
available, this research might have to rely on direct contact with the stakeholders. Since 
these incidents happened between 1912 and 2010, collecting primary data might be 
inappropriate as memories may have faded and key persons might not be readily 
available. The research will continuously make references to these disasters as the thesis 
develops. These seven disasters occurred in four different industries, in different 
countries and across different continents and are arranged in order of occurrence. These 
are: 
1. The Titanic disaster (1912) 
2. The Bhopal disaster (1984) 
3. The Chernobyl nuclear disaster (1986) 
4. NASA’s Challenger (1986) and Columbia (2003) disasters 
5. Piper Alpha disaster (1988) 
6. BP Texas City disaster (2005) 
7. BP Deep water Horizon disaster (2010) 
 
These disasters are described below in a chronological order. 
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2.6.2  Titanic Disaster (1912) 
Titanic sank in 1912, killing 1514 passengers and crew (Howells, 1999). Labib & Read 
(2013) attributed the Titanic disaster primarily to poor decision making, insufficient 
provision of critical equipment, organisational procedural factors, over confidence, and 
other human factors. Although there were obvious environmental factors and 
technological factors, perhaps the human factors exacerbated the effects these would 
have otherwise had on the incident. The Titanic was built as the world’s biggest and 
most luxurious ship at its time (Labib & Read, 2013). It was built by The White Star 
Line to fend off competition from its rivals, Cunard, Hamburg America, and 
Norddeutscher Lloyd. It was built and equipped with the latest technology in its time 
and could accommodate 2228 passengers and crew (Labib & Read, 2013). When 
Titanic hit an iceberg during its maiden voyage in 1912 at a high speed, its 
superstructure catastrophically failed, ripping the hull and damaging 5 of its 16 
watertight compartment. About 1514 passengers and crew lost their lives (Howells, 
1999). The visibility was poor, and a mild winter had caused large numbers of icebergs 
to shift off the west coast of Greenland (Ryan, 1985). These were environmental factors 
that could potentially lead to a disaster, but could some acts of mindfulness have 
prevented the disaster?  
 
Ballard (1987) and Ryan (1985) noted that the visibility was very poor and The Titanic 
had received 6 warnings from other ships about drifting ice, yet the ship continued to 
move at near the ship’s maximum speed of 44 kilometres per hour. The organisation 
prioritized arriving on schedule over safety, thus it was an organisational practice to 
move at close to the maximum speed despite hazard warnings. A mindful organisation 
and captain could perhaps have reduced speed due to the dangerous combination of 
visibility and ice warnings.  In addition to this, the lookouts noticed some haze within 
the horizon ahead of them but did not report it despite earlier instructions to keep a 
sharp look out for small ice and growlers (Barratt, 2010). When the iceberg was finally 
reported by the spotters, the bureaucratic and hierarchical chain of command made it 
difficult to take immediate action to steer the ship away from the iceberg. The ship 
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eventually avoided a head-on collision, but glanced the iceberg with its starboard side, 
making the sinking inevitable.  
 
Reports have shown that the fatality could have been minimized had the passengers and 
the crew been trained or prepared for an emergency of such magnitude (Hutchings & de 
Kerbrech, 2011). First, the distress calls inaccurately directed potential rescuers 13.5 
nautical miles away from the ship’s position (Ballard, 1987). Secondly, most passengers 
and crew did not understand the implication of the impending disaster and ignored the 
warnings to put on their lifebelts and muster (Bartlett, 2011). In addition, the available 
lifeboats were barely enough to accommodate about half of the total passengers on 
board (Hutchings & de Kerbrech, 2011), a clear organisational lapse in judgment. 
Furthermore, there was clear leadership ineffectiveness (Cox, 1999), as the captain, an 
experienced seaman with zero experience in emergencies, was paralysed with 
indecision. He failed to organise his crew, gave ambiguous and mostly impractical 
instructions, did not follow up on his instructions, did not communicate effectively with 
his crew, and failed to give the order to abandon ship. On the other hand, the crew, with 
minimal lifeboat training, was ill prepared for the emergency. Emergency drills were 
inadequate, the lifeboats were only partially provisioned, and most of the crew had no 
clue about the order of boarding, or the capacity of the lifeboats. Cox (1999) reckons 
that over 500 people could have been saved had the crew utilized the right capacity on 
the lifeboats.   
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Figure 2.11 – A Newspaper clipping from 1912 showing the consequence of the Titanic 
disaster (Labib, 2014) 
 
With the foregoing, it is clear there were environmental causative factors that 
contributed to the disaster, however, human and organisational mindfulness could have 
nullified the threat of the environmental factors, or at least reduced the severity and 
impact of the incident. This therefore advances this research’s argument that human and 
organisational errors are the major causative factors in disasters. Under the weight of 
public relation campaigns and litigations resulting from the disaster, White Star Line 
became defunct in 1934.  
 
Table 2.5 maps all the causative factors of the Titanic disaster already identified in the 
text above in terms of the five high reliability organisation principles. Each column 
represents an HRO principle and all the causative factors related with the principle.  
 
Table 2.5: A table that maps the causative factors of Titanic disaster in terms the 5 HRO 
Principles 
 
Preoccupation with Failure Reluctance to Simplify Sensitivity to Operations Commitment to Resilience Deference to Expertise
Consideration of arriving on 
schedule over safety. 
Failure to report haze within 
the horizon.                
Organisational practice to 
move at maximum speed
Oversimplifying the effects 
of maximum speed                  
Ignored saveral warnings 
Maximum speed despite 
weather and visibility     
Poor crew training and 
passenger instructions    
Poor comprehension of 
impending disaster        
Ineffective leadership      
Ineffective communication    
Leadership indecision
Inadequate emergency 
management procedures 
Inadequate emergency 
management training        
Inadequate lifeboats            
Inadequte emergency drills 
Partially provisioned lifeboats 
No defined orderfor lifeboat 
boarding
Excessive bureaucracy 
impeded actions to 
stear away from the 
iceberg/reduce speed
Mapping the causative factors of the Titanic disaster in terms the 5 HRO Principles
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2.6.3 Bhopal Disaster (1984) 
The Bhopal incident of December 1984 is another avoidable incident that highlights the 
effects of human and organisational actions and inactions on disasters.  On the night of 
2
nd
 December, 1984 around 11 pm, an operator at the then Union Carbide’s pesticide 
plant in Bhopal, Madhya Pradesh, India, noticed a small leak of methyl isocyanate gas 
(MIC), as well as an increasing pressure inside a storage tank. MIC was originally used 
in World War 1 and it attacks the ‘wet’ parts of the human body such as the mouth, 
eyes, nose, and throat. As soon as it enters the lungs, it reacts with bodily fluids and 
drowns the person from inside (Ishizaka & Labib, 2014). About two hours after the leak 
was observed, a safety valve failed, and released about 40 tonnes of methyl isocyanate 
gas (MIC), mixed with other chemicals into the atmosphere. The gas enveloped the 
neighbouring communities, immediately killing over 3000 residents with the figure 
eventually rising to about 20,000 (Ishizaka & Labib, 2014). Over 300,000 people were 
believed to be suffering from serious ill health from its effects 4 years after the incident 
(Rosencranz, 1988) 
 
 
Figure 2.12 – A Schematic illustration showing the causes of the Bhopal Disaster as 
described in this research 
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Several investigations concluded that the root causes majorly resulted from series of 
organisational and individual errors (Rosencranz, 1988; Broughton, 2004; Labib, 2014; 
Ishizaka & Labib, 2014). Labib (2014) used a fault tree analysis method to identify 10 
major reasons that led to the catastrophic release of methyl isocyanate gas (MIC). The 
first key reason he identified was ineffective workforce. By the 1980s, a combination of 
widespread crop failures and famine on the sun-continent had led to a decreased 
demand for pesticides. Increased competitiveness from global pesticide manufacturers 
further eroded Union Carbide’s market share, leading to further decreased profitability 
and forcing the organisation to consider plant closure and divestment. With these 
developments, attrition rate for experienced employees increased with no corresponding 
replacement with equally experienced persons. New and inexperienced personnel were 
quickly progressed to backfill the attritions, and the entry standards were lowered to 
attract people to backfill some critical roles. By 1984, the workforce had been reduced 
by half with no clear investments in technology to justify the reduction. The employees 
and the management therefore were neither adequately resourced, nor did they have 
adequate training and experience to manage such a hazardous process.  
 
Labib (2014) identified two other reasons that culminated in the disaster. These were 
diminished design specifications and ineffective flare tower. Ishizaka & Labib (2014) 
summarized these as a direct effect of cost cutting initiatives by the organisation. The 
plant was initially approved for only the formulation of pesticides in relatively small 
quantities, and as such was located in a light industrial and commercial zone. Pressure 
from competition led to an increased capacity with no corresponding hazard assessment 
that would have relocated the plant to a zone that could handle hazardous substances. 
Other instances of diminished design specifications include replacement of stainless 
steel piping with a cheaper, but more corrosive carbon steel; manually controlled safety 
devices instead of the automatically controlled safety devices with back up as used in 
their West Virginia plant; unavailability of computerized warning systems on the 
storage tank that could have alerted the personnel of an increasing temperature; lack of 
a unit storage system; and an ineffective water spray system. At similar Union Carbide 
plants, there were computerized early warning systems that sensed leaks, monitored 
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rates and concentrations, and were configured to instantly dial out alerts. This was non-
existent at Union Carbide, instead, their US$6 million celebrated cost cutting saw a 
reduction in the number and quality of safety devices. Furthermore, their flare tower 
was ineffective: there was no redundancy built into it, and the existing flare tower was 
incapable of dealing with the quantity of the gases released. Finally, the Methyl Iso 
Cyanate was stored in large batches, a departure from the safe storage process adopted 
in other Western plants.  
 
Another key reason identified in Labib’s fault tree analysis was the resultant effect of 
poor management decisions. Due to cost cutting initiatives and lack of experience, large 
sections of the plant were allowed to run outside their design parameters and processes 
were revised to ensure continued production whist essential components of the system 
were defective (Ishizaka & Labib, 2014). They decided to shut down the refrigeration 
unit that would normally cool the methyl isocyanate storage tanks and redirected the 
freon gas to be used somewhere else. They also made the decision to utilize the reserve 
methyl isocyanate storage tank in normal operation, instead of leaving it empty for 
emergencies as it was designed for. As soon as they realized the tank was in use, the 
process specifies that production must be halted until it is emptied. The management 
failed to take this decision. Two other critical reasons for the disaster were poor 
maintenance practices and poor maintenance procedures on the plant. A blow down 
valve on the methyl isocyanate storage tank was known to be malfunctioning, but was 
left in service. The main line from a relief valve header to a pressure vent header was 
known to be faulty, and a jumper line, instead of the correct replacement, was used for 
the connection, thereby enabling water from a routine washing operation to pass into the 
methyl isocyanate storage tank. The gauges were also known to be faulty, and as such, 
the workers ignored early signs of potential failure. In addition, the slip blind process 
was omitted from existing maintenance procedures, and the procedure omitted the 
checking of all related lines.  
 
The last three reasons are related to safety: poor health and safety awareness; impaired 
capability of safety devices; and deficient emergency response procedure. There were 
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no robust emergency response procedures both at the organisational level, and at the 
civil authorities’ level. The danger alarm was sounded after the incident to warn the 
adjacent residential communities, but was turned off after 5 minutes. It is unclear if 5 
minutes is enough time to warn the residents to evacuate. According to Labib (2015), 
the management did not notify external agencies about the incident, and initially denied 
the incident when contacted by the authorities. When the authorities finally understood 
the gravity of the incident, there were undecided for long periods on the proper actions 
to take. These misinformation and indecisions ultimately increased the severity of the 
disaster.  
 
In conclusion, the Bhopal disaster could have been avoided through mindful actions of 
the organisation. According to Labib (2014), a lot of safety events had happened in the 
years, months, and weeks leading to the disaster, yet the organisation neglected these 
cues and continued with operations as usual. They ignored warnings from experts who 
studied the process and predicted a similar incident.  It is therefore clear that of gross 
violations of basic safety practices and a very poor safety culture within the 
organisation led to this incident. Over 3000 people died immediately as a result (Labib, 
2014); over 20,000 people are believed to have died over a 20 year period after the 
incident as a result (Broughton, 2004); and over 300,000 people were believed to be 
suffering from its effect 4 years after the incident (Rosencranz, 1988).  
 
Table 2.6 maps all the causative factors of the Bhopal disaster already identified above 
in terms of the five high reliability organisation principles. Each column represents an 
HRO principle and all the causative factors related with the principle.  
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Table 2.6: A table that maps the causative factors of Bhopal disaster in terms the 5 HRO 
Principles 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Preoccupation with Failure Reluctance to Simplify Sensitivity to Operations Commitment to Resilience Deference to Expertise
Diminished design specs.    
Poor design of flare tower.  
Choice of cost over quality. 
Replaced stainless steel 
with cheaper less durable 
carbon steel.                         
Wrong plant location.      
Increased capacity with no 
corresponding hazard 
assessment.                 
Manual safety devices 
instead of automatic.       
Reduced quality standards.  
No unit storage system.  
Ineffective water system.   
No computerized early 
waring systems/Impaired 
capability of safety devices. 
Poor incident reporting.   
Poor maintenance 
procedures.       
Revised processes to 
enable operation outside 
design parameters.       
Ignored warning cues.    
Similar incidents in the 
past not learned from.          
Ignored warnings from 
experts. 
Ineffective workforce.    
Inexperienced workforce. 
Operating outside design 
parameters/envelopes.    
Used emergency MIC 
tank in normal operations. 
Shut down refrigeration 
unit and redirected freon 
gas.                    
Ineffective maintenance 
practices.                    
Poor health and safety 
awareness.          
Deficient emergency 
response procedures.                     
Poor coordination with civil 
authorities.                     
Alarm turned off after 5 
minutes.                           
Late reporting to authorities. 
Poor coordination with 
neighbouring communities. 
Mapping the causative factors of the Bhopal disaster in terms the 5 HRO Principles
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2.6.4 Chernobyl Nuclear Disaster (1986) 
On the 26
th
 of April 1986, during a scheduled exercise to test a potential safety 
emergency core cooling feature, a nuclear reactor in Chernobyl, Ukraine, suffered a 
catastrophic power increase that resulted in an explosion in its core. This explosion 
released large amounts of radioactive isotopes into the atmosphere, causing an open air 
fire (Medvedev, 1990). Over 40 fatalities were recorded from the April 1986 Chernobyl 
nuclear disaster in Ukraine. 237 cases of acute radiation sickness were reported, and 
cancer related deaths from the incident was projected to reach 4,000 (WHO, 2006).  
Belarus estimates $235 Billion economic damage over 30 years (MFA, 2009), and a 
similar estimate was expected from Ukraine. Today, the disaster zone remains a ghost 
town  
 
According to INSAG (1992) and World-Nuclear.org (2016), the Chernobyl power 
complex was situated about 130 km north of Kiev, Ukraine, and about 20 km south of 
the border with Belarus. It consisted of 4 Soviet designed, graphite moderated, pressure 
tube type, RBMK 1000 nuclear reactors with 2 more reactors under construction the 
time of the incident. It used slightly enriched (2% U-235) uranium dioxide fuel, and had 
2 loops feeding steam directly to the turbines without an intervening heat exchanger. 
The process flow is shown in figure 2.7 below.  
 
 
Figure 2.13 – “Diagram of RBMK nuclear reactor schematic, showing the process 
flow” by Fireice licensed under CC BY-SA 3.0 
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Before a planned shutdown on the 25
th
 of April 1986, the personnel started to prepare 
for a test to establish the length of spin of the turbines while supplying power to the 
main circulating pumps should there be a loss of the mains electricity power supply. 
This was not a new test. The test was also to determine the effectiveness of the newly 
installed voltage regulator designs following the previous year’s tests where the power 
from the turbine ran down more rapidly than was expected. The operator disabled the 
automatic shutdown systems to perform this test, and by the time the operator moved to 
shut down the reactor, it had already attained a catastrophically unstable condition. 
There was fuel fragmentation and a drastically increased reactor pressure as result of the 
interaction between the very hot fuel and the cooling water. This damaged the 4 fuel 
assemblies, partially detached the cover plate of the reactor, ruptured the fuel channels 
and jammed all the control rods. There was a steam explosion and fission products were 
released into the atmosphere. Within seconds, a second explosion occurred, expelling 
fragments from the fuel channels and about 300 tonnes of hot graphite. The graphite 
and the fuel became incandescent, generating a number of fires
 
causing the catastrophic 
release of radioactivity into the environment (World-Nuclear.org, 2016).  
 
The International Nuclear Safety Group (INSAG) in its 1992 report of the immediate 
and remote causes of the Chernobyl disaster (INSAG, 1992) attributed the causative 
factors of the disaster to operator error, disabling of safety systems, poor quality of 
operating procedures, violations of available operating procedures and instructions, 
design and construction error, negligence, inadequate competency, and inadequate 
communication were mostly considered to be responsible for the incident. All these are 
human and organisational causative factors that could have been eliminated with 
mindfulness behaviour by the organisations and the individuals.  
 
Table 2.7 maps all the causative factors of the Chernobyl disaster in terms of the five 
high reliability organisation principles. Again, each column represents an HRO 
principle and all the causative factors related with the principle.  
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Table 2.7: A table that maps the causative factors of Chernobyl disaster in terms the 5 
HRO Principles 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Preoccupation with Failure Reluctance to Simplify Sensitivity to Operations Commitment to Resilience Deference to Expertise
Design error.               
Construction error.  
Inadequate procedures
Disabling of automatic 
shutdown systems.   
Inadequate training.    
Violating existing 
procedures.               
Negligence.    Inadequate 
competencies.      
Ineffective communication
Mapping the causative factors of the Chernobyl disaster in terms the 5 HRO Principles
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2.6.5  NASA Challenger (1986) and Columbia Shuttle (2003) Disasters 
On the 28
th
 of January, 1986, NASA’s space shuttle Challenger broke apart, barely 73 
seconds into its flight; while the space shuttle, the Columbia, disintegrated on the 1
st
 of 
February, 2003 upon re-entering the earth’s atmosphere (Labib & Read, 2013). In both 
cases, all 7 crew members were killed, and hundreds of millions of dollars lost.  
 
 
Figure 2.14 – “Space Shuttle Challenger explodes shortly after take-off” by NASA for 
CC public domain 
 
 In the Challenger incident, an O-ring seal in its right solid rocket booster failed at lift 
off. This caused a breach in the joint it was meant to seal, resulting in a chain of events 
that culminated in the disaster. The report of the presidential commission on space 
shuttle (PC & Rogers, 1986) found considered poor organisational culture and weak 
decision making processes to be the key causative factors of the incident, with NASA 
found to have violated a number of its safety rules. The management had known for 
over 11 years that the design of the O-rings in the solid rocket booster had a potentially 
catastrophic flaw. The disregarded several warnings from their engineers about the 
potential catastrophic implication of launching the rocket at low temperatures and failed 
to cascade the reports and concerns to senior management. They oversimplified the 
problem and wrongly defined it as an acceptable risk. They waived 6 launch constraints 
related to O-rings that could have prevented the launch from happening. Furthermore, 
the report considered failures in communication as a major causative factor. The launch 
was “based on incomplete and sometimes misleading information, a conflict between 
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engineering data and management judgments, and a NASA management structure that 
permitted internal flight safety problems to bypass key shuttle managers”.   
 
 
Figure 2.15 – “Challenger crew in the white room before the launch” by NASA for CC 
public domain 
 
Table 2.8 maps all the causative factors of the NASA Challenger disaster in terms of the 
five high reliability organisation principles. Again, each column represents an HRO 
principle and all the causative factors related with the principle.  
 
Table 2.8: A table that maps the causative factors of NASA Challenger disaster in terms 
the 5 HRO Principles 
 
 
Preoccupation with Failure Reluctance to Simplify Sensitivity to Operations Commitment to Resilience Deference to Expertise
Disregarded warnings 
about O-ring flaws.     
Oversimplified flaws        
Accepted risks on flaws   
Waived 6 launch 
constraints.              
Ignored expert warning 
not to launch at low 
temperature              
Weak decision making    
Safety rules violations     
Communication failure
Mapping the causative factors of the NASA Challenger disaster in terms the 5 HRO Principles
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The Columbia disaster followed a similar pattern as the Challenger in terms of 
oversimplification”. A piece of foam insulation shed off from the external tank of the 
shuttle during launch and struck the left wing orbiter.  
 
 
Figure 2.16 – “Close-up photo of the left bipod foam ramp that caused the destruction 
of the Space Shuttle Columbia” by NASA for CC public domain 
 
The CAIB (2003) attributed the major causative factors to organisational culture, weak 
decision making, and inadequate risk management process. According to the report, 
similar problems with the foam had occurred in the past, but did not lead to mission 
compromising conditions. The organisation therefore once again oversimplified and 
considered this as an acceptable risk. They accepted the deviations from design criteria 
and with time, these became the norm. The report also concluded that the design of the 
organisation structure created an error enforcing condition whereby one person was 
responsible for multiple and often conflicting responsibilities, such as schedule, cost 
and safety compliance. These are three conflicting responsibilities that should be 
separated in a mindful organisation, but NASA often had them combined. Finally, the 
organisation did not demonstrate a preoccupation with failure or a commitment to 
safety. The crew did not have enough time to prepare for the launch; neither did they 
have adequate basic personal protective equipment such as safety gloves, helmets, and 
harnesses. Finally, there were no contingencies built in in case such incident. The report 
concluded that both a rescue mission and an on-orbit repair by the shuttle astronauts 
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were possible and could have helped prevent the disaster, had NASA built in such 
emergency response processes into their system. In both cases therefore, organisational 
and individual errors played key roles in the initiation and escalation of the disasters.  
 
 
Figure 2.17 – Official portrait of the Columbia crew by NASA for CC public domain 
 
Table 2.9 maps all the causative factors of the NASA Columbia disaster in terms of the 
five high reliability organisation principles. Again, each column represents an HRO 
principle and all the causative factors related with the principle.  
 
Table 2.9: A table that maps the causative factors of NASA Columbia disaster in terms 
the 5 HRO Principles 
 
 
 
Preoccupation with Failure Reluctance to Simplify Sensitivity to Operations Commitment to Resilience Deference to Expertise
Poor risk management 
process                        
Poor organisation structure: 
one person holding three 
conflicting positions.      
Insufficient time to prepare 
for launch            
Inadequate supply of basic 
personal protective devices. 
Disregarded cues from 
previous similar 
occurences.  
Oversimplified and 
accepted the risk from 
foam
Weak decision making    No contingency plan for such 
occurrence.                       
No emergency response plan 
for such occurence
Mapping the causative factors of the NASA Columbia disaster in terms the 5 HRO Principles
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2.6.6 Piper Alpha Disaster (1988) 
On the 6
th
 of July 1988, an explosion occurred at Piper Alpha, an offshore oil platform 
operated by Occidental Petroleum, and located in 474 feet of water in the North Sea, 
about 120 miles north east of Aberdeen, Scotland (Broadribb, 2014). At the time of the 
incident, Piper Alpha’s production was at 125,000 barrels of oil per day. Piper Alpha 
had 4 export risers connected to it: the Flotta oil terminal riser; the 30 inch subsea 
pipeline Occidental Claymore platform riser; the 16 inch Texaco Tartan riser; and 18 
the inch Total MCP-01 gas processing platform riser.  
 
 
Fig 2.18 – Piper Alpha’s interconnections with other platforms 
 
A gas leak from a blind flange at high pressure resulted in an explosion, killing 165 
people on the platform and 2 rescue crews from a standby vessel for a mobile offshore 
drilling unit nearby (Broadribb, 2014).  
 
Investigations (Cullen Report, 1990) revealed that the incident was caused by a mixture 
of actions and inactions of organisations and individuals within the organisation. One of 
2 condensate pumps (Pump A) was taken out for maintenance, and the open pipe was 
closed with a blind flange, but was either not properly tightened, or a blind flange of the 
incorrect rating was used. The maintenance was not completed at close of shift, and the 
technician duly noted this on the permit to work, returned the permit to the control 
room, but reportedly did not inform the night shift. Some divers were working on the 
platform jacket in the evening, and as a result, the diesel and fire pumps were on left on 
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manual. Later that night, Pump B failed and as was the practice, Pump A was started, 
with no knowledge that the maintenance on it had not been completed. Gas leaked out 
from the blind flange and formed a gas cloud, leading to a subsequent explosion that 
destroyed the firewalls, creating secondary fires that kept escalating within a short time. 
Most ranking supervisors and managers were killed in the initial explosion, and as such, 
there were limited evacuation instructions or communications with the crew, and with 
the neighbouring platforms.   
 
The neighbouring Tartan and Claymore platforms did not receive any communication 
from Piper Alpha, and therefore continued to pump oil into the pipeline, further fuelling 
the already escalating. They knew they should shutdown considering the level of 
explosions they could see and hear from Piper Alpha. They did not act based on their 
expertise, rather, waited for shutdown instructions from their respective hierarchical 
management. They continued to pump into the pipeline, further fuelling the explosion 
and massively escalating the disaster.  
 
The Cullen report (1990) determined that the operator’s inadequate maintenance and 
safety practices were the major contributory factors to the initiation and escalation of 
the incident. It was highly critical of the breakdown in the chain of command, and in 
leadership communication with the crew. There were also issues around plant designs 
and management of change. Blast walls were not designed into the process when Piper 
Alpha was upgraded to handle gas. A new hazard (gas) was introduced into the process 
without a proper risk assessment and mitigating process to contain the new hazard 
source. The blast walls could have contained the initial explosion and prevented 
escalation. Furthermore, the shift handover process was deemed ineffective. The 
technician left site without properly handing over the details the job done and the scope 
of remaining work. The new shift on the hand resumed without properly going through 
the records to see if there were some outstanding work before assuming control. With a 
proper permit to work system and shift handover system, the initial blast could have 
been prevented. Finally, the report considered the emergency response process 
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ineffective. This includes the incident escalation process, the evacuation process, the 
escape systems, and the rescue systems.  
 
In conclusion, it is also clear that the disaster could have been avoided with mindful 
actions by the organisations involved and by the individuals within these organisations.  
 
Table 2.10 maps all the causative factors of the Piper Alpha disaster in terms of the five 
high reliability organisation principles. Again, each column represents an HRO 
principle and all the causative factors related with the principle.  
 
Table 2.10: A table that maps the causative factors of Piper Alpha disaster in terms the 
5 HRO Principles 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Preoccupation with Failure Reluctance to Simplify Sensitivity to Operations Commitment to Resilience Deference to Expertise
Inadequate plant design.        
Inadequate change 
management process.                        
Inadequate hazard 
assessment.         
Inadequate maintenance 
procedures.        
Inadequate safety 
procedures.          
Inadequate permit to work 
system.                
Inadequate shift handover 
process. 
Poor shift handover       
Inadequate attention to 
permit process   
Ineffective emergency 
response procedure
Neighbouring plants 
waited on hierarchy 
for shutdown 
instructions, 
inadvertently fueling 
the explosion. 
Mapping the causative factors of the Piper Alpha disaster in terms the 5 HRO Principles
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2.6.7 BP Texas City Incident (2005) 
The BP Texas city incident of March 23
rd
 2005 led to the death of 15 people, injuring 
170 people (Labib & Read, 2013). The incident happened at BP’s Texas City oil 
refinery, considered the 3
rd
 largest refinery in the United States, and BP’s largest and 
most complex refineries with production levels up to 11 million gallons of gasoline per 
day and a having a rated capacity of 460,000 barrels per day. During normal operations, 
while an isomerization process unit was in the process of starting up, there was a loss of 
containment of liquid hydrocarbon, which resulted in a vapour cloud that led to the 
explosion. The raffinate splitter had been shut down for about a month for maintenance 
and was in the process of being restarted. After nitrogen purging and pressure testing, 
cold feed was reintroduced to establish feed drum and column levels. As normal 
operation commenced, the flammable hydrocarbon was continuously pumped into the 
raffinate splitter tower for separation into light and heavy hydrocarbons. The level 
indicator either failed or the operator inadvertently continued filling the distillation 
column for over 3 hours, much longer than the procedure required, until it began to 
overflow. The air gas mixture moved at a pressure of about 64 psi and passed through 
the 21 psi rated safety relief valves which expectedly popped open, allowing the 
mixture to flow to the blow down drum and stack. From here, the mixture was released 
into the atmosphere where it caused a gas cloud build up and eventual explosion. Figure 
2.19 show the process flow at Texas City isomerization process unit.  
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Figure 2.19 – Diagram showing the process flow at the Texas City refinery leading to 
the 2005 incident. Diagram by US CSB (2007) for CC public domain 
 
Investigations (US CSB, 2005) revealed the causative factors to be employee actions or 
inactions that led to loss of containment. Some of the actions and inactions include 
deviations from operating procedures, inadequate supervision, unclear chain of 
command, ambiguity in roles and responsibilities, inadequate emergency response 
practices, inadequate hazard identification, inadequate communication, and plant design 
and engineering problems.  
 
According to Labib & Read (2013), there had been previous events such as leaks, 
vapour releases, and fires involving the isomerization process unit in the past, but these 
events were not taken seriously, nor were learning from them used to improve the 
process. In this instance, the initial causative factor was an operator error of 
inadvertently over filling the distillation column. This column was designed for a 
relatively low level in the distillation column. With the overflow, a mixture of 
hydrocarbon liquid and gas flowed out of the gas line at the top of the distillation 
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column, through the emergency overflow piping, and vented hundreds of feet away. 
The hydrocarbon vapour, in the presence of oxygen, presented an explosive air-gas 
mixture that was ignited by a truck engine left idling in the area.  
 
 
Figure 2.20 – Photo showing the aftermath of the 2005 explosion at BP Texas City 
refinery. Photo by US CSB (2012) for CC public domain 
 
The final report (BP, 2005; Labib & Read, 2013) also considered organisational and 
personnel errors as the primary causative factors for the incident. First, the loss of 
containment was as a result of operator error in overfilling the unit. Secondly, if there 
was a provision within the design to shut off or recycle the flow, or reduce the base 
temperature if the level exceeds a certain level, the disaster could have been averted. 
Thirdly, the operators did not follow specified procedures, neither was there adequate 
supervision during the start-up, resulting in overfilling the unit, a delayed start-up of the 
unit, wrong start-up sequence, and a start-up at higher temperature that is specified. In 
addition to this, communication and adequate control of work in adjacent vicinity was 
inadequate. The unit was wrongly not considered hazardous in earlier designs and as 
such, people working nearby were neither warned of the start-up process and the 
impending danger when the loss of containment occurred. Furthermore, the emergency 
response process was ineffective. The emergency alarms were not activated in time, and 
people working in trailers within the vicinity of the unit were neither warned nor 
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evacuated when the loss of containment occurred, increasing the severity of the 
incident. Finally, although the unit was not tied to the relief flare system at design, there 
had been several modifications to the process design with no corresponding 
modification to the flare system. According to Mogford (2005), introducing a relief 
flare system would have burnt off the hydrocarbon vapour leading to a much reduced 
impact of the incident. In summary, like the disasters before it, the Texas City incident 
was also as a result of the actions and inactions of organisations and individuals within 
the organisation.  
 
Table 2.11 maps all the causative factors of the Texas City disaster in terms of the five 
high reliability organisation principles. Again, each column represents an HRO 
principle and all the causative factors related with the principle.  
 
Table 2.11: A table that maps the causative factors of Texas City disaster in terms the 5 
HRO Principles 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Preoccupation with Failure Reluctance to Simplify Sensitivity to Operations Commitment to Resilience Deference to Expertise
Inadequate hazard 
identification and 
assessment.                    
Poor plant engineering and 
design. There should have 
been a shut off or recycle 
flow process at high 
temperatures.               
Plant modification with no 
corresponding hazard 
assessment. 
Disregarded cues of 
possible reoccurence 
based on similar 
occurences in the past. 
Deviation from operating 
procedures.                
Poor supervision.         
Unclear chain of command  
Ambigous roles and 
responsibilities.           
Poor communication. 
Inadequate training
Inadequate emergency 
response practices.    
Emergency alarms not 
activated in time
Mapping the causative factors of the Texas City disaster in terms the 5 HRO Principles
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2.6.8  BP Deepwater Horizon Incident (2010) 
The BP Deep water horizon incident is another disaster that demonstrates the influence 
of human and organisational causative factors in disasters. On April 20 2010, an 
explosion destroyed the BP Deepwater Horizon drilling rig in the Northern Gulf of 
Mexico, resulting in 11 fatalities and 17 injuries, and leading to a spill of over 4.9 
million barrels of crude oil, the largest marine oil spill in the history of the petroleum 
industry (Guard, 2011). The spill caused extensive damage to aquatic and wildlife 
habitats with heavy impact on fishing, sea transport, and tourism. The public images of 
the BP and that of its partners such as Halliburton and Transocean were tarnished. As at 
2013, BP had lost US$42.2 billion in criminal and civil settlements and payments 
(Fontevecchia, 2013)  
 
 
Figure 2.21 – Picture showing Deepwater Horizon offshore production unit on fire. 
Photo by US Coast Guard (2010) for CC public domain 
 
The drilling rig had resumed drilling the Macondo well in the seafloor at a depth of 
about 8000 feet. High pressure methane gas from the well expanded into the drilling 
riser and rose into the drilling rig. Investigations (Labib, 2014) have shown that the 
hydrocarbon was released through poorly designed cement barriers that had been earlier 
cast to isolate the well. The hydrocarbon gas mixed with mud with a resultant increased 
pressure that damaged the gasket inside the blowout preventer. The blowout preventer 
is designed to seal off a well in case of, or to prevent over pressure. With the blowout 
preventer gasket damaged, large quantities of oil, gas, and mud flowed up the rig unto 
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the rig surface leading to the initial explosion. This initial explosion damaged the cables 
that link the blowout preventer to the control room, thereby reducing the likelihood of 
initial intervention. The hydrocarbon leak continued, spilling into the engine room and 
triggering a second and more massive explosion.  
 
 
Figure 2.22 – A schematic illustration of a subsea blowout preventer stack installed on a 
seabed. Diagram by 84user for CC public domain 
 
 The On Scene Coordinator report (Guard, 2011) summarized the magnitude of the 
disaster by the amount of resources committed to the clean up between April 20
th
 2010 
and January 31
st
 2011 and its impacts. According to the report, “on a single most 
demanding day of the response, over 6000 vessels, 82 helicopters and 20 fixed wing 
aircraft and over 47,849 personnel/responders were assigned; 88,522 square miles of 
fisheries were closed; 168 visibly oiled wildlife were collected; 3,795,985 feet of 
containment boom was deployed; 26 controlled insitu burns were conducted, burning 
59,550 barrels of oil; 181 miles of shoreline were heavily to moderately oiled; 68,530 
gallons (1632 barrels) of dispersant were applied, and 27,097 barrels of oil removed”.    
 
Reports on the 2010 BP Deep water horizon incident also indicates that human factors 
such as poor design, poor maintenance of safety systems, failure to interpret a failure 
test, delay in reacting to signals, poor communication, inadequate training, and 
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management issues contributed to the disaster. Labib (2014), citing a DSHP report on 
the investigations into the Macondo well blowout, considered poor design of cement 
barrier as the main cause of the blowout. To compound the error of poor design, the 
cement barrier was not function tested to confirm its suitability to withstand the 
pressures. Secondly, poor maintenance practices at Deepwater Horizon meant that the 
fire and gas systems did not work when they were expected to do so. This system could 
have prevented the explosion. In addition to this, the emergency response management 
process was ineffective. The safety alarms were non-functional, the crews were not 
properly coordinated, and most of the crew had no clue what was going on. When it 
eventually became clear what was going on, most members of the crew were not sure 
how to respond: some wanted to jump into the sea, while others wanted to wait for the 
lifeboats. The lifeboats were not adequate for the number of personnel: only two 
lifeboats were ready, and even then, they were only partially full. The report further 
blamed BP and its partners for a series of cost cutting decisions that culminated in the 
compromise of process safety. In all, human and organisational causative factors 
contributed to the initiation and escalation of the disaster.  
 
Table 2.12 maps all the causative factors of the Deepwater Horizon disaster in terms of 
the five high reliability organisation principles. Again, each column represents an HRO 
principle and all the causative factors related with the principle.  
 
Table 2.12: A table that maps the causative factors of Deepwater Horizon disaster in 
terms the 5 HRO Principles 
 
 
Preoccupation with Failure Reluctance to Simplify Sensitivity to Operations Commitment to Resilience Deference to Expertise
Poorly designed cement 
barrier                          
Poor maintenance 
procedures.                      
No function test of cement 
barriers.                             
No function test of safety 
safety systems.               
Non functional safety 
alarms. 
Failure to interprete a 
safety test.                    
Poor communication         
Inadequate training           
Poor maintenance 
practices.                      
Poor crew coordination. 
Delay in reacting to signals    
Inadequate emergency 
response training.            
Inadequate supply of 
lifeboats Poor mustering 
process        
Mapping the causative factors of the Deepwater Horizon disaster in terms the 5 HRO Principles
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2.6.9 Chapter Summary 
The Rio-Paris Flight 447 (Moura et al, 2016), the 2011 Fukushima nuclear disaster 
(Labib & Harris, 2014), and the 2000 Concorde crash (Labib, 2014) all share similar 
characteristics of the significance of avoidable causative factors.  
 
Some studies have also shown that the effects of natural disasters could be mitigated 
through human actions. For instance, a modelling exercise conducted by the U.S. Army 
Corps of Engineers on Hurricane Katrina (Anderson, 2007) shows that 2 out of every 3 
deaths in the Hurricane were due to levee and floodwall failure, and therefore could 
have been avoided. Rogers et al. (2015) supported this claim and concluded that the 
flooding during the hurricane Katrina "could have been prevented had the corps retained 
an external review board to double-check its flood-wall designs." In a bid to cut cost, 
the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the designers of the flood control system and 
builders, had made a decision to use shorter steel sheet pilings. This, with the benefit of 
hindsight proved flawed and contributed to the levee and floodwall failure, leading to 
deaths of hundreds of people. The emergency response process was also considered 
flawed and the fallout led to the resignation of key personnel in the Federal Emergency 
management Agency, including their director, and the New Orleans Police 
Superintendent. Political leaders, most notably the then Mayor or New Orleans, the then 
Governor, and the then President of the United States were criticized for their 
inadequate response to the emergency.  
 
In some cases, the organisations, agencies, institutions, and individuals involved in the 
disasters could not recover from the social, political, and financial impact of these 
disasters. In some other cases, the organisations, agencies, institutions, and individuals 
withstood the impacts and evolved to become stronger and more competitive. 
Understanding the differences between these two categories of organisations, agencies, 
institutions, and individuals and how they are able to design their processes to withstand 
the vagaries of operations and remain competitive forms the basis for studying high 
reliability organisations.  
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The next two sections shall set the stage for developing the measurement standards by 
discussing some literatures around the concepts of benchmarking and maturity models.  
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2.7 Benchmarking 
Benchmarking is considered as one of the most successful processes of assessment and 
continuous improvement (Tasopoulou & Tsiotras, 2017). Vlăsceanu et al. (2004) 
defines benchmarking as a standardized method for collecting and reporting critical 
operational data in a way that enables relevant comparisons among the performances of 
different organisations or programmes, usually with a view to establishing good 
practice, diagnosing problems in performance, and identifying areas of strength. 
Similarly, Blackstock et al. (2012) defines it as the “process of self-evaluation and self-
improvement through the systematic and collaborative comparison of practice and 
performance with similar organisations in order to identify strengths and weaknesses, to 
learn to adapt and to set new targets to improve performance”. Benchmarking compares 
actual and planned practices to those of comparable organisations in order to identify 
best practices, generate improvement ideas, and generate a basis for performance 
measurement (Invernizzi et al, 2017) 
 
A comparable Japanese work for benchmarking is “dantotsu”, which literally means: 
the best way to be the best of the best. It is therefore a practical tool that aids users to 
learn from best practices and processes, with a view to improving their own practices 
and procedures, and possibly surpass those best practices and procedures. It helps users 
examine how others have achieved their performance levels and to understand the 
processes the adopted with a view to business improvement.  
 
There is no universally accepted process for benchmarking. Camp (1989) developed a 
12 step approach to benchmarking. This includes the selection of the subject; definition 
of the process; identification of potential partners; identification of the data source; and 
collection of data and selection of partners. The other stages include the determination 
of the gap, establishment of the process differences, targeting future performance, 
communication, adjustment of goals, implementation, and review. This has been refined 
by different organisations to suit their needs. In all, most benchmarking processes occur 
in three stages: 
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 The diagnostic stage: where the performance metrics are compared with other 
organisations to identify gaps and organisations to learn from. 
 The analysis stage: where the practices behind the numbers are evaluated  
 Implementation stage: where the best practices are implemented 
 
A more detailed benchmarking process step would be divided into planning, evaluation, 
integration, implementation, and maturity stages. The planning stage is normally a 
painstaking stage as any errors here would potentially negate the intent of the 
benchmarking exercise. During the planning stage, the organisation is expected to: 
 Identify what is to be benchmarked 
 Identify comparative companies 
 Determine data collection methods 
 Collect relevant data 
 
The evaluation stage involves going over all the data collected during planning, as well 
as the reasons for the better outcome of the benchmarked processes. The organisation 
would thereafter set goals in line with benchmarked processes. During the evaluation 
stage, the organisation is expected to: 
 Perform a gap assessment and identify performance gaps 
 Identify potential performance projections 
 
The evaluation stage would be followed by the integration stage where the organisation 
would: 
 Communicate benchmark findings among relevant stakeholders 
 Gain acceptance from the stakeholders 
 Establish functional goals. 
 
As soon as the functional goals are established, the next stage would be to implement. 
During implementation, the organisation would be expected to: 
 Develop action plans with all the factors involved such as time line, responsible 
owners, and targets. 
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 Implement agreed actions. During implementation, management buy-in is 
critical, and as such, senior management would normally drive the coordination 
of activities, monitor implementation progress, and act promptly to de-
bottleneck the implementation process.  
 Use feedback from the results to improve the benchmarks. 
 
There are generally three types of benchmarking. Internal benchmarking involves 
comparing different business units, operating units, or departments against a standard 
the organisation has set for itself. Competitor benchmarking involves benchmarking 
against other organisations within the same industry that are in direct competition, such 
as where Google benchmarks against Yahoo; Apple against Microsoft; or University of 
Portsmouth against University of Southampton. External benchmarking, also regarded 
as “Best in Class” benchmarking involves benchmarking an organisation against other 
organisations both within and outside their industry, that are considered to be at the 
highest level in the indicators being benchmarked against. An example would be 
manufacturing company benchmarking its safety standard against Lufthansa Airlines, if 
Lufthansa is considered a “best in class” in safety.  
 
Despite the obvious advantages of benchmarking, there are a few pitfalls that 
practitioners should bear in mind before adopting the process. First, there is no 
guarantee that the performance indicators used to improve one organisation would be 
appropriate in another organisation. Secondly, poor definition and planning could 
potentially render the benchmarking process useless with results that irrelevant. Poor 
planning might also develop performance indicators that are not fit for purpose, or 
would lead to incorrect comparisons. They might be indicators that are not properly 
aligned with the business process, and would therefore be counterproductive, or a waste 
of resources and man-hours. Finally, implementing a benchmarking exercise without 
establishing a baseline would make it impossible for the organisation to know when the 
processes are improving. A careful and mindful implementation of the benchmarking 
process however would ultimately lead to organisational maturity. Organisational 
maturity would be discussed in the next section. 
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2.8 Maturity Models 
Researchers have studied organisations’ maturity levels as a way of improving 
performance. De Bruin & Rosemann (2005) defined a maturity model as “a measure to 
evaluate the capabilities of an organisation in regards to a certain discipline”. It is a 
framework that describes a methodical progression through successive stages of 
maturity with incremental maturity behaviours, towards the desired maturity 
behaviours. It helps organisations identify their current status in terms of the subject 
being reviewed, identify where similar organisations are in terms of the same subject 
and benchmark themselves against acceptable standards, often the best in class. It 
describes a gradual path to sustain the status or progress to a desired maturity level, with 
a view to optimizing continuous performance improvement. It allows for individuals 
and organisational internal interdepartmental and external assessments, to self-assess 
the state of maturity of various aspects of their processes against benchmarks 
(Neuhauser, 2004), with a view to optimizing continuous performance improvement 
(Demir & Kocabas, 2010).  
 
Maturity models attempt to systematise certain processes prevalent in organisations 
considered as mature, and describe precise criteria for attaining and progressing through 
different maturity levels. Maturity models describe expected behaviour for each level 
and the behaviour usually improves towards the desired behaviour as the maturity level 
increases. For an organisation trying to implement a maturity model, the first step 
would normally be for it to establish its current status. It would then perform a gap 
assessment to determine the variance between its current maturity level and the desired. 
Once the gap is determined, the organisation would progressively perform specific 
actions to close the gap and attain its desired maturity level. Afterwards, it would 
continuously perform specific actions to ensure the sustainability of the attained 
maturity level.  
 
Some researchers have tried to question the usefulness staged maturity models in 
organisational improvement.  While accepting the usefulness of staged maturity models 
in large organisations, Huang & Zhang (2010) questioned its usefulness in small and 
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medium scale organisations. They cited conflicts with business operations, cost 
overruns, poor implementation by consultants, absence of specialized personnel, and 
inefficient alignment of the model with business goals as key bottlenecks faced by small 
and medium scaled organisations during the implementation of staged maturity models. 
Beadell (2009) questioned the usefulness of a staged maturity model in an engineer’s 
job performance and job satisfaction. He also questioned the embedded theories and the 
extent to which they exploit the negative effects of the organisation with respect to the 
worker. Uskarci & Demirors (2017) also questioned the continuity, extent, and 
participation characteristics of staged maturity models. They analysed the software 
process improvement activities and employee perception within 2 different software 
companies on maturity level 3 – the mid-point on most maturity models. They 
concluded that despite the usefulness of the maturity model, there were short comings 
with respect to organisation wide continuous improvement. The implementation was 
heavily influenced by the quality and motivation levels of the personnel, as well as their 
roles within the organisational hierarchy. They therefore argue that although staged 
maturity models are key to organisational improvement, the contribution of employees 
during implementation could potentially derail the process and erode the potential 
process improvement gains. In all these arguments, one thread is common: the 
effectiveness of a staged maturity model directly proportional to the effectiveness of its 
implementation. This ties closely with the keys to a successful benchmarking exercise 
as discussed in Section 2.7. Faulty implementation would negate the aims of adopting 
the model.  
 
Research indicates that organisations with higher maturity levels are expected to be 
successful in terms of effectiveness and efficiency; thus they have a competitive 
advantage in the marketplace (Backlund et al, 2014; Nikkhou et al, 2016). According to 
a UK Office of Government Commerce publication in 2010, more mature organisations 
have experienced an 85% reduction in defects and a 75% reduction in cost (Nikkhou et 
al, 2016). 
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Most of the works on maturity models were adapted from Crosby’s (1979) work on 
quality management. The purpose of the maturity model was to provide a roadmap for 
organisations on their march towards a formalized quality improvement programme. 
Crosby (1979) developed a quality management maturity model (Table 2.13) that 
mapped organisations into five maturity stages: stage 1 - Uncertainty, stage 2 - 
Awakening, stage 3 - Enlightenment, stage 4 - Wisdom, and stage 5 – Certainty, with 
uncertainty being the lowest and certainty being the highest. To him, the higher an 
organisation is on the maturity grid, the better the product quality. For each level, 
categories of dimensions were assigned. These include: management understanding and 
attitude; quality organisation status; problem handling; cost of quality as a percentage of 
sales; quality improvement actions; and summary of company quality posture. For 
immature organisations in level 1, Crosby maintained that product quality was at the 
lowest with poor management understanding of the issues surrounding quality. These 
issues improved as the organisation moved up the maturity grid 
 
Table 2.13 - Crosby’s quality management maturity model showing the five stages of 
maturity mapped against quality management dimensions. Adapted from Crosby (1979) 
 
Stage 1: Uncertainty Stage 2: Awakening Stage 3: Enlightenment Stage 4: Wisdom Stage 5: Certainty
Management 
Understanding
No comprehension of 
quality as a management 
tool. Tend to blame 
quality department for 
"quality problems".
Recognising that quality 
management may be of 
value but not willing to 
provide money or time 
to make it all happen.
While going through 
quality improvement 
programme learn more 
about quality 
management; becoming 
supportive and helpful
Participating. Understand 
absolutes of quality 
management. Recognise 
their personal role in 
continuing emphasis.
Consider quality 
management as an 
essential part of company 
system
Quality 
organisation 
status
Quality is hidden in 
manufacturing or 
engineering departments. 
Inspection probably not 
part of organisation. 
Emphasis on appraisal 
and sorting.
A stronger quality 
leader is appointed but 
main emphasis is still 
on appraisal and moving 
the product. Still part of 
manufacturing or other.
Quality department 
reports to top 
management, all 
appraisal is incorporated 
and manager has role in 
management of 
company.
Quality manager is an 
officer of company; 
effective status reporting 
and preventive action. 
Involved with customer 
affairs and special 
assignments.
Quality manager on board 
of directors. Prevention is 
main concern. Quality is a 
thought leader.
Problem 
handling
Problems are fought as 
they occur; no resolution; 
inadequate definition; lots 
of yelling and 
accusations.
Teams are set up to 
attack major problems. 
Long-range solutions 
are not solicited.
Corrective action 
communication 
established. Problems 
are faced openly and 
resolved in an orderly 
way.
Problems are identified 
early in their 
development. All 
functions are open to 
suggestion and 
improvement.
Except in the most usual 
cases, problems are 
prevented.
Reported: Unknown Reported: 3% Reported: 8% Reported: 6.5% Reported: 2.5%
Actual: 20% Actual: 18% Actual: 12% Actual: 8% Actual: 2.5%
Quality 
improvement 
actions
No organised activities. 
No understanding of such 
activities
Trying obvious 
"motivational" short-
range efforts.
Implementation of a multi-
step programme (e.g. 
Crosby's 14-step) with 
thorough understanding 
and establishment of 
each step.
Continuing the multi-step 
programme and starting 
other pro-active / 
preventive product quality 
initiatives.
Quality improvement is a 
normal and continued 
activity.
Summary of 
company 
quality posture
"We don't know why we 
have problems with 
quality".
"Is it absolutely 
necessary to always 
have problems with 
quality?"
"Through management 
commitment and quality 
improvement we are 
identifying and resolving 
our problems."
"Defect prevention is a 
routine part of our 
operation."
"We know why we do not 
have problems with 
quality."
Cost of quality 
as % of sales
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Crosby’s research led to the development of maturity grids for different management 
fields. Introna et al (2014) proposed the energy management maturity model. They 
structured it much like Crosby’s quality management maturity model with 5 stages: 
stage 1- initial, stage 2 - occasional, stage 3 - planning, stage 4 - managerial, and stage 
5 - optimal. Nikkhou et al (2016) developed the portfolio management maturity model 
using the same model developed by Crosby. They also recognized 5 increasing maturity 
levels of recognition, forming, dynamism, wisdom, and property.  
 
Using Crosby’s model, Antil (1991) and later Fernandez et al (2003) and Oliveira et al 
(2012) modified the quality management maturity model and adapted it to suit 
maintenance management body of knowledge. They focused the categories of 
dimension to reflect management understanding and attitude; problem handling; 
company maintenance posture; and computerized maintenance management systems.  
 
Table 2.14 - Maintenance management maturity model showing the five maturity stages 
mapped against four maintenance dimensions. Adapted from Fernandez et al (2003) 
 
 
The maturity level of each maintenance organisations would determine the maintenance 
strategies adopted. For instance, Oliveira (2012) showed that whereas lower maturity 
organisations deployed only corrective maintenance, had no computerized maintenance 
Stage 1: Uncertainty Stage 2: Awakening Stage 3: EnlightenmentStage 4: Wisdom Stage 5: Certainty
Management 
understanding 
& attitude
No comprehension of 
maintenance as a 
management tool
Recognition that 
maintenance 
management may be of 
value
Learn more about 
maintenance 
management: becomes 
supportive
Participative and 
recognised its role
Maintenance is an 
essential part of the 
company system
Problem 
handling
Problems are fought as 
they occur
Still reactive but with 
spare parts available 
when failures occur
Problems solved by 
input from maintenance, 
operations, engineering 
and quality control
Predictive using 
monitoring techniques
Problems are prevented 
increasing availability and 
therefore productivity
Company 
maintenance 
posture
"We don't know why we 
have problems in 
maintenance"
"Is it necessary to have 
problems with 
maintenance?"
"We identify and solve 
problems"
"Quality products 
cannot be made with 
poorly maintained 
equipment, therefore 
quality maintenance is a 
routine"
"We don't expect 
breakdown, on the 
contrary, we are 
surprised when they 
occur"
CMMS No CMMS used System contains asset 
and materials 
management modules
A condition monitoring 
event module is 
integrated into the 
system
Capable to generate 
PM schedules. A DSS 
is used to support the 
decision making process
Fully austomated. From 
the detection of failure to 
the generating of work 
orders based on 
meaningful and reliable 
information.
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management system, used no key performance indicators, and had no management 
models in place; medium organisation progressed to a combination of corrective and 
preventive maintenance, used few simple key performance indicators and generic 
computerized maintenance management systems, and adopted some form of total 
productive maintenance. The more mature organisations on the other hand deployed 
predictive maintenance, used specialised key performance indicators, customised 
computerized maintenance management systems, and deployed a number of 
management models like total productive maintenance, reliability cantered 
maintenance, and maintenance engineering. Oliveira (2012) also observed that mature 
organisations are characterised by the systematic and standardized way they conduct 
their business. They act and achieve their objectives consistently irrespective of which 
personnel is on duty, and irrespective of the individual differences of personnel.  
Immature organisations on the other hand rely on the heroic and often-spontaneous 
approaches of individuals, who depend on their often-biased individual experiences and 
often times lose their targets by wide margins of error. Understanding these would 
therefore help the organisation to deploy improvement resources optimally. 
 
Other maturity models include the maturity model for production management 
(Kosieradzka, 2017), safety culture maturity model (Fleming, 2000), Capability 
Maturity Model (CMM); Capability Maturity Model Integration (CMMI); Modelling 
Maturity Levels (MML); and Organisational Project Management Maturity Model 
(OPM3).  
 
This research leveraged Crosby’s model (table 2.19), and the maintenance management 
maturity model (table 2.20) to develop its maturity model, the Organisational Reliability 
Maturity Model (ORM
2
) but with focus on organisational reliability dimension. The 
research sees a close relationship between quality, maintenance, and reliability 
management and therefore developed its maturity model to mirror these two models. 
Furthermore, the models discussed earlier mostly follow a similar structure of mapping 
the maturity models against their own individual dimensions. This research utilised the 
same five maturity levels as used by Crosby (1979), Antil (1991), and Fernandez et al 
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(2003) and Oliveira (2012), but mapped them against the five principles of high 
reliability organisation theory instead of the quality dimensions used by Crosby (1979, 
or maintenance dimensions used by Antil (1991), and Fernandez et al (2003) and 
Oliveira (2012). It also moved a little bit away from Crosby’s choice of terms for the 
maturity levels, choosing instead five terms “Silent”, “Starter”, “Stable”, “Sustain”, 
and “Summit”. These words are simplistic and are used in an alliterative manner to 
enhance visibility and usability. This research believes that it would be easier to 
visualize and remember these words than the terms “Uncertainty, Awakening, 
Enlightenment, Wisdom, and Certainty”, all of which could require further literature 
reviews to fully understand. Finally, by referring to this model as the “5S Model”, this 
research hopes to enhance visualization and comprehension, and hopefully connect 
better with the potential users. The model would be discussed in more details in chapter 
five. 
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2.9 Chapter Summary 
This chapter has identified and discussed some relevant literature that helped to shape 
the research. The research had set out to investigate the extent to which the mindfulness 
of organisations could be measured, as well as the ability of these measurements to help 
improve the maturity of organisations. The research tried to argue that most disasters 
are resultant effects of the lack of mindfulness in organisations, and that for disasters to 
be prevented, the mindfulness of organisations must first be improved. This chapter 
therefore discussed 7 of the world’s worst disasters to gain a perspective on how they 
happened, the circumstances that led to the disasters, and the mindful actions that could 
have prevented their occurrence.  
 
The chapter started with the circumstances surrounding the Titanic sinking in 1912 and 
attributed the causative factors to human and lack of organisational mindfulness. It 
further discussed the Bhopal disaster  of 1984; the Chernobyl nuclear disaster of 1986; 
the 1986 explosion of NASA’s Challenger; the 2003 explosion of NASA’s space 
shuttle, the Columbia; the 1988 Piper Alpha disaster; the 2005 BP Texas City refinery 
disaster; and the 2010 BP Deep water Horizon disaster. In each of the incidents, the 
research tied the causative factors to organisational and human influences. In addition to 
these disasters the chapter also described a few natural disasters and argued in favour of 
human and organisational influences in reducing the impacts of the natural disasters. It 
argues for instance that casualties of hurricane Katrina could have been tremendously 
reduced by the mindful behaviours of the responsible people before during and after the 
hurricane.  
 
The chapter described 8 different perspectives about the causative factors of disasters. 
These perspectives include the Normal accident theory as described by Perrow in 1984; 
Turner’s man-made disaster model; the energy and barrier model; the conflicting 
objectives theory; defence-in-depth model; inherently safer design model; the principles 
of resilient engineering; and the high reliability organisation theory. It each perspective, 
the chapter tries to show how it relates or differs from some other perspectives, as well 
as how the perspective ties into the research’s perspectives.  
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Finally, the chapter described literatures surrounding the concepts of mindfulness, 
benchmarking, and maturity models. These are all key concepts that will recur for the 
duration of the research and therefore their meanings with respect to the research had to 
be explained.  
 
Chapter 3 will describe the methods and methodologies utilized during the data 
collection and analysis. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
Methodology 
3.1 Introduction 
Chapter two has identified and discussed some relevant literature that helped to shape 
the research. It tried to argue that most disasters are resultant effects of the lack of 
mindfulness in organisations, and that for disasters to be prevented, the mindfulness of 
organisations must first be improved. To highlight this, the chapter described seven of 
the world’s worst disasters, and traced their causative factors to lack of individual and 
organisational mindfulness. It pointed out that the circumstances that led to the disasters 
could have been avoided through mindful behaviours of the respective social entities 
within the organisations. In addition to the industrial disasters, it also argued that human 
and organisational influences could reduce the impacts of the natural disasters such as 
hurricane Katrina.  
 
The chapter described literatures on different perspectives about the causative factors of 
disasters, their differences and relationships, as well as how they tie into the 
perspectives of this research. Finally, the chapter discussed the concepts of mindfulness, 
benchmarking, and maturity models - all key concepts that helps develop the research.  
 
Chapter three will describe the methods and methodologies utilized during the data 
collection and analysis process. Crotty (1998) stated that for a research to be considered 
successful, it must clearly state and explain all the choices it made to arrive at its data. 
The chapter therefore sets out to explain the choices made in this research; adopting the 
Saunders’ research onion (Saunders et al, 2016) as a theoretical lens. The onion (figure 
3.1) depicts the factors underlying the choice of data collection techniques and analysis 
methods. It has five outer layers that must first be peeled open, understood and 
explained, before the method of data collection and analysis that resides at its core can 
be understood. These five outer layers include the research philosophy, the approach to 
theory development, methodological choice, research strategies, and the time horizons. 
The research onion is a very useful tool due to its adaptability for most research 
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methodologies and varying contexts (Bryman, 2016). 
 
 
 
Fig 3.1: Research onion depicting the factors underlying the choice of data collection 
techniques and analysis methods. Adapted from Saunders et al. (2016) 
 
Using the onions, this chapter describes the data gathering process and discusses the 
rationale behind the choices and assumptions made during the data gathering process. It 
starts by examining the various philosophical underpinning, and the approaches to 
theory development behind this research. It explains and justifies the assumptions and 
rationale behind these philosophical choices in relation the myriad of alternatives 
available. It then delves into the research design, where it discusses the various choices 
and strategies involved. Furthermore, it describes the research sampling techniques and 
processes; data collection techniques and processes; issues around reliability and 
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validity; as well as the research limitations. Finally, it narrates all the ethical 
considerations made in the course of the research.  
 
The next section shall describe different research philosophies in academic research. It 
shall highlight the philosophy adopted by this research and provide justifications for the 
adopting some philosophies over others.   
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3.2       Research Philosophy 
3.2.1 Introduction to Research Philosophy 
Research philosophies are the set of beliefs concerning the nature of the reality being 
researched (Bryman, 2016), and they justify how researches are carried out (Flick, 
2015). The usefulness or otherwise of understanding research philosophies and adopting 
one philosophy over another has been an ongoing debate among scholars (Knudsen, 
2002; Mkansi & Acheampong, 2012; Saunders et al, 2016). This debate has been 
exacerbated by the apparent lack of consensus among the proponents of the 
classifications and descriptions of the various taxonomies of the research philosophies 
as used by different scholars.  
 
Among the proponents of understanding and adopting research philosophies, two 
positions – unificationism and pluralism, have emerged (Knudsen 2003). Unificationists 
such as Pfeffer (1993) lean heavily on Kuhn (1970) and Polanyi (1958), both of whom 
argue for the unification of management research under a uniform philosophy, paradigm 
and methodology. To them, management research could learn from scientific research, 
which are paradigmatically developed and thus tend to have more structure and a more 
rapid advancement Knudsen (2002). Pluralists on the other hand believe in the “more 
the merrier” syndrome. To them, the diversity helps enrich business and management 
research field (Saunders et al, 2016). Different theories are therefore required to 
understand complex realities associated with management research, as well as enhance 
competition. This research therefore tries to avoid the ‘specialization trap’ (Knudsen 
(2002) by adopting the pluralism perspective, while keeping focus on the research 
questions and the limits of the research to avoid straying along the ‘fragmentation trap’ 
(Knudsen (2002). 
 
Research philosophies are influenced by philosophical assumptions and these 
assumptions must be understood to gain clearer insights into how the philosophies 
contribute to the data collection and analysis process. These assumptions include 
axiological assumptions, ontological assumptions, and epistemological assumptions. 
Axiological assumptions refer to values and ethics and will be discussed in more details 
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in section 3.9: Ethical considerations.  
 
Ontological assumptions refer to assumptions a research makes about the nature of 
reality (Saunders et al, 2016), and clarifies the position of the research on reality. These 
assumptions determine the view of the research based on the objectivity or subjectivity 
of its reality (Bogdan & Bilken, 1998; Blaikie, 2007). Whereas objectivism is derived 
from the natural sciences and views the social reality of the research as external to the 
social actors, subjectivism is derived from the arts and humanities, and sees the social 
reality as a function of the actions, perceptions, and nuances of the social actors 
(Bogdan & Bilken, 1998; Bryman & Cramer, 2001; Hatch & Cunliffe, 2006; Bell & 
Bryman, 2007; Blaikie, 2007; Bryman, 2016; Saunders et al, 2016)  
 
Given that this research expects to study the behaviour of the organisations as well as 
the people within the organisations to help apply the high reliability organisations 
theory towards organisational maturity improvement, it is therefore necessary for the 
research to combine both objective and subjective assumptions. This research makes 
objective assumptions based on facts and figures derived from secondary sources and 
questionnaires. It also uses subjective assumptions derived from the feelings, 
understandings, perceptions, and nuances of the social players within the organisations, 
obtained through interviews, to triangulate the objective assumptions.  
 
Epistemological assumptions on the other hand refer to the considerations of what 
constitute acceptable, valid, and legitimate knowledge (Saunders et al, 2016). They are 
assumptions about the grounds of knowledge, how to define and separate what is 
regarded as ‘true’ from what is regarded as ‘false’, and how knowledge might be 
understood and communicated to others (Burrel & Morgan, 1979; Hassard, 2012; 
Bryman, 2016). They are assumptions about how to gain the knowledge of reality, how 
what exists may be known, what can be known, and the criteria that must be fulfilled to 
describe what is known as knowledge (Blaikie, 2007). These assumptions explore the 
sources and limits of knowledge, and determine whether knowledge can be acquired or 
personally experienced (Burrel & Morgan, 1979; Temple & Johnson, 1998). They 
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question the research methods and how knowledge can be produced and validated 
(Eriksson & Kovalainen, 2015).  
 
This research delves into the multidisciplinary realm of operations and process 
management, organisational behaviour, human behaviour, and interpersonal 
relationships. It would therefore be expected that different types of knowledge could be 
considered legitimate for this research. With a variety of acceptable epistemologies 
come a wide variety of choice of methods, and the inherent effect those variety of 
choice of methods could have on the strengths and limitations of the research findings 
(Saunders et al, 2016). This research agrees with the positivist assumption that objective 
facts offer the best credibility as they are less open to bias, are easily verifiable and 
replicable. It also understands that to explore its multidisciplinary concepts of 
operations and process management, organisational behaviour, human behaviour, and 
interpersonal relationships, it must be open to exploring other subjectivist assumptions. 
These subjectivist epistemological assumptions are more likely to offer a rich and 
complex view of organisational realities, account for the differences in individual 
contexts and experiences and are therefore better equipped to explore the social realties 
surrounding the social actors (Saunders et al, 2016). The research therefore used a 
combination of epistemologies to arrive at its results and conclusions.  
 
Research philosophies are the cornerstones of a research. Although they might view the 
research goals and the possible roadmap towards achieving these goals differently 
(Goddard & Melville, 2004), they complement, rather than oppose one another. Their 
choice is dependent on the type of knowledge under research (May, 2011). The 
philosophies helped this research to determine the evidence required, how they are 
gathered and interpreted, and how they would provide answers to the questions under 
investigation. They helped the research identify early enough, which research design 
will work or otherwise. They also encouraged creativity and innovations where the 
design could be beyond the experience of the researcher or where there could be 
constraints of different subjects or knowledge structures (Easterby-Smith et al, 2012).  
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The five different philosophies identified by Saunders et al (2016) in the ‘research 
onion’, as well as how each is related to and applied by this research will be discussed 
next. These include positivism, critical realism, interpretivism, post modernism, and 
pragmatism.  
 
3.2.2 Positivism 
Positivism relates to the philosophical position of the natural sciences and views social 
entities as real, just as natural scientists would view physical objects and natural 
phenomena (Creswell, 2013; Saunders et al, 2016). It entails working with discrete 
observable social reality and events that interact in an observable, determined, and 
regular manner. It would usually lead to statistical analysis and the production of 
credible and meaningful data (Saunders et al, 2016; Collins, 2010). Positivism holds 
that “the social world exists externally, and that its properties should be measured 
through objective methods, rather than being inferred subjectively through sensation, 
reflection, or intuition” (Easterby-Smith et al, 2012). Positivism relies on data from 
experiments, samplings, and surveys to objectively interpret reality (Gill & Johnson, 
2010) and the product of such research should be “law-like generalizations” akin to 
physical and natural science. These generalizations become rules and laws that would 
help explain and predict behaviours and events of social entities and organisations 
(Saunders et al, 2016).  
 
The researcher adopts a positivist approach through the use of secondary data, as well 
as through questionnaires. The questionnaires were administered anonymously with the 
respondents required to select from a list of pre-determined responses without any 
chance of the researcher influencing the data. This method kept the researcher neutral, 
detached from the responses, and therefore external to the data collection process - a 
key element of the positivist philosophy (Saunders et al, 2016; Crotty, 1998). Data from 
secondary sources such as company publications, financials, and journals, used in this 
research also fall within the realm of positivism. They are already established facts and 
could not therefore, be influenced by the researcher.  Data obtained from interviews are 
subjective and do not fall under positivist approach. They could be influenced by a lot 
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of factors such as the respondent’s attitude, initial responses that could lead to further 
follow up questions, and the possible connection or relationship that might develop 
between the researcher and the respondent. This data could therefore lose its objectivity 
and would then rely on subjective realities inferred through the feelings, intuitions, 
experiences or individual world views of the social actors involved.  
 
3.2.3   Critical Realism 
Critical realism is a research philosophy in which the researcher strives to be aware of 
the ways the socio-cultural backgrounds and experiences might influence the research 
and strives to minimize such biases and enhance objectivity as much as possible 
(Saunders et al, 2016). Tversky & Kaheman (1974) and Tversky et al (1990) studied 
how biases and beliefs might influence judgments and decisions. They concluded that 
subjective decisions and judgments are mostly based on data with limited validity, 
processed through heuristics – a learning and problem solving approach that employs a 
practical method not guaranteed to be optimal or perfect, but sufficient for the 
immediate goals. They described biases based on three heuristics: representativeness, 
availability, and anchoring; all of which might be highly economical and usually 
effective, but would often lead to systematic and predictable errors. They are mostly 
mental shortcuts that ease the cognitive load of decision making.  
 
Critical realism tries to minimize these biases by looking beyond sensations and 
observations to understand the underlying structures of realities that shape these 
observable sensations and realities. Critical realism layers ontology into three levels: the 
real, the actual, and the empirical (Bhaskar, 2008). The ‘real’ are the mechanisms that 
generate phenomena at the level of the actual, while the ‘empirical’ refers to the 
experiences of the social actors in those events. Critical realism is non –reductionist and 
does not separate the physical world of causes from the mental world of thoughts (Harre 
& Bhaskar, 2001). It rather takes a stratified view of the nature of reality, in which the 
real stratification of being is separate from the knowledge of being (Peters et al, 2013).  
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It recognizes the existence of multiple levels and modes of engagement that exist 
between the ‘knower and the known’ (Norris, 2007).  
Whereas the direct realist makes judgments and reality based on the immediate 
observations, experiences and sensations (Saunders et al, 2016), the critical realist views 
reality based on ‘retroduction’ (Reed, 2009), an ability to combine the immediate 
sensations, experiences and observations with a retrospective mental processing of the 
circumstances and possible causative factors of those observations, experiences and 
sensations.  
 
This research adopts the critical realism worldview in its analysis. It assumes the 
position of Bhaskar (2008) that to understand what is going on in the social world, there 
need to be an understanding of the social structures that gave rise to the phenomena 
under research (Saunders, 2016). This research therefore tries to explain the observable 
behaviour of organisations with respect to their reliability by looking for underlying 
causative factors and mechanisms through which their social structures shape their daily 
actions and interactions.  
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3.2.4   Interpretivism 
Interpretivism contrasts directly with the positivist views on observable reality and 
posits that methods of the natural sciences are inadequate for conducting research 
within the domain of social science (Tsang, 2014). This contrast stems from the fact that 
whereas the natural sciences try to explain unintentional phenomena, social sciences 
focus on intentional phenomena by trying to interpret the meanings behind the actions 
and interactions of the social actors (Schutz, 1970). Interpretivism stems from the view 
that reality is neither objective nor exterior but is socially constructed and given 
meaning by people. It sees humans as social actors, interpreting social roles in relation 
to their perceived meanings at each time, (Willian, 2000). Interpretivism understands 
that different social actors with different experiences, orientations and cultural 
backgrounds would infer different meanings to different circumstances and therefore 
would create and experience different social realities. It therefore progresses through 
data gathering from which ideas are induced and generalized, often through theoretical 
abstraction (Saunders et al, 2016). 
 
This research relied on the interpretivist mind set and tries to capture as diverse social 
actors as possible. It researched a diverse array of employees with different cultural 
backgrounds, different experience levels, different job levels, and different industries so 
as to get a balanced view of the different realities prevalent within the organisation. For 
instance, when confronted with a question on how the ‘managers constantly monitor 
day to day activities’, the responses were sharply divided along the line of years of 
experience and position within the organisation. On the one hand, the managers were 
contented in their belief that they were constantly monitoring the day to day activities of 
their teams. On the other hand, most of the mid-level employees and older supervisors 
believed they were being micro-managed by the managers, and were not happy about it. 
The younger supervisors and some lower level employees viewed the constant 
monitoring as positive and relished the chance to interface with their managers. By 
studying the diverse social realities from the diverse perspectives of these social actors, 
this research tries to gain new and richer understanding and interpretations of the 
complexities of the social actors within the organisations.  
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3.2.5   Postmodernism 
Postmodernism seeks to expose and question the power of relations that creates and 
sustains dominant realities (Calas & Smircich, 1997). It argues that there is no 
underlying reality to things, that ‘reality’ is what the current dominant social entities 
have defined as real (Montagna, 1997). Positivism posits that accepted social realities 
are functions of the power relations and prevalent ideologies that dominate the 
particular contexts. It tries to deconstruct these realities to identify and make visible the 
instabilities within their widely accepted truths, as well as other realities those truths 
may have failed to take into consideration or left silent (Saunders et al, 2016). It argues 
that for each currently accepted reality, there are as many meanings as there are 
interpretations of them, and therefore that all discourses are rhetorical (Montagna, 
1997). 
 
Just like history is said to be written by the victors to suit their own narrative, and may 
therefore not be a true account of the actual events, the accepted social realities may not 
necessarily be the best. These accepted social realities are just perceived, at that instant, 
as the collective choice based on the power relations and ideologies that dominate the 
particular context (Saunders et al, 2016). The other latent realities could create 
alternative realities and truths, and could become the accepted realities should the 
dominant ideologies and social players change. The main goal of postmodernism is to 
challenge the established ways of thinking and knowing (Kilduff & Mehra, 1997), and 
to highlight the validity and legitimacy of the suppressed and marginalized ways of 
thinking and knowing (Chia, 2003). 
 
Proponents of the high reliability organisation theory have long held that only certain 
named organisations are considered high reliability, and laid out some criteria to justify 
this classification. A postmodernism world view would therefore challenge this concept 
and seek to demonstrate what perspectives and realities have been excluded and whose 
interests the exclusions would serve. Such perspective falls outside the scope of this 
study, as it seeks to find out how the high reliability organisation theory can be 
extended to help other organisations become more mature in terms of organisational 
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reliability. Within this context however, the theory has so far tended to favour big 
organisations with highly coupled and complex technologies. This research therefore 
borrows from postmodernism to show that smaller organisations with less complexity 
and less coupling (Perrow 1984) could potentially pose as much danger as the 
traditional “high reliability organisations’ and as such, should be included as 
organisations requiring to perform at high reliability.   
 
3.2.6   Pragmatism 
Pragmatism as a research philosophy argues that concepts are only relevant when they 
support action. It considers that research starts with a problem and aims to contribute 
practical solutions that inform future practice (Saunders et al, 2016). Pragmatism 
understands that given the diverse ways of understanding and interpreting the world and 
conducting a research, it would be impossible for a particular point of view to providing 
a comprehensive appreciation of the entire picture (Saunders et al, 2016). Although 
most pragmatists use mixed methods for data collection and analysis, pragmatism does 
not presuppose the use of mixed methods. It rather advocates the use of a method or 
methods that enable credible, well founded, reliable and relevant data to be collected 
that advance the research (Armitage, 2007; Kelemen & Rumen, 2008; Saunders et al, 
2016). By combining two or more philosophies, the researcher could complement the 
strengths and weaknesses of the philosophies to produce a research that better answers 
the research questions (Patton, 1990; Creswell, 2013).   
For instance, this research intends to answer the questions: 
 To what extent can the reliability of organisations be measured? 
 How can these measurements help diverse organisations become more mature? 
 
To answer these questions, the research first delved into the realm of positivism by 
researching secondary data and through the use of questionnaires to establish objective 
facts. The questionnaires, administered anonymously, with the responses devoid of 
researcher influences, were combined with data from secondary sources such as 
company publications, financials, and published academic journals to establish the 
objective observable facts. These facts alone could not answer the research questions. It 
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could not capture the subjective realities inferred through the feelings, intuitions, 
experiences nuances, and individual world views of the social actors involved. A new 
philosophy was therefore introduced through the use of interviews to help achieve this. 
Furthermore, an effective answer to the research questions would involve increasing the 
diversity of the respondents, which falls within the interpretivism world view. Finally, 
the research tries to explain the observable behaviour of organisations with respect to 
their reliability by looking for underlying causative factors and mechanisms through 
which their social structures shape their daily actions and interactions. This falls within 
the realm of critical realism.  
 
 It can therefore be seen that although the research combines different philosophies and 
methods, it does so only to help provide credible, well founded, reliable, and relevant 
data that furthers the research objectives and help provide answers to its research 
questions 
 
To summarise, given that this research expects a balanced insight from the 
organisations and individuals within the organisations under study, it combines 
objective and subjective ontologies to obtain facts and figures, as well as understand the 
feelings, experiences, perceptions, and nuances of the social players within the 
organisations. From the perspective of epistemology, the research is interdisciplinary in 
nature. The research has foundations in diverse knowledge areas such as process safety, 
engineering, reliability, operations management, human resources, sociology, and 
psychology. Different types of knowledge were therefore considered to be valid and 
legitimate, and therefore acceptable. Finally, the research takes a pragmatist approach 
by combining the objectivity of positivism, the subjectivity of interpretivism, and the 
explanation of the world view of organisations using critical realism to provide reliable 
and relevant data to further the research objectives and help provide answers to its 
research questions. 
 
The next sections shall describe the research approach.  
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3.3       Research Approach 
3.3.1   Introduction 
It is very useful to understand and clearly specify the research approach used in a 
research, as the approach influences the research design. It gives the researcher the 
opportunity to consider how each of the various approaches may contribute to, or limit 
the study (Creswell, 2013). The extent to which the research is clear at the beginning 
about the theory raises an important question concerning the design of the research 
project (Saunders et al, 2016).  Understanding and identifying the research approach is 
useful in that it enables the researcher make more informed decisions about the research 
design. Furthermore, it helps the researcher think about the strategies and 
methodological choices that will or will not work. Finally, it enables the researcher to 
adapt the research designs to cater for constraints (Easterby-Smith et al, 2012). In short, 
it provides a roadmap on how the research can achieve the set objectives, despite 
existence of hurdles. Most researchers present two contrasting research approaches: 
inductive approach and deductive approach. A third: the abductive research approach 
will be included in this discourse. 
 
3.3.2  Deductive Research Approach 
The deductive approach leans a lot towards scientific research and involves the 
development of a theory that is then subjected to a rigorous test through a series of 
propositions (Saunders et al, 2016).  It develops the hypothesis or hypotheses upon a 
pre-existing theory and then formulates the research approach to test it (Silverman, 
2013). Deductive reasoning derives its conclusions logically from a set of premises, and 
that conclusion is true if all the premises are true (Ketokivi & Mantere, 2010). The 
research begins with a theory, an idea, a premise or a hypothesis, and deduces a testable 
proposition or a set of testable propositions. It then designs a research strategy to test 
the premises to confirm if the results are consistent with the premises. The theory is 
corroborated if the results are consistent with the premises (Saunders et al, 2016; 
Blaikie, 2009; Marcoulides, 1998).   
 
The deductive approach is mostly utilized in contexts where the research is concerned 
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with examining whether the observed phenomena fit with the expectations based upon 
previous research (Wiles et al, 2011). Since it leans on the methods of the physical 
sciences, the deductive approach is mostly used within the positivism context (Snieder 
& Larner, 2009). According to Saunders et al (2016), deductive approach possesses 
some distinct characteristics.  First is the search to explain casual relationships between 
concepts and variables, using a highly structured methodology to facilitate replication. 
Secondly, concepts need to be operationalized in a way that enables facts to be 
measured, often quantitatively. Finally, the sample needs to be carefully selected with 
an appropriate size and from the appropriate population, to give credibility the 
generalizations that will be made by the research. 
 
This research does not begin with a hypothesis, neither does it begin with a theory and 
would therefore not be said to have adopted the deductive approach. It however 
references the HRO theory as it tries to investigate the extent to which the mindfulness 
of organisations could be measured; as well as how the measurements, if achievable, 
could help organisations become more mature. It is going to first observe the 
behavioural traits and trends of organisations and the social players within those 
organisations. It will try to identify some patterns in their behaviour and try to 
generalize based on those patterns. As will be seen in the next section, this is approach 
belongs to the inductive research approach.  
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3.3.3 Inductive Research Approach 
With increasing studies into the social sciences, researches became increasingly critical 
of the deductive approach that relied on a cause and effect link between variables, as 
well as the rigid methodologies without recourse to alternative explanations and the 
interplay and interactions between social entities. They therefore began leaning towards 
the inductive approach that was more concerned with the context in which events occur 
(Saunders et al, 2012). Inductive approach, in contrast with deductive approach, 
involves a move from the specific to the general (Bryman & Bell, 2015). It does not 
start with a framework that informs data collection and the research focus is mostly 
formed after data collection (Flick, 2015), and could then be found to fit an existing 
theory (Bryman & Bell, 2015).  
 
Inductive approach begins with detailed observations of the world and then moves 
towards a more abstract generalisation and ideas (Neuman, 2002). It starts with the 
observations and proposes theories towards the end based on the results of the 
observations (Goddard & Melville, 2004). It searches for patterns from the observations 
and the development of the explanations for the patterns through series of hypothesis 
(Bernard, 2011). Inductive approach does not necessarily preclude theories while 
developing the research questions; rather it tries to generate meanings from the data set 
collected in order to identify the patterns and relationships to develop its theory 
(Saunders, et al, 2016). Lodico et al (2010) considers inductive reasoning a ‘bottom-up’ 
approach to knowing, in which the researcher uses observations to build an abstraction, 
or to describe a picture of the phenomenon that is being studied.  
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3.3.4  Abductive Research Approach 
Abductive research approach neither moves from the data to the theory as seen in 
inductive approach, nor does it move from theory to the data as seen in deductive 
approach, but rather seeks to effectively combine both (Suddaby, 2006). The abductive 
approach moves back and forth between theory and data. It usually begins with an 
observation, and then works out a plausible reason to explain the observation. As the 
research progresses, the theories uncover more observations that could lead to the 
research addressing its assumptions (Saunders et al, 2016; Van Maanen et al, 2007).   
 
Abductive reason is best suited for scenarios where there are incomplete set of 
observations and therefore proceeds to the most likely explanations for the observations.  
According to Saunders et al (2016), abductive approach adopts a pragmatist approach to 
overcome the inherent weaknesses in both the deductive and inductive approaches. 
Whereas the deductive approach lacks clarity in terms of how to select the theory to be 
tested through hypotheses formulations, inductive approach is weak in the sense that no 
amount of empirical data will necessarily enable theory building. This is mostly used in 
the fields of law, research in artificial intelligence and computing, and research in 
diagnostic expert systems.  
 
In summary, to best answer the research questions “to what extent can the reliability of 
organisations be measured?” and “can the measurements help improve …?” the 
research approached the theory development through inductive reasoning’s ‘bottom-up’ 
approach that uses observations to build an abstraction and describe a picture of the 
phenomenon that is being studied.  The research observed organisations and the social 
players within the organisations and searched for patterns from the observations. It 
thereafter developed the explanations for the patterns, and proceeded to make 
generalizable proposals that would help answer the research questions.   
 
The next section shall discus the methodical choice. 
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3.4        Methodical Choice 
Methodical choice is yet another layer of the ‘research onion’ that must be peeled away 
to understand the choice of data collection methods. It is one of the three components of 
research design, the other two being research strategy and time horizon. Research 
design on its own is the general plan on how the research will progress with answering 
the research questions (Saunders et al, 2016). Methodical choice centres on the choice 
of quantitative research design, qualitative research design, or the mixed methods 
research design, including the various variations of each of them. 
 
3.4.1  Quantitative Research Design 
Quantitative research ‘examines relationships between variables, which are measured 
numerically and analysed using a range of statistical and graphical techniques’ 
(Saunders et al, 2016). It borrows from the physical sciences, is objective, 
generalizable, and reliable (Creswell, 2013). Quantitative research puts a lot of 
consideration on numeric, measurement, sampling, and designing. It also puts a lot of 
consideration on the analysis of relationships between variables.  
 
It involves statistical and numerical measurement of the raw data captured in 
questionnaires. It is effective when it involves large numbers of respondents available, 
where the respondents can be grouped and sub-grouped to achieve the desired objective, 
where the data can be effectively measured using quantitative techniques, and where 
statistical methods of analysis can be used . Its results can be used as benchmark with a 
high level of repeatability (May, 2011).   
Quantitative research design therefore is generally associated with positivism, 
especially when used with pre-determined and highly structured data collection 
techniques (Saunders et al, 2016). It can however be used to investigate a wide range of 
social phenomena, including feelings and subjective viewpoints (May, 2011).  
 
Saunders et al (2016) gave further two sub-divisions of the quantitative research design. 
These include the mono-method quantitative research design and the multi-method 
quantitative research design. The mono-method quantitative research design uses a 
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single quantitative data collection technique and analyses the technique quantitatively. 
For instance, this research used questionnaires as a quantitative data collection 
technique and analysed using corresponding quantitative data analysis tools. The multi-
method quantitative research design on the other hand uses more than one quantitative 
data collection technique in addition to a corresponding quantitative data analysis tool. 
For example, this research collected data from questionnaires and triangulated this with 
data from secondary sources such as company financials and company documentations, 
and analysed these with corresponding quantitative data analysis tools. 
Multi-methods are useful due to their likelihood to overcome the weaknesses associated 
with a mono-method, as well as their ability to provide a more enhanced approach to 
data collection, analysis, and interpretation (Saunders et al, 2016; Bryman, 2016) 
 
Quantitative research method helped the research identify the objective and observable 
facts and figures within the organisations devoid of researcher influences. It offered an 
objective comparison of the reliability of these organisations. It could not capture the 
subjective realities inferred through the feelings, intuitions, experiences nuances, and 
individual world views of the social actors involved within these organisations. It could 
not explain the observable behaviour of the organisations and the social actors within 
them. The research therefore introduced a qualitative research method to help identify 
underlying causative factors and mechanisms through which the social structures of 
these organisations shape the daily actions and interactions of the social players. 
 
3.4.2  Qualitative Research Design 
Qualitative research design studies participants’ meanings and the relationships between 
them, using a wide variety of data collection techniques and analytical procedures to 
develop a conceptual framework and theoretical contribution (Saunders et al, 2016). It 
is the process of understanding the thought process, the behaviour, experiences, and the 
perceptions of the social entities in their natural setting, and thus is often associated 
with interpretivism (Denzin & Lincoln; 2011).  
 
Qualitative research design tries to make sense of the subjective and socially 
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constructed meanings expressed about the phenomenon under research (Saunders et al, 
2016) It tries to understand the meaning of the reality under study, as well as the 
reasons behind the behaviour, thought process, and inter-relationships of the social 
actors (Creswell, 2013; Eriksson and Kovalainen, 2015). 
 
Qualitative research would usually involve a careful sampling of the respondents, who 
should as representative of the population as possible, and enables informal interactions 
between the researcher and the respondents.  This informal interaction enables the 
researcher to build a rapport with the respondent and explore the depths of the 
respondents’ emotions, experiences, and thought process. It would also involve a non-
standardized data collection process so that questions and procedure could change and 
emerge during a research process that is both naturalistic and intelligent (Saunders et al 
2016) 
 
Just like in the quantitative research design, Saunders et al (2016) also gave further two 
sub-divisions of the qualitative research design. These include the mono-method 
qualitative research design and the multi-method qualitative research design. The mono-
method qualitative research design uses a single qualitative data collection technique 
and analyses the technique qualitatively.  For instance, this research collected 
qualitative data through in-depth interviews, and analysed the results qualitatively using 
a corresponding qualitative data analysis tool. The multi-method qualitative research 
design on the other hand uses more than one qualitative data collection technique in 
addition to a corresponding qualitative data analysis tool. For example, the research 
might collect data from in-depth interviews and diary accounts and analyse these with a 
corresponding qualitative data analysis tool. This research used in-depth interviews as 
the only qualitative data collection technique. It was impossible to adopt the focussed 
group or the observation method due to the unique nature of this research. First, the 
researcher could not get authorisation from the management of most of the 
organisations to form focus groups as it could have been a distraction to the employees. 
Moreover, the data collection was towards the end of the year, the busiest period for 
most of the companies. Furthermore, attempting to observe the respondents at work as a 
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method of qualitative data gathering would have been time consuming, and would have 
involved travelling by boat or helicopter to offshore and swamp locations. This was not 
realistic due to the huge cost the research would have incurred, the time it would have 
taken, and the safety considerations given the prevalent challenging security situations 
within the area. The research therefore arranged interviews to coincide with the time off 
for respondents in offshore and swamp locations. 
 
3.4.3 Mixed Method Research Design 
In addition to quantitative and qualitative research and their variations, a third 
paradigm, the mixed methods research design is gaining acceptance and use across 
disciplines (Jalongo & Saracho, 2016; Cresswell & Plano Clark, 2011). It combines the 
qualitative and quantitative methodologies, and involves the collection and analysis of a 
combination of both quantitative and qualitative data in a single research (Jalongo & 
Saracho, 2016; Saunders et al, 2016; Aramo-Immonen, 2013; Cresswell & Plano Clark, 
2011; Tashakkori & Teddlie, 2010). 
  
This research involved trying to understand the reliability of organisations and how they 
behave under certain circumstances. It tried to identify the extent to which the reliability 
of organisations can be measured, as well as how these measurements can help diverse 
organisations become more mature. 
 
Quantitative research method would help the research identify the objective and 
observable reliability facts and figures within these organisations devoid of researcher 
influences, and offer an objective comparison of the reliability of these organisations. It 
would however not be able to not capture the subjective realities inferred through the 
feelings, intuitions, experiences nuances, and individual world views of the social actors 
involved within these organisations. It would not be able to explain the observable 
behaviour of the organisations and the social actors within them. Introducing a 
qualitative research method would therefore help this research to look for the 
underlying causative factors and mechanisms through which the social structures of 
these organisations shape the daily actions and interactions of the social players.  
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By combining these methods in a mixed method design, this research receives two 
different yet complementary perspectives to the phenomenon. It actively invites us to 
participate in dialogue about multiple ways of seeing and hearing, multiple ways of 
making sense of the social world, and multiple standpoints on what is important 
(Jalongo & Saracho, 2016) 
 
Mixing data however poses the risk of research chaos and confusion due to the use of 
different terminologies, philosophies, and notation systems and as such, the research 
design must be clearly articulated (Aramo-Immonen, 2013). When used well, the mixed 
method has the potential to address the research questions in a more balance manner 
with better triangulation.  
 
This research therefore uses the mixed method research design only to help provide 
credible, well founded, reliable, and relevant data that furthers the research objectives 
and help provide answers to its research questions (Saunders et al, 2016).  
 
The next section shall describe the strategies considered and adopted by this research.  
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3.5 Research Strategy 
For research, just like any endeavour, to be successful, there must be a methodical plan 
laid out to achieve the set objectives. Steen (2016) defines strategy as “smallest set of 
(core) choices to optimally guide the other choices”. The Oxford dictionary defines 
strategy as “a plan of action designed to achieve a long-term or overall aim”. From 
these definitions, strategy can be said to be at the core of an intended course of action. It 
ensure consistency throughout a defined period by providing a bird-eye view of all the 
individual plans and paths and how the fit with one another into the overall strategy. 
From a research perspective, the research strategy refers to the adoption of courses of 
actions and the allocation of resources to achieve long term research goals. The strategy 
for any research should be closely related to the research philosophy adopted by the 
research (Denzin & Lincoln, 2011). 
 
 A research with a positivism philosophy would lean heavily towards a quantitative 
based research philosophy as positivism deals primarily with discrete observable 
realities. Quantitative based strategies include experiments and survey (Saunders et al, 
2016). On the other hand, a research with an interpretivist philosophy would lean 
heavily towards a qualitative based research philosophy. This is because the 
interpretivist tries to understand and explain the reasons behind the actions and 
interactions of social actors. It would be difficult, for instance, to design an experiment 
to study how people within organisations react to management of change. Individuals 
would react in a certain way at one moment and react in a different way at other 
moments. These actions and reactions could be influenced by the vagaries of human 
emotions, changes in the social contexts, or biological and environmental changes. A 
qualitative research strategy would therefore be better suited for researches based on 
interpretivist philosophy. The strategies to adopt would include narrative inquiry, 
grounded theory, action research and ethnography.  
 
Finally, a research with a pragmatic philosophy would involve a strategy that combines 
both quantitative and qualitative strategies. It could mean adopting the archival research 
or the case study research strategies, or combining two or more of the quantitative and 
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qualitative strategies.  
 
To understand the reasons behind the choice of strategies, it would be important to 
highlight and understand a few of the strategies considered, as well as the rationale for 
adopting or rejecting the strategies. This discourse will be arranged in two sub-sections: 
qualitative data collection strategy, and quantitative data collection strategy. 
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3.5.1 Quantitative Data Collection Strategy 
 
This research considered three major strategies to help it collect quantitative data. These 
are experiments, surveys, and archival research strategies. These would be discussed 
further. 
 
Experiments 
Experiment as a research strategy is deeply rooted in the natural sciences. It studies the 
probability of change in an independent variable causing a change in another variable 
(Saunders et al, 2016), and typically studies and documents how the identified and 
manipulated variables affect all the observable outcomes (Fenton & Pfleeger, 1996). It 
uses null and alternative hypotheses to predict the degree of changes within the 
variables. Whereas the null hypothesis is the hypothesis that the researcher tries to 
disprove or nullify, alternate hypothesis is the hypothesis that the researcher is trying to 
prove to be correct.  
 
Experiment as a strategy was not considered a feasible choice for this research. First the 
research questions are open – ‘to what extent can the reliability of organisations be 
measured’ and ‘how can these measurements…’, and are designed to inquire into the 
relationships and behaviours of members of certain organisations, as well as how these 
behaviours differ to other organisations. The research intends to inquire if relationships 
exist between the variables, and if so, to what extent. Rather than open questions, 
experiments would use predictive hypotheses (Saunders et al, 2016) to test for expected 
relationships between the variables. Secondly, the scope of this research would make it 
almost impossible to design experimental groups and control groups within 
organisations. Such a project would not be logistically and financially feasible. Finally, 
it would also be impracticable to design laboratories conditions to perform the 
experiments. 
 
Given these reasons, the research concluded that experiments would impracticable and 
not feasible as a research strategy. 
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Survey 
This involves gathering information from an entire group, or more usually samples, 
which can then be used to make inferences, generate polices, or reveal unsuspected 
facts. It is usually very effective to answer open questions of ‘what’, ‘how much’, ‘how 
many’ or ‘to what extent’. It allows the researcher to collect a large amount of data from 
a large population in a cost effective manner, and allows for easy comparison (Saunders 
et al, 2016). It typically includes the use of questionnaires, structured interviews, and 
structured observations, all of which are quantitative data collection techniques.  
 
This research considered the use of questionnaires, a survey strategy, as one of the 
strategies to use as it appeared to tick most of the boxes. First, since the research tends 
to be exploratory in nature, attempting to explore the behaviours and relationships of 
organisations and between the members of the organisations, survey strategy would 
therefore be the obvious and effective choice to answer the research questions ‘to what 
extent can the reliability of organisations be measured’ and ‘how can these 
measurements…’  
 
Another reason for the choice of questionnaires is the consideration that the use of 
questionnaires would be a cost effective way of collecting responses from the desired 
number of respondents. The research needed to study over 500 respondents in eight 
different organisations across 2 continents. These respondents would comprise of 
different demographics, be based in different cities, at different work locations, in 
different organisations, possess different temperaments, and with different availability 
needs. As such, any other survey strategy would have been a logistical nightmare. In 
addition to this, the representative nature of the samples reduces the cost, time, and the 
logistics that would have been incurred should the whole population be surveyed. Thus 
the survey strategy helps reduce the cost and logistics involved in population sampling, 
while retaining the accuracy and reliability of the results. 
 
The next reason for adopting the survey strategy was the relative ease the survey 
instruments would be designed, the ease at which it would be explained, and the ease at 
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which it would be understood. Furthermore, with the survey, it would be easy to run 
various comparisons between the respondents in the same organisation, between 
different organisations, and between different demographics.  
 
Finally, this research needed quantitative data to enable it make balanced assumptions. 
The choice of survey strategy made it possible to collect quantitative data through 
questionnaires, administered anonymously, and with the responses devoid of researcher 
influences. These responses would be analysed quantitatively leveraging on one or more 
of the numerous data analysis instruments available to the researcher.  
 
Archival Research Strategy 
This strategy involves a methodical process of identifying relevant archives and 
extracting relevant original data from them. Archives may include original institutional 
records, governmental records, media records, or organisational records, archived in 
libraries or on the internet. This excludes the secondary data and publications related 
with the subject of research.  
 
To help understand the results from the surveys, this research needed some data. These 
included organisational reports, safety reports, and financial reports. Some of these were 
difficult to obtain due to the sensitive nature of the information. Some of the data were 
however in public domain.  
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3.5.2 Qualitative Data Collection Strategy 
To enhance the quality of the research and to better answer the research questions, this 
research had to collect qualitative data to better understand and triangulate the results 
obtained from the quantitative study. The choice of qualitative data collection strategy 
was influenced by the ability of such a strategy to help understand the thoughts, the 
behaviour, experiences, the biases, and the perceptions of people within the 
organisations in their natural setting (Devine, 2002). The research considered the case 
study strategy, the action research strategy, the grounded theory strategy, and the 
narrative inquiry strategy. These strategies, as well as the reasons for adopting or 
rejecting them are discussed further below. 
 
Case Study Research Strategy 
The use of case studies as a research strategy has been explained in different ways by 
different researchers, the variety of definitions stemming from the differing approaches 
of the various researchers to the development of the methodology (Harrison et al, 2017).  
 
Among the variety of definitions, a common theme in case studies is its definition as a 
versatile form of qualitative inquiry, most suitable for a comprehensive, holistic, and in-
depth investigation of a complex subject in context, where the boundary between the 
context and issue is unclear and contains many variables (Flyvberg, 2011; Cresswell, 
2013; Starman, 2013; Harrison et al, 2017). Yin (2013) further simplifies the definition 
by viewing it as an in-depth inquiry into a topic or phenomenon within its real life 
setting. The topic under study could be a phenomenon, an event, a program, a situation, 
a person, a group, an institution, or an organisation. It typically studies a single subject, 
but could be designed to show the comparative relationship between subjects.  
 
Despite this variety, Flyvberg (2011) recommends the use of a very basic and simplified 
definition to avoid the confusion the proliferation of definitions might portend. When 
designed and executed appropriately, the case study strategy is considered one of the 
most effective strategies for qualitative (and quantitative) data collection and analysis 
(Saunders et al, 2016). 
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Despite the obvious advantages of using the case study research strategy, this research 
considered it not feasible. First, case study has the disadvantage of relying on small 
sample size for its effectiveness (Flyvberg, 2011). To effectively answer the research 
questions, this research expected to study enough respondents to be representative of 
the population. This meant studying a very diverse sample of over 500 respondents in 
different organisations and different industries. To achieve this number, this research 
would have had to design multiple cases for each organisation. Such a venture would 
have been expensive, a logistics burden, almost not practicable, and beyond the scope 
and experience of this researcher. Secondly, a case study strategy would involve access 
into the organisation for long periods, as well as access into certain organisational data 
bases. Due to sensitivity of operations, such accesses are usually restricted to core 
employees or consultants with high privacy and non-disclosure agreements. The 
research therefore considered it impracticable to request for such access. 
 
Finally, Yin (2013) and Flyvberg (2011) admit that the sample size in case studies may 
be too small to make the results generalizable. This research aims to create a model that 
would be used to access diverse organisations. To achieve this, the sample size must be 
representative enough so the results could become generalizable. Given these 
disadvantages, this research considered case studies inappropriate for use as the sole 
source of data. Some case studies were however considered to help understand the 
results from this research as well to help deepen some phenomenon discussed in the 
research such as disasters.   
 
Action Research 
Saunders et al (2016), citing Coghlan (2011) and Coghlan & Brannick, 2014) defined 
action report as an ‘emergent and iterative process of inquiry that is designed to develop 
solutions to real organisational problems through participative and collaborative 
approach, which uses different forms of  knowledge, and which will have implications 
for participants and organisations beyond the research project’. It begins with a question 
or a problem, and works through series of iterations to reach a result or set of results. In 
an organisation based research as this, the action researcher would normally act as the 
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facilitator and work with members of the organisation to arrive at a potential resolution.  
 
For this research, adopting the action research strategy would involve the participation 
by the members of the organisation and their collaboration with the researcher to study 
the organisations’ work practices. Such participation and collaboration would have been 
difficult to achieve for the same reasons as explained in case studies: the size of the 
sample, the logistical nightmare, the cost, the difficulty of access, and the sensitivity of 
some operations. Furthermore, this strategy would meet with obvious resistance from a 
large spectrum of the employees, some of whom may consider this an unnecessary 
distraction from their day to day activity (Reason, 2006), especially that safety is a 
considered as a ‘non-event’; something that have not happened and hence difficult to 
justify. 
 
In addition, for an action research to be effective, the organisation (or members of the 
organisation) would need to identify a gap or gaps within their organisational process, 
the resolution of which would impact the organisation positively. This means that the 
need for the change has to come from within the organisation to enable the members 
buy into the participatory and collaborative approach that underpins action the research. 
The research questions for this research do not indicate such need and could therefore 
meet resistance from within the organisation. The research therefore considered action 
research not appropriate to meet the research needs.  
 
Glasser and Straus’ Grounded Theory 
Grounded theory is a research strategy that involves forming a theory based on the 
gathered data as opposed to gathering data after forming a theory. The theory is 
grounded on the data, looks at a particular situation and tries to understand what is 
going on (Kervin et al, 2006). It is based on interpretivism and is designed to 
understand the meanings that social actors ascribe to their experiences, observations, 
and interactions in specific situations (Saunders, 2016; Suddaby, 2006).  
 
To triangulate the results obtained from the quantitative aspects of the study, obtain a 
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balanced view, and to better understand the meanings that underpin the actions and 
interactions of members of the organisations under study, this research adopted the 
interview strategy. This qualitative approach involved obtaining data from the 
interviewee, interpreting the data, and using the data to refine further questions and 
iterations. This is a key element of the grounded theory strategy. As the interviews 
progress, relationships and patterns between the responses begin to form. These 
relationships and patterns would be fed back into the research and compared with 
results obtained from the quantitative approach for triangulation.  
 
Effective use of grounded theory is dependent on the amount of time and expertise 
available to the researcher. It is cumbersome, requires a lot of time and effort, and has 
the potential to accumulate unimportant information. Additionally, wrong use of the 
grounded theory may lead to ethical issues. There is the potential for the use of leading 
questions and the information could therefore be tainted by biases from both the 
interviewer and interviewee. All these were considered and would be discussed further 
under the ethics section.  
 
Narrative Inquiry 
Narrative inquiry was the last qualitative strategy considered and is fairly related to 
grounded theory, the difference being in the nature of data obtained from the interviews. 
It invites the respondent to provide a complete narrative of their experiences and 
viewpoints (Chase, 2011). This narrative is the main intent of subjective data for this 
research, as it enables the researcher to understand the in-depth views, experiences, 
value systems, and biases of the respondents.  
 
Additionally, using the narrative inquiry strategy meant that the research obtained 
contextual details of the organisations’ deeper realities closely linked with their social 
relationships (Gabriel & Griffiths, 2004). To enhance the quality of the responses, the 
in-depth interviews were conducted across a broad spectrum of the organisations being 
studied. It allowed this research to analyse the linkages, relationships, and the 
explanations across the spectrum, thereby allowing it to understand the complex 
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processes the respondents used in making sense of their organisational realities. Finally, 
this research considered the narrative inquiry a simpler strategy to adopt that the 
grounded theory.  
 
To summarise, this research considered different research strategies and chose a 
combination of the survey method and in-depth interviews. First, this combination helps 
the research to obtain a combination of objective and subjective data. It is also the best 
combination to answer the exploratory questions ‘to what extent can the reliability …’ 
and ‘how can these measurements…’ Furthermore, survey was considered to be cost 
effective and less logistically demanding than the others, and with the ability to reach 
the intended respondents within the time frame. Finally, both strategies were considered 
easy to design and administer. The next section shall discus the time horizon involved 
in this research. 
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3.6 Time Horizon 
Time horizon is the final layer of the ‘onion’ that must be peeled away to reveal and 
understand the choice of data collection and analysis methods. It is the timeframe within 
which the research is expected to be carried out and completed.  
 
Some research may not be time dependent or times constrained, and are designed to 
study the relationships between variables over extended periods of time. These are 
longitudinal studies (Saunders et al, 2016). The researcher is able to track data and 
changes in the data over an extended period. Cross-sectional studies on the other hand 
are time dependent and the data is obtained within a defined time snapshot. The 
research question would normally give an indication of the type of time horizon to be 
used.  
 
This is useful as it makes the researcher aware of the impact of time on the quality of 
the research. For certain time dependent researches, a change in certain social realities 
could affect the objectives of the research and render the research useless.  
 
This research requires data to be collected within the snapshot. A respondent could 
change responses should the social realities that influenced the choice of those 
responses change. For instance, a respondent’s feeling about the organisation could 
change following a catastrophic event within the organisation or with the industry. The 
responses could also change should the respondent suddenly receive bonuses due to an 
improved company financials. This research therefore falls within the cross-sectional 
study time horizon. Nevertheless, the research method is clearly set and justified in such 
a way so that other researchers in different times can replicate the proposed framework 
and model. 
 
The next section shall describe the data collection process as well as the considerations 
made during the data collection process.  
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3.7 Methods for Data Collection 
This section outlines the considerations made by this research during the data collection 
process. It describes the sample population and the considerations made during the 
sampling process. It describes the questionnaire design and the assumptions made 
during the design. It concludes with the assumptions, considerations and lessons learned 
from questionnaire administration and collection process.  
 
3.7.1 Sampling Technique 
The two major sampling techniques considered were the probability and non-probability 
sampling techniques. Probability sampling refers to any technique where the chance of 
being selected is known and is the same for all members of the sample population 
(Saunders et al, 2016). With this, it is easy to make statistical inferences about the 
characteristics of the population and reach generalizable conclusions from the research. 
For non-probability sampling on the other hand, the chances of being selected from the 
sample population is not known, neither is it possible to make statistical inferences 
about the characteristics about the members of the sample population.  
 
For probability sampling to work, the sampling frame must be available. This is the 
complete list of all members of the target population. For this research, this would mean 
a complete list of all organisations. It would also mean a complete list of all employees 
within those organisations. Since the sample frame comprises the entire target 
population, the probability sample would be representative of the entire target 
population, the selection would eliminate bias, and the results could be used to 
generalize the characteristics of the entire target population.  
 
While it might be possible to get a list of registered organisations, knowing with 
certainty that the list would be accurate might not be feasible. In addition, the process 
involved in compiling such a list would involve a lot of time and huge resources, both 
of which the research does not have the luxury of. Getting the complete list of all 
members of the organisations would therefore be beyond the scope of this research. 
Furthermore, this research is not designed to make generalizations about organisations. 
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It is designed to study individual organisations and how they differ from one another in 
terms of organisational reliability, with a view to developing a model that could utilize 
those differences to help other organisations tend towards more mindfulness, reliability, 
and maturity. This research therefore concluded against the suitability of probability 
sampling to further its research objectives and provide answers to its research questions, 
and therefore settled for non-probability sampling techniques.  
 
Various techniques are available for use as part of the non-random technique, the choice 
of which must be selected carefully with the research questions and objectives in mind.  
This research utilized the quota sampling and purposive sampling techniques 
throughout the sampling process. The quota sampling technique is a stratified non-
probability sampling technique based on the premise that the sample within strata will 
represent the target population since the variability in the sample for the various quota 
variables is the same as that of the target population (Saunders et al, 2016). Its 
likelihood of being representative is reasonably high, but will depend of the selection of 
the quota variables 
 
Pilot Study 
The pilot study was purely a non-probability purposive sampling, where the researcher 
selected known associates that would be expected to give honest opinions about the 
survey design and the issues being studied. Purposive sampling technique (Saunders et 
al, 2016) involves the use of judgement to select the cases that will be most beneficial to 
meet the research objectives and answer the research questions. It sacrifices the 
statistical representation of probability sampling on the altar of information-rich 
benefits. The research weighed the need for statistical representation and the need for 
obtain as much information as possible to enable it set the direction of the rest of the 
research and decided that the benefits of the information far outweighed the need for 
statistical representation and therefore settled for the purposive sampling technique.  
 
The pilot study was conducted within the production and maintenance department of a 
multinational petroleum company in Nigeria. 20 respondents were selected in a purely a 
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non-probability purposive sampling. The sample was demographically stratified in 
terms of current responsibility, years of experience, and gender. Considering current 
responsibility, 10% of the respondents were people in management positions, 30% were 
respondents in supervisory positions, and 60% were respondents at the shop floor based 
on conventional wisdom of the staff – supervisor – manager ratios. This is expected to 
be representative of the ratios within most organisations. 
 
Considering years of experience, the research developed a five level stratification for 
years of experience in the industry, ranging from below three years; between three to 
seven years; above seven years and below 15 years; 15 to 25 years; and above 25 years. 
This five level stratification assumes that new employees in an industry would spend 
the first three years trying to adapt and understand the peculiarities of industry.  
 
Assuming the employee joined at the shop floor level, the experience and motivation 
level would be expected peak within three to seven years of work. At this point, the 
employee would expect to be transitioning into a supervisory role. After 15 years in the 
industry, the employee would have become highly experienced and would be expected 
to be transitioning into a management role, or already in that role.  
 
Over the career lifecycle, the employee experiences and motivation levels would be 
expected to change, so will their perceptions and attitudes. For instance, a new 
employee or a newly promoted employee would be expected to have a higher 
motivation level than an employee that has spent over 10 years in the industry and is 
still stuck at the shop floor, especially if the employee believes he/she has more to offer. 
The employees would have different world views about their jobs, and their perceptions 
about the nature of reality would be different.  
 
Similarly, an employee that has spent over 10 years on a role would have a different 
perception about the nature of reality from an employee that has just completed an 
orientation for the same role. Their perceptions about safety and risk taking would be 
expected to differ. The routine of lubricant replacement could become monotonous to 
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the staff with 15 years’ experience on the job to the point of complacency, causing the 
staff to bypass procedures, often with catastrophic consequences. 
 
After 25 years, most employees would be past their mid-career, at which point, opinions 
and perceptions would also be different. This stratification therefore helps the research 
to obtain data from people at different career levels and with diverse perspectives on the 
social realities within the organisation, with a view to providing depth and balance to 
the results.  
 
Finally the pilot gave consideration to gender stratification, with the perception that 
gender might also influence the respondents’ world view and their belief of what 
constitutes the nature of reality. The research expects that the diversity that this type of 
stratification brings would help expand the responses, and enhance the research validity 
and reliability.  
 
Benefits of the pilot to the main study 
The main objective of a pilot test is to pre-test the research instrument and provide 
information that could potentially enhance the research’s reliability and validity (Van 
Teijlingen & Hundley, 2001). The pilot for this research was therefore designed to test 
the feasibility of the research, the suitability of the survey instruments, identify and 
address potential logistical issues that may arise during the main research, and assess 
the outcome in terms of the research objectives. In addition, it was also intended to test 
the researcher’s preparedness and ability to conduct the main research. Should the pilot 
test fail, the research would assume that the premise of this study is faulty, thereby 
potentially saving the time, money and effort that would have been otherwise invested 
in the research. Finally the results of the pilot test would help this research to refine its 
research questions for better chances of success (Saunders et al., 2016). 
 
The pilot achieved most of these. By successfully completing the pilot with a 100 
percent return rate, this research became confident that the instrument was simple, easy 
to understand, and in that regard, therefore suitable for this research. The pilot also 
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helped to confirm the ability to reach the required respondents in terms of their 
stratification and helped focus the main research on the need to work with the gate 
keepers on the need for an effective stratification of the respondents. Furthermore, by 
reviewing the results from the pilot, the research was able to test the usability of the 
results to develop the measurement framework required to answer the research 
questions. Had this failed, then the premise on which the research was built would have 
been considered faulty and reviewed or the research abandoned. This therefore gave 
clarity that the research was on the right track. Finally, the pilot helped the researcher 
develop confidence in his ability to complete the survey.  
 
The Main Study 
The main study followed the same assumptions made during the pilot study in terms of 
purposive sampling and respondents’ demographic stratification. In addition to these, 
the research had to make a decision about the choice of organisations to study. In 
adopting the technique for the choice of organisations, the research considered the 
organisations where rich and contrasting information would be obtained, instead of just 
considering statistical representation – a purposive sampling technique. The research 
purposively contrasted the choice of organisations in terms of size, age, and 
geographical spread, so as to add depth and diversity to the final data. For each large 
organisation, a relatively smaller one was chosen; for each new organisation, a 
relatively much older organisation was selected; and for each localized organisation, an 
organisation with a relatively wider geographic spread was selected. If organisation A is 
an old organisation with national spread and expansive networks, organisation B would 
be a direct contrast: relatively new and relatively smaller. This is expected to provide 
different and deeper information sets that will help answer the research questions.  
 
The interviews were also based on the same stratification as the questionnaires, but on a 
much smaller scale. The research adopted a loose ratio of 10 questionnaires to 2 
interviews spread among the 3 strata of management, supervisors, and the shop floor.  
 
3.7.2 Research Population and Participation 
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The research population refers to the entire subject matter of interest a under 
investigation by the research (Sekaran & Bougie, 2016). It includes entire people, 
groups, events, organisations, occurrences, or things under investigation. It may not 
always be possible to research the entire population, and as such a sample is selected 
from the population. The validity of the research and its results will be called to 
question if the sample is not representative of the entire population. 
 
One of the main objectives of this research is to study organisations outside the 
traditional high reliability organisations, with a view to investigating the extent of their 
operational and cultural similarities and differences, as well as understand how these 
differences may influence the organisations’ mindfulness. To achieve this, the sample 
size must be representative of the organisations. Nigeria was chosen for primary 
research due to the researcher’s location and experience, as well as the possibility of 
obtaining the required side of data.  
 
The main research was conducted in eight organisations in three industries across two 
continents, again using purposive sampling technique to determine organisations where 
rich and contrasting information would be obtained. The three industries were selected 
to contrast with existing research on the HRO theory, which had been concentrated on 
certain industries. Furthermore, these three industries have potentials for incidents of 
catastrophic proportions. The reasons for the choices, the nature of catastrophic events, 
as well as a few examples of past catastrophic events within these industries is 
highlighted below. 
 
Oil and Gas Industry 
The oil and gas industry was selected due in part to the researcher’s experience in the 
industry, as well as the ability to call upon previous contacts to gain access for data 
collection. The researcher’s experience in the industry is expected to create a spirit of 
camaraderie among the respondents, the effect of which is expected to be honest and 
sincere responses. Secondly, the oil and gas industry in has experienced some major 
accident hazards in the past and is expected to be a mine for the type of data required to 
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effectively carry out this research. Finally, the research expects that given the 
catastrophic nature of possible effects of lack of mindfulness within the oil and gas 
industry, the industry should have evolved to design processes and practices to guide its 
practices and operations.  
 
A 2016 report by the bureau of labour statistics at the United States department of 
labour (Bls.gov, 2017) considers the oil & gas industry to be one of the most hazardous 
industries with an average annual fatality count of 109 between 2003 and 2015. 
According to the report, this represents an average of 14 fatalities for every 100,000 
employees.   
 
 
Figure 3.2: A graph showing oil and gas fatalities (oil & gas figures in deep 
blue) blueA Oil & Gas fatality report 2003–2015. Source: (Bls.gov, 2015) 
 
In addition to fatalities, catastrophic events from oil and gas operations could result in 
environmental pollution, explosions, and fire. An oil tanker, the Amoco Cardiz, sank on 
the 16
th
 of March 1978, spilling about 1.64million barrels of crude near the northwest 
coast of France. Millions of molluscs, sea urchins, and other sea creatures were killed, 
and France presented a legal claim of US$2 billion to the United States courts (Visser, 
2010). A liquid petroleum gas explosion in November 19
th
 1984 in San Juanico, Mexico 
destroyed the plant, killing 600 people and severely burnt about 7000 people in the 
neighbouring San Juan Ixhuatapec (Arturson, 1987). The Piper Alpha oil production 
platform disaster of July 6, 1988 (Ross, 2008) in the North Sea killed 167 people with a 
total insured loss of about US$3.4 billion. An explosion at the Texas City refinery on 
the 23
rd
 of March 2005 killed 15 people and injured over 180 others (US CSB, 2005). 
The Deepwater Horizon oil disaster of April 20, 2010 in the Gulf of Mexico, killed 11 
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people destroyed the platform, and spilled about 4.9 million barrels of crude into the sea 
with huge impact on marine life (National Response Team, 2011).  
 
Beverage & Brewery Industry 
The research also identified the beverage manufacturing industry as a potential industry 
where small lapse in mindfulness could lead to catastrophic loss of lives. For instance, 
Nigerian Breweries Plc, controls over 60% market share in the Nigerian Breweries 
industry (Proshare, 2017). With the hot and humid weather, majority of Nigerians use 
Nigerian Breweries products daily with their meals, for entertainment, and for 
recreations. This means that with a population of about 186 million (CIA, 2017), over 
112 million people could potentially be directly affected by an error in the 
manufacturing, or distribution process. A simple calibration error in the manufacturing 
process could lead to food poisoning of catastrophic proportion, the fallout of which 
most organisations may not survive.  
  
The London beer flood of October 17
th
 1814 spilled 1.47 million litres of beer into the 
streets. The wave destroyed homes and killed 8 people, including 2 toddlers 
(Greenberg, 2006). The Boston Molasses flood of January 15, 1919 caused by a burst 
tank, resulted in a wave of molasses rushing through the streets at an estimated 56 km/h, 
killing 21 people and injuring over 150 others (Puelo, 2004). Should this happen in a 
major city today during peak hours, the resultant catastrophic effect would increase 
exponentially. More recently in Honolulu, Hawaii, 1400 tons of molasses were spilled 
into the harbour in September 2013 as a result of a faulty pipe. Most aquatic life around 
the vicinity was reported killed. 
 
Restaurant Chains 
Finally, the research identified the restaurant chain as another industry where a minor 
lapse in mindfulness could lead to catastrophic loss of life. This choice is to include a 
service related organisation to contrast with the manufacturing and production related 
organisations already identified.  
Food contamination could also be a major source of disaster for a restaurant chain and 
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history is rife with such incidents with multiple fatalities. The contamination could 
happen at any point in the supply chain. There have been instances where chicken feed 
were contaminated, leading to poisonous chicken and eggs being used in multiple 
service locations. There have also been similar cases with milk, meat, and grains. 732 
people were infected with E.coli in 1993 when Jack in the Box, a US restaurant chain, 
served infected burger across 73 locations in the United States. 4 children died, and 178 
people were left with permanent damage.  
 
In addition to Jack in the Box, E.coli outbreak have affected other major restaurant 
chains including Kentucky Fried Chicken (KFC), McDonald’s, Sizzler, Wendy’s, and 
Taco Bell all with catastrophic consequences. Burger King, another restaurant chain, 
was forced to recall 25 million pounds of beef from 650 locations in 1997 after E. coli 
contamination got 16 customers sick. In 2003, 640 people were affected and 4 died in 
Pennsylvania, USA, when tainted tomatoes at Chi-Chi’s restaurant caused a hepatitis A 
outbreak. The reputation of the organisation never recovered.  The reputation of 
Chipotle, another restaurant chain, took a major hit in 2015, when sick employees led to 
an outbreak that affected almost 400 customers.  
 
The final consideration made during the choice of organisations was the need to 
accommodate organisations of various sizes to eliminate the potential bias. For instance, 
larger and more established organisations within an industry is expected to have a more 
evolved procedures based on their past experiences. Multinational companies would 
also be expected to leverage on their global corporate strategies organise the processes 
different from their smaller local counterparts.  Smaller organisations may just be 
concerned with meeting their financial obligations and insist of production at the 
expense of safety. On the other hand, some smaller organisations may be interested in 
the sustainability of their small businesses and design a highly reliable process, whereas 
laxity and over confidence bias may be introduced into larger and older organisations.  
 
 
This research therefore mixed up the organisations with larger and smaller 
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organisations, multinational and local organisations, and older and newer organisations 
to generate a wide range of data that could potentially help address the research 
questions.  
  
Summary of Organisations 
These organisations chosen will be referred to as Company A, B, C, D, E, F, G, and H 
at this stage. The eight organisation, A, is a multinational oil and gas company based in 
Canada, and responses were obtained from their locations in Canada. This was chosen 
to triangulate the results that would be obtained from the organisations in Nigeria. The 
summary is presented in the table below. 
 
Table 3.1: A Summary of research participation showing the companies, the number of 
respondents, and the number of interviewees for each company 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Determining the Sample Size 
Organisation Location Consideration Questionnaires Interviews
A CANADA
Multinational organization. Expected enhanced processes and culture. To be 
used for triangulation 40 6
B NIGERIA
Multinational organization. Expected enhanced processes and culture. Large 
employee base 50 10
C NIGERIA
Local organization. Smaller than B, but Larger than D. Newer than B, but 
older than D. 30 5
D NIGERIA Local organization. New. Small employee base 30 5
E NIGERIA Large operational base. National spread. Decades of operation. 50 10
F NIGERIA Regional operational base. New organization 50 10
G NIGERIA Regional operational base. New organization 50 10
H NIGERIA Large operations base. National spread. Decades of operation. 70 15
Oil and Gas
Beverage Manufacturing
Restaurant Chain
RESEARCH PARTICIPATION
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Determining the appropriate sample size for a given population is a critical process that 
must be undertaken carefully. While a small sample size relative to the population 
increases the margin of error (De Vaus, 2014), a very large sample size relative to the 
sample population will be an expensive and logistical nightmare to achieve. For this 
reason the sample size must be carefully determined with considerations to the total 
population being studied, the confidence level, and the confidence interval.  
 
The confidence level is the amount of uncertainty the research can tolerate (Saunders et 
al, 2016). It is the percentage of all possible samples that can be expected to include the 
true population parameter, and is directly proportional to the sample size. It states the 
precision of the estimates of the target population as a percentage that is within a certain 
range of margin of error (Saunders et al, 2016). For this research, a 95% confidence 
level is assumed. At 95% confidence level, 95 out of 100 samples are expected to be 
representative of the true characteristics of the true population. This implies that the true 
population parameter would be included in 95% of the confidence intervals. 
Extrapolating 95% confidence level from a Z table the Z score would be 1.96. 1.96 
would therefore be used in this research as the confidence level.   
 
Confidence interval on the other hand is the amount of error the research can allow. It 
is usually referred to as the margin of error and is expected to be as low as reasonably 
practicable. It determines how much higher or lower the population mean the research is 
willing to let its sample mean fall. The larger the sample size, the lower the margin of 
error. This research assigned a margin of error of +/-5%  
 
Standard deviation is a measure of the level of variance expected from the responses. A 
generous standard deviation of 0.5 ensures a sizable number samples with the allowed 
margin of error.  
 
The research assumes a population of 5.26 million based on the Nation Master Labour 
statistics’ (Nationmaster, 2017) estimates of the labour force employed in Nigerian 
industries. 
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Given these variables, a number of options are available to calculate the sample size. 
These include the formula method, use of standard calculators and the graphical 
method. The formula and the software are described below. 
 
Formula 
A number of formulas are available ranging from simple to the very complex. Smith 
(2013) gives a very simple formula for calculating sample size and is shown below.  
 
                                                  N = Z
2 
* P (1 – P) / E2                                                (3.1) 
 
N = minimum number of samples  
Z = confidence level (1.96 – see in section 3.7.2.3) 
P = standard deviation (0.5 – see section 3.7.2.3) 
E = confidence interval (+/-5% - see section 3.7.2.3) 
 
N = 1.96
2
 * 0.5(1 - 0.5) / 0.05
2
 
 
This gives the value of the required sample size to be 384.  
 
Software 
A quick search on the internet will show numerous software and websites that will 
automatically generate the sample size when the variables are inputted. The variables 
for most of them include the confidence level, the standard deviation, and the 
confidence interval. For all the software tested, the research obtained the same value of 
384 as the sample size. 
 
 
 
 
 
3.7.3 Questionnaire Design 
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A questionnaire is a data collection technique in which respondents are requested to 
respond to the same set of questions in a pre-determined order (Saunders et al, 2016). It 
includes questions and statements designed to seek appropriate information and allow 
for easy analysis. It is a very effective and generally accepted method of quantitative 
data collection from large samples (Saunders et al, 2016; Bell & Waters, 2014; Dillman 
et al, 2014; Teddlie and Tashakkori, 2006). To ensure effectiveness, the individual 
questions must be carefully designed; the visual presentation must be clear and 
pleasing; and the purpose must be lucidly explained. It should also be pilot tested and 
the administration executed to perfection (Saunders et al, 2016) 
 
The questionnaire used in this research is based on the work of Weick & Sutcliffe 
(2007) that seeks to explore how organisations could maintain a resilient performance in 
an age of uncertainty, as well as how organisations could learn high reliability 
organisations. Information based on the experiences of the researcher, information from 
different professionals, and organisational improvement texts from different 
organisations have been used to enrich the questionnaire. Weick & Sutcliffe (2007) had 
identified five principles of high reliability organisations to include preoccupation with 
failure, reluctance to simplify, sensitivity to operations, commitment to resilience, and 
deference to expertise. They designed a set of question for each of these principles to 
help organisations spot the five principles in their processes.  
 
Weick & Sutcliffe used a combination of a three points rating system and a two points 
rating system to design their questions. In some of the principles, the respondents are 
requested to select between numbers one, two, and three, to describe how each of the 
statements describes their work units, departments, or organisation. The selections one, 
two, and three in this instant stand for: not at all; to some extent; and a great deal 
respectively. In some other principles, the respondents are given only two choices: 
agree and disagree, and are requested to indicate whether they agree or disagree with the 
provided statements.  
 
This research considered that a five points rating system would expand the options 
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available to the respondents and enhance the chances of getting deeper, richer, and 
wider range of responses. Furthermore, harmonizing into a single five point rating 
system would make it easier for the respondents to follow through, instead of jumping 
between two different rating systems in the same questionnaire. The available responses 
are one, two, three, four, and five for strongly disagree, partially disagree, neither agree 
nor disagree, partially agree, and strongly agree. This is to help maintain uniformity 
throughout the research and avoid confusing the respondents (Dilmal et al, 2014). The 
neutral point of neither agree nor disagree also helps the respondents sit on the fence 
when considering an implicitly negative statement or potentially uncomfortable 
statement. This also helps collect more expansive responses from the respondents on a 
wide range of issues rather than just a two point scale of ‘agree or disagree’.  
 
The other difference between this questionnaire and that by Weick & Sutcliffe (2007) 
lies in the choice of questions. The questions have been expanded in this research to 
include more areas not covered by Weick & Sutcliffe (2007). For instance, considering 
preoccupation with failure, this research expanded the questions to fifteen from the 
original ten. The questions are made to follow the sequence that would be expected in 
an actual incident from near miss or incident reporting, to documentation; through the 
root cause analysis, recommendation implementation, and the finally the lessons 
learned. Furthermore, the questions are made more active by making the respondent feel 
a part of the organisation and a part of the research. This is achieved by the consistent 
use of the pronouns “we” and “our” throughout the questionnaire. The respondent is 
therefore made to feel he/she is talking about himself/herself, instead of “them”. The 
next section describes the questionnaire design in more details.  
 
The design 
The questionnaire starts with a cover letter that introduces the research and the 
researcher. It provides informed consent and assures on confidentiality. The second 
page provides a brief description of high reliability organisation and the five principles 
of high reliability organisations to help the respondents deepen their understanding of 
the concept being studied and its relationship with their individual organisations.  
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The next page collects demographic information with a dropdown selection to indicate 
demographic information. All the demographic questions are provided in a list question 
format. Information includes industry type: 
 
 
Fig 3.3: Excerpt from the questionnaire showing demographic question on industry type 
 
The next page identifies the name of organisation (or its code name), primary 
responsibility of the respondent, and years of experience of the respondent within the 
industry. 
 
Fig 3.4: Excerpt from the questionnaire showing demographic question on 
responsibility and experience 
 
Years of experience in the industry was chosen over years of experience within the 
160 
 
organisation because of the attrition rate within some industries. A management 
employee could be less than three years within an organisation but has spent over 25 
years in multiple roles in other organisations. Provided the roles were within the same 
industry, the risks and experiences are considered similar and transferable, and therefore 
should count for this research. 
 
Finally the research requested gender information to gauge if the trend could show the 
role of gender in certain responses.  
 
Fig 3.5: Excerpt from the questionnaire showing the demographic question on gender 
 
The actual research questions were split into five sections, with each section 
representing one high reliability organisation principle. 
 
Section 1: Assessing preoccupation with failure 
There are 15 questions within this section. The questions are arranged in a five point 
rating scale of strongly agree, partially agree, neither agree nor disagree, partially 
disagree, and strongly disagree. Weick & Sutcliffe (2007) rightly designed their 
questions to gauge the respondents’ impressions about their organisations preoccupation 
with failure. They however failed to mention incidents and near miss reporting, how 
they are documented, and what the organisations do with the documented reports. 
Observing, reporting and documenting near misses and incidents are key steps to 
eliminate or reduce the incubation period in Turner’s man-made disaster model (Turner, 
1978). In most of the disaster cases described in chapter two, the incidents could have 
been avoided or the effects reduced had there been a good culture of reporting, 
documentation, and action close out. The lookouts in Titanic noticed some haze within 
the horizon ahead of them but failed to report (Barratt, 2010). This research considers 
incident and near miss management as a key aspect of an organisation’s preoccupation 
with failure and has therefore added questions to reflect this. The research also 
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unbundled the incidents and the near misses and treated them as clearly separate 
entities. An organisation that is not mindful might neglect near misses to its peril. Frank 
Bird analysed the general results of more than 1,000,000 incidents and concluded that a 
relationship exists between the number of near misses and an eventual injury or 
equipment damage (Morrish, 2017). He considered near misses as incidents with no 
visible damage or injury and used his research to design an incident triangle that 
describes the relationship between near misses and incidents (figure 3.6) 
 
 
Figure 3.6 Bird’s incident triangle (Bird, 1992) 
 
From the triangle, for every 600 near misses, there are 30 equipment damages, 10 minor 
injuries, and 1 major injury. Borg (2002) argued against this, stating the blurry line 
between minor and major injuries. He simplified the triangle and grouped the injuries 
together to include 1 injury and 3 equipment damage from 30 near misses (this should 
actually be 60 near misses from simple mathematics) 
 
Figure 3.7 Borg’s incident triangle (Borg, 2002) 
 
If the near misses are considered as warnings, this triangle suggests that there must have 
been 10 warnings before equipment damage would occur, and 30 warnings before an 
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injury. With this idea of a near miss as an asset damage, or injury, or fatality waiting to 
happen, this research justified its inclusion of incident reporting, as well as unbundling 
the near misses and incidents in its questionnaire.  
 
The questions are arranged to flow through the failure analysis process: observing the 
incident/near miss; reporting it; a database of the reports being maintained; root cause 
analysis being performed; actions being assigned to investigate and prevent 
reoccurrence; applications of leaning from failures; regular reviews, perception of the 
people that file the reports; perceptions of the people who are involved in the incidents; 
near misses; and unsafe acts or unsafe conditions. The questionnaire is attached in 
appendix 3. 
 
Each question ends with an open question type with provision ‘other (please specify)’. 
This is to enable the respondents indicate their own thoughts on the question. Finally, 
each section ends with a rand order type question set, in which the respondent is asked 
to rank the questions in order of importance to them, with 1 being the most important, 
and the last number on the list being the least important among all the selections.  
 
Section 2 
Sections 2 follows the same pattern as section 1 and makes the same assumptions in 
terms of the type of the rating questions style, the rating scale used, the open question 
for ‘other’ to enable the respondents’ opinions, and the ranking type questions at the 
end to enable the respondents rank the questions in order of importance. The section 
assesses how organisations balance simplification and standardization of processes with 
actively seeking to avoid undue generalisations on how and why things work or fail. 
 
The research recognises that the culture in some organisations is built such that career 
advancement becomes a function of the extent to which the individual conforms to 
whatever processes and behaviours exist within the organisation. People would not want 
to be labelled as “process disruptors” and therefore scepticism is silenced. The 
unintended consequence is that people would make potentially damaging observations 
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about the processes but would choose to look the other way. For a manufacturing 
organisation, dripping oil from an engine could be an indication of a seal failure or 
internal failure with potentially catastrophic consequences on the whole process. For 
fear of punishment, or what people might say or do, or what they might not say or not 
do, the observer might just clean the drip and walk away. Overtime, the drips might be 
seen as a norm and overlooked, possibly with disastrous consequences.  
 
This section therefore sets out 12 questions to gauge the organisations’ reluctance to 
simplify. The questions include the ability of people to challenge the procedures and 
processes, as well as how the organisation treats critics and sceptics. It also gauges the 
level of shared trust among people within the organisation, how viewpoints are 
respected or not. Finally it gauges how much people are encouraged to deepen their 
understanding and analysis of processes and the nature of problems to be better 
prepared to challenge them or solve the problems when they arise. The NASA 
Challenger disaster could have been prevented had the management not oversimplified 
the flaw in the O-Rings designs when their engineers reported the issue. They did not 
respect the engineers view points and failed to challenge the process with their senior 
management. Similar to this, the management at NASA oversimplified and considered 
as acceptable risk the possibility of foam insulation shedding off from the external tank 
of Columbia’s shuttle, leading up to the Columbia disaster. The events leading up to the 
Texas City incident described in chapter two had occurred several times in the past, but 
the events were oversimplified, and learnings were not applied. The questionnaire is 
therefore designed with consideration to the issues around oversimplification.   
 
Section 3  
Section 3 assesses the organisations’ sensitivity to operations: their responsiveness to 
details of their operations; their staffing adequacy; competence and motivation levels; 
and their ability to detect and competently react to slight changes in the process. The 
section consists of 11 questions built around each individual being mindful of assigned 
jobs, having an overview of other jobs going on around, how the jobs relate with one 
another, as well as being able to participate in jobs outside own areas of competence. It 
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also assesses the communications among staff, between staff and management, 
relationships among staff, and between staff and management. It assesses the leadership 
and decision making process, as well as availability of resources to manage unexpected 
issues. Most of the disasters discussed in chapter two had sensitivity to operation at the 
heart of their causative factors. For instance, from chapter two, the crew of Columbia 
appeared to have been rushed into the launch, with very limited time to prepare, and 
they did not have adequate basic personal protective equipment.  Investigations into 
Piper Alpha incident revealed that the disaster resulted from inadequate communication 
among staff, inadequate communication between staff and management, insufficient 
duty of care, poor operational decision making by those responsible, breakdown of the 
chain of command, and inadequate maintenance and safety practices. There were also 
issues around sensitivity to operations in the BP Texas city incident, and the Deep 
Water Horizon incident. These issues bothered around deviation from procedures, 
inadequate supervision, unclear chain of command, ambiguity in roles and 
responsibilities, inadequate communication, inadequate hazard identification, 
inadequate trainings, and delays in reacting to signals. The eleven questions have been 
carefully selected to cover these issues around sensitivity to operations.   
 
Section 4 
This section assesses the organisations’ commitment to resilience: the ability of the 
organisation to respond to incidents, recover from failure, learn from it, and restore 
operations to the conditions before the incident. It assesses the organisations’ emphasis 
on technical, behavioural and attitudinal competence; the extent to which these 
competencies are assessed; and the availability of relevant skillsets for all aspects of the 
processes.  It also assesses the emergency response and contingency plans; how they are 
deployed; and how the people accept and implement the processes.  
 
Finally it assesses the availability of formal and informal contacts the people can access 
to solve problems and how aware people are aware of the availability or otherwise of 
these key contacts. These questions would also attempt to close the gaps around 
commitment to resilience described in the seven cases in chapter two. In the case of 
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Columbia, it was discovered that there were no emergency response processes built into 
the system to enable effective rescue missions and on-orbit repairs by the shuttle 
astronauts should the need arise. Furthermore, the emergency response practices leading 
up to the Texas City incident was considered inadequate by the post disaster 
investigations. The same was identified in the Deepwater Horizon incident, where the 
final events were considered at best chaotic: people were unsure whether to muster, wait 
for lifeboats, or jump into the sea. The emergency response equipment such as lifeboats 
was considered grossly inadequate to handle the emergency. The questions in this 
section are designed to investigate the level of preparedness of organisations for 
emergencies.  
 
Section 5 
This final section assesses the extent to which the leaders in the organisations are 
willing to set aside hierarchy and respond to the insights from experienced and 
competent staff for each particular emergency, despite their position within the 
organisation.  
 
The section has eight questions that try to assess peoples’ respect for one another’s job. 
It tries to assess if for instance, the general manager will yield authority to the security 
person during a security emergency despite the security person’s hierarchical position 
within the organisation. It also assesses if electrician at the shop floor is valued and 
respected as much as the process analyst or the human resource personnel at the head 
office, all of whom are key elements of the organisations’ success or failure. It assesses 
how much people are committed to doing their jobs well; the availability of different 
key expertise for all anticipated emergencies in all key areas of the organisations’ 
processes; and the extent to which people know who has the most expertise for different 
aspects of the organisations’ processes. The section also assesses how much expertise 
and experience are valued over rank during emergencies. Finally it assesses how 
responsible people feel about problems until they are resolved.  
 
The Piper Alpha incident is a clear example of the dangers of not deferring to expertise 
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during emergencies. The staff at Tartan and Claymore were experienced enough to 
know they should shut down their facilities to reduce the effect of the incident, but 
waited for shutdown instructions from their hierarchical leadership. This delay fuelled 
the disaster and massively escalated it.  
 
As already stated, the questionnaire is influenced by Weick & Sutcliffe’s questionnaire, 
the researcher’s industry experience, experiences of the research supervisors, and 
knowledge sharing sessions with industry and subject matter experts. For instance, 
some of the questions were heavily influenced by the researcher’s health, safety and 
environment (HSE) background. In addition to the experiences of the research 
supervisors, subject matter experts, the questions were also influenced by past 
experiences where people potentially fail to report issues for fear of a punitive measures 
and low end of year appraisal. Furthermore, the reluctance to simplify section for 
instance was heavily influenced by the researcher’s involvement in several “war room” 
sessions, where people from diverse backgrounds, viewpoints and temperaments are 
brought together to “think outside the box” on performance and organisational 
improvement initiatives and processes.  
 
The incident described in section 2.5.9, after the discussions on deference to expertise, 
played heavily on the choice of some of the questions, especially in the sections 
‘sensitivity to operations’ and ‘deference to expertise’. If an employee hits the 
emergency shutdown button due to a potential incident leading to production loss, how 
will the employee be treated within the organisation? What if it turned out to be a false 
alarm and the process was not really in danger? How would such employee be treated in 
the organisation? Are the employees expected to seek management approval to shut 
down the operations during an emergency?  
 
Questions such as the ones below were designed to find out how the organisations 
would react when faced with a scenario as above 
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Fig 3.8: Excerpt from questionnaire showing sample questions 
 
Finally, some questions were found to fit into more than one section. In such instances, 
the individual judgment of the researcher was used to determine the section that best fits 
the question. The two questions below found in section 3: assessing sensitivity to 
operations are perfect examples. 
 
“Everyone is expected to take decision, such as operations shutdown to forestall 
catastrophic failure”  
“People have discretion to resolve unexpected frontline problems without differing to 
leadership” 
 
These questions could easily fall under section 5: deferring to expertise. The research 
however considered that operational shut down during emergencies should not just be 
left to experts, but should be an operational decision, the decision of which should rest 
on everyone. The same explanation goes with people having the discretion to resolve 
unexpected frontline problem. Although this also is closely related to difference to 
expertise, it also borders on sensitivity to operations. When people are sensitive to 
operations, they will quickly resolve frontline issues before it escalates. 
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Interviews 
In addition to the questionnaires, semi-structured interviews were designed to delve 
deeper and obtain qualitative details about the issues raised in the questionnaires. It 
helps to obtain the story behind respondents’ knowledge (Cohen & Manion, 1994), and 
to attain in-depth knowledge about the phenomenon under investigation (Wahyuni, 
2012). The questions were loosely based on the questionnaire, but the respondents were 
asked to give their opinion about the questions. 
 
The selection of interviewees was done in a stratified manner to ensure the distribution 
of the interviewees in line with employee supervisor manager ratio as previously 
discussed. The research adopted a ratio of 10 questionnaires to 2 interviews spread 
among the 3 strata of management, supervisors, and the shop floor. Letters were sent 
out to the managers and supervisors through the gatekeepers with a date agreed between 
gatekeepers and the researcher for the interviews. The eventual interviews were based 
on availability of the managers and supervisors. Interviews for people on the shop floor 
on the other hand was carried out purely based on availability on the proposed date as 
some of the proposed interviewees were on shift related work cycles. This was 
facilitated through the gatekeepers.  
  
The interview started as a semi-structured interview with similar questions but with the 
flexibility to use closed-ended and open-ended questions. It then gradually developed 
into an unstructured interview format that would rely on the social interaction between 
the researcher and the respondent. This helped to expose the researchers to unexpected 
ideas that potentially helped illuminate the respondents’ social reality.  
 
The interviews were structured into six sections. Section one was designed to capture 
the interviewees’ demographic information. It contained questions to extract the 
respondents’ gender, industry, organisation, primary responsibility, and years of 
experience in the industry.  
 
The next five sections discussed each of the five HRO principles, much similar to the 
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questionnaires. Each of these five sections had general open ended questions, as well as 
questions that tried to personalize the interviewees’ experiences.  Section two captured 
the interviewees’ experience with respect to assessing preoccupation with failure. 
Questions include investigations on how the organisations manage near misses and 
incidents, with follow up questions around reporting, incident database management, 
and overall perspectives about near misses and incidents. Questions also include what 
processes are available to prevent recurrences of incidents and near misses, and to 
prevent these from escalating. Follow up questions include processes around incidents 
and near misses analysis, learning from incident, and use of worst case scenarios during 
planning and analyses. The section also asked questions to gauge the focus of 
organisations on successes or failures, how the organisations treat people that make 
mistakes, and the nature of communications between the staff and management, and 
among the staff. The section ends by asking about the personal experiences of the 
interviewees with respect to failure.  
 
Section three assessed the reluctant to simply in organisations. The interviewees are 
asked their opinion about skeptics and people that challenge the norms, as well as how 
they are perceived within the organisation. The section asks to know the behaviour of 
organisations towards learning with a follow up to know if learning is geared towards 
understanding processes. There are also questions around the interviewees’ impression 
about the level of trust that exists within the organisation, as well as the extent to which 
everyone’s viewpoints are heard and taken into consideration. Finally the interviewee is 
asked if he/she has ever taken something for granted that turned out to lead to failure, 
and if it has previously happened within the organisation. The interviewee is asked to 
describe the incident and the effect it had on the organisation as well as the lessons 
learned.   
 
Section four assessed the sensitivity to operations. It asks about the nature of team 
meetings and tries to understand the frequencies, usefulness, participation, and terms of 
reference of team meetings. It also asks the level to which superiors and managers 
intervene in daily activities, and how this is perceived by the employees. It asks about 
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the feedback process and field supervision, the extent to which supervision is available 
in the field, and the extent to which field leadership can take decisions without deferring 
to management. In addition to these, the section asks the question: “If someone 
interrupts the process to forestall a catastrophic failure, what would happen? What if it 
turns out to be a false alarm?” The section ends by exploring the interviewees 
experience about the nature of communication available between frontline and 
management, and among staff. 
 
Section five assesses commitment to resilience. It asks the question “What emergency 
response and contingency processes are available?”, “how do people respond to these 
processes?” It asks questions that explore the availability of required skillsets within the 
organisation and how the skills are assessed. Finally it asks about the interviewees’ 
personal experiences about emergencies, details of those emergencies, how they were 
managed, the effects of those emergencies, and the lessons learned from how those 
emergencies were managed.  
  
The final section assesses deference to expertise. It asks personalized questions around 
the leadership structure during emergencies, as well as the relationship between the 
experienced people and the management staff during emergencies. It tries to understand 
the difference, if any, in the leadership of teams during emergencies and under normal 
operations.  Finally, the section tries to understand the level of expertise available 
within the teams. 
 
In summary, the interviews are structured such the “reasons behind the responses” from 
the questionnaires are identified. The questions delve deeper into the responses from the 
questionnaires to understand the perceptions and experiences of the respondents and 
therefore throw light into the responses. Finally, the interviews would be useful to 
triangulate the results obtained from the questionnaires.  The next section describes the 
data administration and collection process. A copy of the interview questions is attached 
on appendix 4. 
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3.7.4 Administration and Collection 
This section will briefly describe how the questionnaires were administered as well as 
the challenges encountered. The research initially chose the online as its preferred 
method of questionnaire administration. This was to ensure wider distribution and 
enhance anonymity. Sogosurvey was selected from the pool of other electronic survey 
instruments available. It was easy to set up given the researcher’s lack of experience 
with online survey instruments. The technical team of sogosurvey was also easily 
available through the online chat service, through telephones, and through emails to 
offer assistance when obvious hitches were encountered. Finally it was offered free as a 
student package and its cost effectiveness was a relief to the research.  
 
All the 20 pilot questionnaires were returned successfully and the results documented. 
The 20 test questionnaires included 2 questionnaires administered to people within the 
management cadre, 8 were administered to people within the supervisory cadre, and the 
rest administered to people at the shop floor. This was the expected percentage 
representation for the rest of the research. 
 
 However, after 4 months of administering this survey through the gatekeepers, and 
repeated reminders, the response rate was still at 3.8% with 668 questionnaires 
delivered. The strategy was changed to distribute paper questionnaires using the same 
gatekeepers, but with the researcher making personal visits to these organisations. With 
this strategy, the desired sample size was obtained.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
172 
 
3.8 Reliability and Validity 
Reliability and validity are key concepts that determine the quality of a research 
(Saunders et al, 2016; Golafshani, 2003). 
 
3.8.1  Reliability  
Reliability refers to the ability of the research to be replicated with consistent results. 
An unreliable research will prove to be invalid since any error or bias will affect the 
results and subsequent interpretations, casting doubts on the means to measure the 
phenomenon being studied (Saunders et al, 2016). Biases and errors from both the 
participant and researcher could affect the reliability of a research, and care must be 
taken to ensure these biases and errors are eliminated or reduced to as low as reasonably 
practicable.  
 
For this research’s questionnaire, reliability was achieved by the robustness, simplicity, 
and clarity of the wordings so that the meanings would remain the same with different 
respondents. Within the same organisation, the responses within certain groups were 
mostly similar, and consistent, indicating a high reliability. For instance, the managers 
appeared to answer in the same line, the supervisors appeared to be fairly consistent 
across the questions, and the employees at the shop floor appeared to be fairly 
consistent with their responses. 
 
 Finally, throughout the questionnaires there are deliberate alternative forms (Mitchell, 
1996) introduced at random. These are check questions or group of check questions 
deliberately introduced with different semantics. The responses for these check 
questions are expected to be the same, thereby confirming reliability. For instance the 
question: ‘we have well defined emergency plans’ and ‘we have well defined 
contingency plans’ are similar and should have similar responses. A well-defined 
emergency plan must contain contingency plans. Similarly, the questions: ‘people in the 
organisation value expertise over rank’ and ‘we are expected to take expert decisions 
irrespective of position or rank’ are similar questions worded differently, but are 
expected to generate similar responses.  
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Table 3.2 and Table 3.3 demonstrate the reliability of the research in terms of check 
questions. Both tables show the comparison of the results obtained in the check 
questions and indicate how close the responses are.  
 
Table 3.2 – Comparison of the results from the emergency/contingency check questions 
 
 
For the questions ‘we have well defined emergency plans’ and ‘we have well defined 
contingency plans’, the responses are very similar in almost all the organisations. In 
Companies A, B, C, and D, all the respondents chose responses between levels 4 and 5 
in both sets of questions. The responses in both sets of questions match exactly in 
companies E and H. In a similar set of questions ‘we are aware of the emergency 
response plans’ and ‘we are aware of the contingency plan’, similar the research 
obtained similar results as above. The responses were exact matches in companies E 
and H with very close responses in the other organisations.  
 
For the questions, ‘people in the organisation value expertise over rank’ and ‘we are 
expected to take expert decisions irrespective of position or rank’, the research obtained 
similar results (Table 3.3).  
 
Table 3.3 – Comparison of the results from the expertise over rank check questions 
 
 
Availability of defined emergency plan Availability of defined contingency plan
Company A 100% at level 5 100% at level 5
Company B 100% at levels 4 & 5 100% at levels 4 & 5
Company C 100% at levels 4 & 5 100% at levels 4 & 5
Company D 100% at levels 4 & 5 100% at levels 4 & 5
Company E 32% (5), 30% (4), 26% (3), 12% (2), 0% (1) 32% (5), 30% (4), 26% (3), 12% (2), 0% (1)
Company F 100% at levels 1-3, 78% of which are at levels 1-2. 100% at levels 1-3, 88% of which are at levels 1-2. 
Company G 100% at levels 1 - 3 100% at levels 1 - 3
Company H 0% (5), 0% (4), 8% (3), 38% (2), 54% (1) 0% (5), 0% (4), 8% (3), 38% (2), 54% (1)
Value expertise over rank Expert decisions irrespective of position or rank
Company A 100% at level 5 100% at level 5
Company B 100% at level 1 & 2 90% at level 1 & 2
Company C 0% (5), 0% (4), 6.67% (3), 36.6% (2), 56.6% (1) 0% (5), 0% (4), 6.67% (3), 36.6% (2), 56.6% (1)
Company D 100% at level 1 & 2 87% at level 1 & 2
Company E 100% at level 1 & 2 82% at level 1 & 2
Company F 100% at level 1 & 2 92% at level 1 & 2
Company G 100% at level 1 & 2 97% at level 1 & 2
Company H 100% at level 1 & 2 96% at level 1 & 2
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Reliability is difficult to achieve in qualitative research such as in the case of the 
interview technique adopted in this research (Saunders et al, 2016), largely due to the 
fact that repeatability is not feasible in a subjective process. The interviews are designed 
to be flexible, with open ended questions designed to engage the respondent and gain 
insights about the feelings, experiences, and social reality of the respondent. Recreating 
the exact circumstances, mood, emotional conditions and environments that produced 
the social interaction is not feasible, therefore reliability is not considered in that respect 
for the interviews. However, it must be pointed out that the reasons underpinning the 
choice of interview technique as already highlighted was to understand more of the 
reasons behind the responses in the questionnaire, thereby triangulating the findings.  
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3.8.2 Validity  
Reliability alone is not enough to enough to justify the quality of a research. A research 
could be reliable but not valid; it could also be valid not reliable. A research must 
therefore be both valid and reliable to be considered of good quality. Validity refers to 
the appropriateness of the measures used, the accuracy of the analysis of the results, and 
the generalizability of the findings (Saunders et al, 2016).  
 
For this research, validity is verified by first through content validity. Content validity is 
an internal validity that refers to the extent to which the questions provides adequate 
coverage of the research objectives and research questions. According to Littlejohn et al 
(2017) described two ways in which content validity could be established. These are 
through expert interviews and pilot study. Various literatures on high reliability 
organisations have been reviewed and all the principles extracted. The questionnaire 
was developed to cover all principles of high reliability organisation theory. Opinions 
from seasoned industry experts, the academia, members of the supervisory board for 
this research and examiners from the major review and subsequent annual reviews were 
collated and used to update the questionnaire and thus enhance the content validity.  
 
The research considered validity during pilot testing by ensuring a similar spread as 
would be expected from the actual research. Out of the 20 respondents, 2 were in 
management positions, 8 in supervisor positions, and the rest in the shop floor. This is 
similar to the distribution one would expect from the sample population. The responses 
from pilot testing were compared against each other within similar strata. The research 
expected the responses from respondents within similar strata in similar industries to be 
similar. These results are expected to be different from responses obtained from 
different strata. For instance, the responses from managers were expected to be slightly 
different from the responses from people on the shop floor. This research achieved this 
as expected in all the HRO principles, and in all the organisations surveyed. The 
evidence and details of this can be found in section 4.4. The results from the pilot test, 
and the ability of the research to use the same content utilized in the pilot test to 
successfully complete the research further affirms the validity.  
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Validity is also a function of the ability of the research to do what it set out to do, 
answer its research questions using appropriate methodologies, and develop 
generalizable findings that are easily replicable. The research started out to explore the 
extent to which the reliability of organisations could be measured, as well as the ability 
of such a measurement framework to be and utilized to improve diverse organisations. 
These were clearly defined at the beginning of the research and everything in the 
research was building up to solve these. The ability of this research to develop the 
maturity model ORM
2
 (discussed further in section 5), and the measurement framework 
FORM (discussed further in section 5) are further testaments to the validity. The 
research was replicated in eight different organisations, from three different industries 
and in two different continents with very similar results. This replicability further adds 
to the research validity.  
 
Issues around construct validity as it relates to this research would be discussed in the 
limitations section.  
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3.9 Ethical Considerations 
This research was conducted in full consideration of the University of Portsmouth ethics 
policy of November 2013. There was no primary data collection until the research had 
been ethically reviewed by the University Ethics Committee and approval received to 
commence.  
 
Clarity 
The language was clear and concise, devoid of unnecessary ambiguity. The objectives 
were clearly spelt out both on the questionnaires, on the request letters and on the 
consent form. There was a clear and brief description of HROs, and this was added as a 
footnote to the ethical review documentation to aid their decision. The principles of 
HRO were also briefly and clearly described to the respondents so they are clear on 
what the expectations are. 
 
At the beginning, the research had intended to conduct a forensic on some organisations 
that had collapsed and try to investigate how high reliability organisation behaviour 
could have prevented their demise. In the course of the ethical review, there was the 
realization that having been defunct for years and the employees moved on or retired, 
the memories of some of the proposed respondents may have become blurred or 
somewhat biased. This could potentially lead to their responses not being accurate 
representations of the events and actions that may have been obtainable or prevalent at 
the time the organisations were operational. This group was therefore excluded to 
remove this bias. 
 
Gaining Access 
Gatekeepers were used to distribute the questionnaires and to gain access for the 
interviews. Gatekeepers were used to ease the distribution burden, as well as eliminate 
the bias of the researcher selecting only respondents that could further the research 
assumptions. The use of gatekeepers presented its own ethical consideration: gatekeeper 
bias. The gate keepers could potentially select respondents based on personal or 
organisational interests, with negative impacts on the quality of the research.  
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To eliminate this bias, the research held initial discussions with the gatekeepers in an 
attempt to obtain an employee list, at the least coded with numbers to maintain privacy. 
It would have been easy to send out the questionnaires from numbers selected at 
random from this sample frame. This was not feasible due to the extra effort that would 
have been required from the gatekeepers to code the list with numbers, as well as the 
effort to transcribe the codes into emails for the distribution list. The compromise was 
to indicate a percentage of distribution, whereby the managers received 10-20% of the 
questionnaires, supervisors received 20-40% of the questionnaires, and the rest of the 
employees received 40-60% of the questionnaires. Finally the use of semi structured 
interviews that enabled follow up questions helped triangulate the results from the 
questionnaires, thereby limiting the gatekeeper bias. 
 
Consent and Anonymity 
Cover letters and consent forms were sent in advance of the interviews so the 
interviewee is aware in advance of all the requirements without pressure or prejudice 
and to ensure the ethics committee requirement for informed consent is met. 
Furthermore, each questionnaire begins with the cover letter, which specifies informed 
consent.  
 
For the interviews, in addition to the consent form, the interview will start with 
explanation of the research objectives, as well as expected format and questions. A 
verbal informed consent was obtained from each interviewee before commencing the 
interview. 
For anonymity, the respondents were not required to sign the consent form, but were 
made aware that continuing with the questionnaire would indicate consent.  
 
Furthermore on anonymity, there are no names on the questionnaires and all 
publications will be anonymised. Electronic survey instrument (sogosurvey) was used 
to enhance anonymity. Where hard copy questionnaire are used, names were not 
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mentioned. The research realizes that it is technically possible to obtain names and 
details of respondents in online survey instruments, but have no intention of doing this. 
 
Some of the organisations requested not to be mentioned in the report for confidentiality 
purposes. Due to this, codes will be used to represent the organisations at this point. 
 
Data Safety 
All responses obtained through emails will be downloaded from the online survey 
instrument and stored on an encrypted and locked hard drive with backup stored on the 
locked N Drive and google drive. All data will first be grouped and coded, while the 
code identifiers will be stored separately. Data from paper questionnaires were also 
extracted, coded and stored on an encrypted and locked hard drive with back up stored 
in the N Drive and google drive. As in the case of the online questionnaires, the codes 
and code identifiers are stored separately .The paper copies are locked away in a home 
safe.  
 
Data analysis will be through statistical means using university resources. At the end of 
the research, all raw data will remain in the research repository for use in further post 
studies papers for about five years. Thereafter they will be discarded. However, the 
analysed data will remain the researcher’s secure repository for future referencing. The 
google drive is tied to the researcher’s student email, which is locked and secured.   
 
Risks 
There were no potential risks to the respondents. 
The major risk to the researcher was security challenges prevalent in most parts of 
Nigeria. The north east was embroiled with the Boko Haram armed conflicts; the south 
had the Niger delta militancy challenges, and the Biafra agitations for secession, and a 
non-Muslim conduction research in the far north would easily stand out and could 
potentially become a target for some criminal elements. Finally, recent political 
activities and harsh economic conditions have led to increased crime rate: robberies, 
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kidnapping for ransoms, ritual killings, and fraud. The researcher therefore had to 
devise means to navigate through these harsh realities safely.  
 
These were initially intended to be avoided through the use of online survey instrument. 
However, due to low response rate from the online instrument, the researcher had to 
resort to traveling between sites, and residing in the area for 2 months for the data 
collection. The researcher however, limited movements within major cities and remote 
locations where safety was relatively assured. In cases where the respondents in remote 
locations that were considered relatively unsafe were required, the researcher relied on 
the gatekeepers to deliver the questionnaires.  
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3.10 Chapter Summary 
This chapter has presented the considerations and assumptions made by the researcher 
in the course of the challenging and interesting data collection process. The research 
adopted the research onion (Saunders et al 2016) as a theoretical lens through which the 
process was navigated and explained. The research combined this theoretical lens with 
many other sources to describe the philosophies, approaches, and strategies adopted, 
and well as the reasons for adopting them and discarding others. Furthermore, the 
chapter described the data collection process, highlighted the successes and challenges 
encountered during the process. Finally, it described the reasons why the results of the 
research should be trusted, its limitations, and all the ethical considerations made.  
 
The revised research onion below summarizes the methods and methodology adopted in 
this research to arrive at the data collection and data analysis.  
 
 
Fig 3.9: Revised research onion showing the choices made by this research highlighted 
in yellow 
 
Chapter four shall describe and analyse the results. The chapter will describe all 
demographic data including results based on gender, years of industry experience, and 
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primary responsibilities. It will describe results based on all the five HRO principles and 
the results based on all the organisations studied. These results will set the stage for 
assessing, comparing, benchmarking, and improving the organisations as shall be 
discussed in the subsequent chapter.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
183 
 
CHAPTER FOUR 
 
Results and Analysis 
4.1  Introduction 
Chapter three described the methods for data collection utilised in this research and 
presented the methodologies adopted to justify the method choices. The chapter 
described in details all philosophical considerations and assumptions made by the 
research, the research approaches, the methodical choices, and the research strategies 
adopted. Finally, the chapter described all ethical considerations made in the course of 
data collection, including considerations around language clarity, gaining access, 
gatekeepers, informed consent, anonymity, data safety, and risks.  
 
Chapter four will present the findings from the data collection process. It will present 
the demographic profiles of the respondents in terms of gender, level of experience, and 
primary responsibility. Furthermore, chapter four will also present the findings based on 
each of the five principles of high reliability organisations. Finally, chapter four will 
discuss the results based on the different organisations studied. It will try to analyse 
these results and their implications to this research. 
 
4.2 Response Rate 
The questionnaire response rate differed with the nature of the distribution. The pilot 
study recorded a 100% response rate. This could have been as a result of a combination 
of reasons. First, the sample size was relatively small and the researcher was able to 
reach each of the respondents personally either on phone or via email to solicit their 
support. 
 
Secondly, the researcher purposively selected a sample that would potentially embody 
the intent of the research. The questions were relevant to the industry selected, and most 
of the respondents were familiar and could relate with the concept being studied.  
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Thirdly, the questionnaire was designed to enable easy response. Walonick (2004) 
argues in favour of the benefits of a well-designed questionnaire to a high response rate. 
The research therefore put in a lot of effort to ensure a relevant and high quality 
questionnaire. There was a cover letter that clearly explained the subject under study, 
explained the response selection process, and guaranteed anonymity. Furthermore, the 
questions followed a logical sequence and appeared to tell a story, making it easy for 
respondents to flow with.  
 
The main research initially conducted through an online survey instrument – 
sogosurvey.com, recorded a very low response rate at less than 4%.  
 
Since the same questionnaire was used as in the pilot study, one would have expected 
similar response rate. The following are possible reasons for the low response rate. 
 
The researcher relocated out of the geographic location earmarked for the research at 
the same time the questionnaires were about to be delivered. This made communication 
with the gate keepers, and the respondents limited.  
 
The researcher also discovered in the course of the interviews that although internet 
connectivity is widespread within the geographic location, its use by a majority of the 
people is mostly limited to online news and social media outlets. 60% of the 
questionnaires delivered were not read, 4% read and answered, while 36% were read 
but not answered. Some respondents interviewed said they received the mail on their 
cell phones, and could not therefore have downloaded and satisfactorily completed the 
questionnaire. This could account for why some were read but not answered. Most 
respondents agreed that they do not check their emails regularly, except their work 
emails, and when they do, it would normally be on their cell phones. Some confessed to 
having multiple private emails, but could not remember the last time they opened the 
inbox to check emails. Almost everyone accepted that they check their social media 
every day. It is therefore likely that the online questionnaires delivered through emails 
may have been lost in the myriad of emails and spams in the respondents’ inbox. The 
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researcher therefore learned that perhaps, subsequent online questionnaires could be 
delivered through social media instead of emails. 
 
Finally, although all the respondents confirmed the availability of internet access and 
data connectivity, most of them complained about the cost and strength of the data 
connectivity. The networks may be readily available, but the signal strength may not be 
enough to enable them download the questionnaire, nor sustain the connectivity long 
enough to complete the questionnaire. Furthermore, the cost of the data connectivity for 
personal use in most cases might become a hindrance and deter potential respondents 
from completing the questionnaires.  
 
Due to this low response rate, the research adopted paper questionnaires and distributed 
them through gate keepers. This received a much higher response rate as shown below. 
 
Table 4.1 – A summary of questionnaire responses showing returned and validated 
 
 
Out of the 400 questionnaires issued, a total of 375 were returned, giving a response 
rate of about 94%. This is an impressive response rate given that Williams (2003) 
considers questionnaire response rates to fall between the ranges of 10% to 90%. Out of 
the 375 returned questionnaires, five were voided due to incomplete responses. 92.5% 
of the questionnaires were validated and used for the analysis.  
 
 
ORGANISATIONS ISSUED RETURNED INVALID VALID
A 40 40 0 40
B 50 50 0 50
C 30 30 0 30
D 30 30 0 30
E 60 52 2 50
F 60 51 1 50
G 50 50 0 50
H 80 72 2 70
400 375 5 370
93.75 92.5
QUESTIONNAIRE RESPONSE SUMMARY
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4.3 Demographic Data 
As described in chapter three, the organisations would be referred to as companies A, B, 
C, D, E, F, G, and H. A summary of the organisations is shown below to aid the 
demographic discussions to follow. 
 
Table 4.2 – Summary of the organisations researched 
 
 
4.3.1. Gender 
The oil and gas, as well as the beverage manufacturing industry, appear to be dominated 
by the male gender based on the summary of the gender demographic represented in 
this research. This dominance is very obvious in organisations B, C, and D where the 
cumulative male - female gender spread is a ratio of 70:30. Organisation A, and D have 
gender ratios that are similar at 57.5:42.5 and 60:40 respectively. 
 
Table 4.3 – Demographic Spread based on Gender 
 
 
A closer look at these organisations could explain this trend. Organisations A, B, C, and 
D, are oil and gas exploration and production organisations and are therefore expected 
to engage more engineers or engineering related personnel. Mann & DiPrete (2013) 
showed that although the female gender has surpassed the male in college completion, 
Organisation Location Consideration Questionnaires Interviews
A CANADA
Multinational organization. Expected enhanced processes and culture. To be 
used for triangulation 40 6
B NIGERIA
Multinational organization. Expected enhanced processes and culture. Large 
employee base 50 10
C NIGERIA
Local organization. Smaller than B, but Larger than D. Newer than B, but 
older than D. 30 5
D NIGERIA Local organization. New. Small employee base 30 5
E NIGERIA Large operational base. National spread. Decades of operation. 50 10
F NIGERIA Regional operational base. New organization 50 10
G NIGERIA Regional operational base. New organization 50 10
H NIGERIA Large operations base. National spread. Decades of operation. 70 15
Oil and Gas
Beverage Manufacturing
Restaurant Chain
RESEARCH PARTICIPATION
A B C D E F G H Total Average
Male 57.50% 65.00% 83.33% 60.00% 66.00% 78.00% 28.57% 24.00% 462.40% 58%
Female 42.50% 35.00% 16.67% 40.00% 34.00% 22.00% 71.43% 76.00% 337.60% 42%
Total 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 800.00% 100%
GENDER
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there has been a slow integration of female in the pursuit of science, technology, 
engineering and mathematics. According to their research, the female gender received 
40% of bachelor’s degree in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics related 
fields as of 2000, up from about 25% in 1997.  
 
This is similar to the National Household Survey (Hango, 2017) research published in 
2017 Statistics Canada, that found women to account for 39% of university graduates 
with degrees in a science, technology, engineering or mathematics related field. This 
gap is even wider in engineering. According to the National Household Survey and 
Statistics Canada (Hango, 2017), only 23% of the engineering graduates were women. 
The survey summarised that women were much less likely at 23% to choose a career 
that involves science, technology, engineering, and mathematics than their male 
counterparts, regardless of their ability.  
 
With these in perspective, it is could be understood why the gender ratio among 
respondents in this research in the oil and gas sector is tilted towards the male gender. 
Another reason for this gender spread may be connected with the location and nature of 
the jobs. Respondent in organisations C, and to a large extent organisation B were based 
in offshore and swamp locations, where the organisations’ operations are concentrated 
in. The personnel in these locations are resident in camp style accommodations on a two 
week work rotation cycle. These locations are far removed from civilization, would 
mostly involve long distance helicopter flights and boat rides, and are known to have 
security challenges. These conditions might further deter some people from working in 
these environments: most married female, and married female with young children 
interviewed would rather not work in these environments if they have the choice. 
Organisations A and D have their locations based mostly on land locations, closer to 
major cities, and with most employees working off their main offices mostly located at 
the city centres. This potentially attracts a more diverse workforce as evidenced in a 
closer gender ratio than organisations B and C.  
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Organisations E and F are beverage manufacturing companies and follow similar trends 
as the oil and gas organisations in terms of the relationship between the engineering 
discipline and gender. Furthermore, a lot of the manufacturing activities involve lots of 
manual lifting and packing, long hours of standing on different production lines, and 
therefore appear to be male dominated. Based on information gathered from the 
interviews, the culture within the respondents’ locality appears to see such manual jobs 
as responsibilities for the male. This also conforms to Statistics Canada (2017) survey 
that gives the ratio of male to female in the manufacturing industry as 72:28. 
 
The restaurant chains recorded a reversal in the gender ratio. Organisation G and H had 
28.57% and 24% males and 71.43% and 76% females respectively. This high female to 
male ratio could be tied to the service oriented nature of restaurant chains, as well as the 
location of the restaurants themselves. Statistics Canada (2017) showed that 55% of 
employees within the service industry are females. The same statistics shows that within 
the food services industry, almost 60% of the employees are female. Given the gender 
inequality in the primary research location, Nigeria as described by British Council 
(2012) and the World Bank (2017), and the percentage of female employed within the 
food services industry as described by Statistics Canada, the gender ratio exhibited by 
organisations G and H could be said to be accurate representations of the industry. 
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4.3.2. Responsibilities 
This research assumed a narrow definition of span of control (Schyns et al, 2010; 
Gumusluoglu &et al, 2013) as the number of direct reports a particular supervisor or 
manager has at any given time. Some researchers (Hattrup, 1993; Davison, 2003; 
Gupta, 2010) had considered span of control as the number of direct reports that can be 
managed effectively and efficiently by supervisors and managers in an organisation. 
They had also considered the advantages and disadvantages of adopting a narrow span 
of control or a wide span of control. They identified factors that could influence an 
organisation’s choice of optimal span of control to include size of the organisation, 
nature of the organisation, and nature of the job. Other factors include skill and 
competencies of the managers or supervisors, skills and competencies of the employees, 
and the type of interactions that exists between the supervisors or managers and the 
employees. Given that different organisations with diverse organisational structures, 
cultures, and general organisational behaviour would be studied, this research adopted a 
span of control that is neither too wide nor too narrow. The research therefore structured 
the survey such that about 10% of the respondents would people in management 
positions, 30% would be respondents in supervisory positions, and 60% would be 
respondents at the shop floor. 
 
The result indicates that on average, 48% of all respondents were people on the shop 
floor, 37% of the respondents were supervisors, while the remaining 15% were people 
in management positions.  
 
Table 4.4 – Demographic Spread based on Responsibilities 
 
  
This result was fairly the same in most of the organisations studied. The slight 
exceptions were organisations B, F, and H where the ratio of the people on the shop 
floor and the supervisors was evenly split. This could be because most supervisors in 
A B C D E F G H Total Average
Shop Floor 57.50% 40.00% 56.67% 50.00% 46.00% 40.00% 50.00% 42.86% 383.02% 48%
Supervisors 30.00% 40.00% 33.33% 33.33% 40.00% 40.00% 40.00% 42.86% 299.52% 37%
Managers 12.50% 20.00% 10.00% 16.67% 14.00% 20.00% 10.00% 14.29% 117.45% 15%
Total 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100%
RESPONSIBILITIES
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these organisations grew from the shop floor and would assume shop floor 
responsibilities when required. All the organisations maintained an average of about one 
manager to six reports, or more accurately, three managers to seventeen reports.  
 
4.3.3. Years of Experience 
The result shows an average even split among all the stratified experience groups. 
18.62% of all the respondents are employees with less than three years of experience in 
their respective industries; 27.01% have between three to fifteen years industry 
experience; and 22.50% have stayed within the industry longer than seven years but less 
than fifteen years. Furthermore, 20.12% of the respondents have between fifteen to 
twenty five years industry experience; while the remaining 11.75% have spent over 
twenty five years within their respective industries. The lower percentage of people 
with over twenty five years’ experience is expected due to the possibility of retirements, 
pursuit of different career choices, and other age related issues. 
 
Table 4.5 – Demographic Spread based on Years of Experience 
 
 
Looking more closely at the organisations, the oil and gas organisations had more 
percentage of respondents within the seven to twenty five years’ experience brackets 
than other industries. The research period coincided with the period of oil price drop 
and employee layoffs. Organisations would normally rely on their experienced people 
to guide them through such difficult periods. They could potentially layoff some less 
experienced people and retain or employ more experienced people until the crisis is 
over. This could perhaps be one of the explanations to why 57% of all the respondents 
within the oil and gas industry are within the seven to twenty five years’ experience 
brackets. 
 
A B C D E F G H Total Average
> 25 17.50% 12.50% 16.67% 23.33% 20.00% 4.00% 0.00% 0.00% 94.00% 11.75%
15 - 25 30.00% 27.50% 43.33% 26.67% 18.00% 8.00% 6.00% 1.43% 160.93% 20.12%
>7<15 17.50% 35.00% 20.00% 26.67% 32.00% 28.00% 18.00% 2.86% 180.03% 22.50%
3 - 7 Yrs 17.50% 15.00% 16.67% 16.67% 18.00% 38.00% 40.00% 54.29% 216.12% 27.01%
< 3 17.50% 10.00% 3.33% 6.67% 12.00% 22.00% 36.00% 41.43% 148.93% 18.62%
100.00%
YEARS OF EXPERIENCE
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Organisations C and D, the relatively newly established indigenous oil and gas 
companies had higher respondents with fifteen or more years of industry experience 
than all other organisations. Organisation C had 60% of respondents within the 
experience group, while Organisation D had 50% respondents. The period covered in 
this research witnessed a surge in the migration of relatively older employees from the 
multinational oil companies to the newly established oil companies. These new 
companies were in need of experienced people to operate their new plants and 
processes, and the employee layoff due to the reduced oil and gas prices offered these 
new companies an opportunity to select the laid off employees. In addition, their good 
incentives were attractive to the experienced people, most of who were pensionable, and 
could therefore take an early retirement from their current employment to join the new 
companies, ensuring two different streams of income.  
 
Finally, some of the multinationals sold off a lot of their marginal fields to these new 
organisations. As part of the sale, contract clauses were inserted to so that the 
experienced personnel in those fields became part of the new organisations to enable 
smooth transition. All these perhaps contributed to these new organisations having 
higher respondents with fifteen or more years of industry experience than all other 
organisations. 
 
The service organisations (G and H), and to some extent the regional beverage 
manufacturing organisation (F) had more people with seven or less years of experience 
than other organisations. Compared to about 20% in C, organisations F, G, and H 
recorded 60%, 76% and 95.71% for respondents with seven years industry experience 
or less. This could be attributed to a number of reasons. First, these organisations are 
mostly owned by individuals with less employee growth and development potentials 
than the other organisations studied. Secondly, these organisations provide less work 
incentives and pay than the other organisations. As a result, people often see these 
organisations as stop gap and short term employments.  
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Perhaps, it is worth studying further to see the relationship between the high 
percentages of females in these organisations (71.43% and 76% for G and H 
respectively), and the much lower percentages of people with less than seven years 
industry experience (24% and 4.29% for G and H respectively) for these restaurant 
chains. Finally, organisations C, D, F, and H are relatively new organisations with less 
than 20 years of operation, and as such, may not have had employees that worked that 
long. Organisations C and D, both oil and gas production organisations established 
within the last 10 years, compensates for this by pulling experienced employees from 
already existing organisations to form their core employee base. Organisation H, a 
restaurant chain on the other hand, may not have the strong pull for experienced people 
as the oil and gas companies; and this might perhaps explain further the 95.71% 
recorded for respondents with seven years industry experience or less. 
 
The next section shall discus the results based on the responses for each of the five 
HRO principles. 
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4.4. Results Based on the Five HRO Principles 
This section shall analyse the results based on the each of five principles of high 
reliability organisations. It shall discus how the organisations and industries perceived 
the principles and perhaps give an indication on how these perceptions relate with the 
organisations’ performance and culture. As discussed in chapter 3, there are five options 
for the respondents: 5 - strongly agree; 4 – partially agree; 3 – neither agree nor 
disagree; 2 – partially disagree; and 1 – strongly disagree. All the questions are positive 
questions with 5 and 1 indicating the most desirable and least desirable organisational 
reliability behaviours respectively.   
 
4.4.1. Assessing Preoccupation with Failure 
An average of 74.17% of the respondents in Organisation A, chose option five – 
Strongly agree in the fifteen questions under the preoccupation with failure section. 
This sharply contrasts with all other organisations in all the industries studied, where the 
highest percentage of respondents with option 5: strongly agree, were organisations B 
and C with 7.5% and 7.56% responses respectively. 
 
Table 4.6 – Responses with respect to assessing preoccupation with failure 
 
 
No respondent in the restaurant chain industry chose option 5: strongly agree, in any of 
the 15 questions under the preoccupation with failure. Only a handful of respondents of 
the respondents in the beverage manufacturing industry, 0.27% and 2.8% for F and E 
respectively, strongly agreed that their organisations exhibited the preoccupation with 
failure behaviours. Similarly, only 1.11% respondents in organisation D considered 
their organisation to exhibit the preoccupation with failure behaviours. Contrasting this, 
over 50% of respondents in all the organisations, except organisation A, strongly or 
partially disagreed that their organisations exhibit the preoccupation with failure 
A B C D E F G H Average
Strongly Agree 74.17 7.50 7.56 1.11 2.80 0.27 0.00 0.00 93.40 11.68
Partially Agree 11.33 25.83 20.44 23.56 7.33 3.07 2.53 0.76 94.86 11.86
Neither Agree nor Disasgree 9.83 33.67 38.44 35.78 17.33 16.93 13.73 9.52 175.25 21.91
Partially Disgree 4.67 17.50 22.22 26.22 24.80 38.93 37.47 40.67 212.48 26.56
Strongly Disagree 0.00 15.50 11.33 13.33 47.73 40.80 46.27 49.05 224.01 28.00
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
PREOCCUPATION WITH FAILURE
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behaviours. This negative response was stronger in the restaurant chain companies G 
and H, where about 84% and 90% respectively strongly or partially disagreed. 
Similarly, about 73% and 80% of respondents in organisations E and F respectively, 
also strongly or partially disagreed.  
 
A look at the interview responses gives some indications to the reasons why most 
respondents think their organisations were not preoccupied with failure. Most 
respondents across the industries indicated that their organisations do not encourage 
incident and near miss reporting. Prominent among the reasons for this in all the 
industries except the oil and gas, is the fear of punishment for incident or near miss 
reports. The respondents claimed that people who make mistakes are often victimized, 
and as such, people would rather hide their errors or potential near misses to secure their 
jobs. Interviewees in the oil and gas organisations indicated that they report near misses 
and incidents, but the reports are mostly not treated, nor their recommendations 
implemented. The consequence of this, they say, is a subsequent reduction in the 
number and quality of reports. In addition, the interviewees indicated that they do not 
review activities at intervals to seek potential hotspots. “You are not allowed to fix it if it 
is not broken” one of them said.  
 
In most of the questions under the assessing preoccupation with failure section, there 
was an obvious gap between the responses of managers and the subordinates. For 
comments such as “we do not victimize people who make mistakes”, all the managers in 
organisation B chose options 3 and above, while all the respondents on the shop floor 
chose options 2 and below. 70% of the respondents on the shop floor strongly disagreed 
with the statement. Similarly, for the communication comments such as “we feel free to 
talk to our superiors”; our superiors freely talk to us about our problems; and “our 
superiors actively seek out bad news about potential issues”, all the managers in 
organisation B chose options 3 and above. An average of 63.3% of the managers 
strongly agreed with these statements, while none of them partially or fully disagreed. 
On the other hand, all the respondents on the shop floor chose options 3 and below; 
with 90% of them disagreeing partially or fully. This split is evident in all the 
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organisations. In organisation E, the beverage manufacturing giant, 67% of respondents 
on the shop floor strongly disagreed with the same set of statements. 91% of all the 
respondents that are either supervisors or on the shop floor in organisation G, the 
restaurant chain, disagreed with the statement. The remaining 9% stayed on the fence 
with the choice of neither agreed nor disagreed.  
 
The same trend was observed among people with different experiences. The responses 
from the more experienced people within the 25 years and above experience bracket 
tended to be similar with the responses from people in management position. Perhaps 
this might be because those in that experience bracket were mostly managers or in 
senior supervisory positions. This schism indicates a huge dichotomy between the 
different strata of the organisations, both in terms of communicating, understanding, 
and implementing the processes required to exhibit the high reliability behaviours in 
terms of preoccupation with failure.    
 
4.4.2. Assessing Reluctance to Simplify 
All the respondents in organisation A agreed, either partially or fully, with all the 
statements under the reluctance to simplify section. This contrasts sharply with the other 
organisations surveyed. While organisation B, the international oil and gas organisation, 
had 38% of the respondents partially or fully agreeing with the statements, 
organisations C and D, the local oil and gas organisations had 17% and 24% 
respondents agreeing fully or partially. The beverage manufacturing organisations had a 
similar response trend at 25% and 15% respectively. For the restaurant chains G and H, 
only 4% and 3% of respondents respectively agreed fully or partially to the statements.  
  
Table 4.7 – Responses with respect to assessing reluctance to simplify 
 
A B C D E F G H Average
Strongly Agree 91.46 15.63 0.28 5.56 2.83 2.50 0.00 0.00 118.25 14.78
Partially Agree 8.54 22.71 16.94 18.89 23.00 12.83 3.67 3.33 109.92 13.74
Neither Agree nor Disasgree 0.00 30.21 30.00 25.56 32.83 28.00 28.50 27.98 203.07 25.38
Partially Disgree 0.00 24.79 35.83 28.89 27.17 32.83 41.00 43.93 234.44 29.31
Strongly Disagree 0.00 6.67 16.94 21.11 14.17 23.83 26.83 24.76 134.32 16.79
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
RELUCTANCE TO SIMPLIFY
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Similar to the responses in the assessing preoccupation with failure section, the 
responses in assessing reluctance to simplify section were highly dichotomous with the 
managers and senior supervisors largely agreeing with the statements, and the people on 
the shop floor largely disagreeing. For instance, in response to the statement “we are 
encouraged to listen carefully to other viewpoints”, all the managers in organisation B, 
the international oil and gas organisation, agreed strongly, while no one on the shop 
floor strongly agreed. This response trend was the similar in all the other oil and gas 
organisations.  
 
The results of the interviews gave a closer idea of the reasons behind some of the 
responses. For the statement “we encourage people to challenge the procedures and 
processes”, and we do not victimize people who challenge the norm”, most shop floor 
respondents in the oil and gas industry and the beverage manufacturing industry 
explained that such challenges are often considered as challenging the boss. Most of the 
supervisors and managers would consider it as acts of insubordination when existing 
norms are challenged by subordinates. For organisations E & F, the beverage 
manufacturing companies, the interviewees stated that only people in sales would be 
rewarded for thinking outside the box, as long as the “thinking” leads to above target 
sales. They will still be victimized should sales drop as a result of their “out of the box 
thinking”. Furthermore, in response to the statement “we are not attacked when we 
report information that could disrupt operations”, no respondent in organisation E, F, 
G, and H agreed. The oil and gas organisations mostly agreed with the statement, and it 
would appear they could challenge the norm even if it could disrupt operations.   
 
Almost 90% of supervisors and people on the shop floor in organisations F, G, and H 
disagreed with the statement “we value constructive criticism”. The responses from the 
interviews suggest that the managers and supervisors are unable to distinguish between 
constructive criticism and insubordination. Finally, in response to the statement “we 
reward people who think outside the box”, the interviews in the oil and gas 
organisations revealed that the rewards are more tilted towards people who spend time 
reactively fixing breakdowns than on people that proactively prevent things from 
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breaking down. The reactive people are seen to be working and as such are rewarded at 
the expense of the proactive ones. People therefore spend more time looking for 
reactive “do-it-yourself” initiatives to enhance their perceived potential than on 
proactive initiatives. In summary, the schism between the leaders and the subordinates 
found in assessing preoccupation with failure was also highly prevalent in assessing 
reluctance to simplify.   
 
4.4.3. Assessing Sensitivity to Operations 
Organisations in the manufacturing and oil & gas industries performed better in 
assessing sensitivity to operations than in all other HRO principles. Only organisation F, 
the smaller and localized beverage manufacturing organisation had less than 30% 
respondents agreeing with the assessing sensitivity to operations statements. An average 
of 47%, 33%, 52%, and 33% respondents in organisations B, C, D, and E respectively 
agreed, either strongly or partially to the assessing sensitivity to operations statements. 
This could perhaps be as a result of the perception of the industry as being more 
hazardous than the restaurant chains. In the restaurant chains on the other hand, only 
about 7.5% of the combined respondents agreed with the assessing sensitivity to 
operations statements.  
 
Table 4.8 – Responses with respect to assessing sensitivity to operations 
 
 
Similar to the other HRO principles already discussed, there is also a schism between 
the perceptions and realities as observed by people in different strata of the 
organisations. People in management appeared to have positive perceptions about the 
direction of the organisations in terms of their sensitivity to operations. The mid-level 
supervisors and people on the shop floor on the other hand appeared to have an 
alternative perception about the nature of reality with respect to the organisations’ 
Strongly Agree A B C D E F G H Average
Strongly Agree 86.82 19.77 8.48 20.00 8.73 5.64 0.18 0.91 150.53 18.82
Partially Agree 9.09 27.05 24.85 32.12 23.82 18.36 6.91 7.14 149.34 18.67
Neither Agree nor Disasgree 2.27 32.50 35.76 20.30 28.18 24.91 31.45 26.88 202.26 25.28
Partially Disgree 1.82 15.68 25.15 16.97 24.91 28.55 38.36 40.00 191.44 23.93
Strongly Disagree 0.00 5.00 5.76 10.61 14.36 22.55 23.09 25.06 106.43 13.30
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
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sensitivity to operations. For instance, whereas 100% of the managers in organisation B 
strongly agreed to the statement “people have the discretion to resolve unexpected 
frontline problems without deferring to leadership”, 100% of the respondents on the 
shop floor did not agree.  
 
Apart from oil and gas organisations B and D, all the others performed considerably 
low in the statements about discretion to take responsibility without deferring to 
management. All the respondents in the restaurant chain disagreed with the statements 
“people have the discretion to resolve unexpected frontline problems without deferring 
to leadership” and “everyone is expected to take decision, such as operations shutdown 
to forestall catastrophic failure”. A similar result was obtained with statements about 
open communication between frontline and management.  
 
The interviews revealed the possible explanation to some of these observations. When 
confronted with the statement “our managers constantly monitor our day to day 
activities” the management staff mostly considered it a positive behaviour to monitor 
the daily activities of the staff, whereas the frontline staff and mid-level supervisors 
considered such monitoring as an act of micro management.  
 
Considering the statement “someone with authority is readily available to frontline for 
prompt decision making”, most interviewees in almost all the organisations confirmed 
that there would always be someone with authority available to the frontline. They 
however disagreed that that person with authority’s ability to take some decisions 
without deferring to the management. Similarly, considering the statement “everyone is 
expected to take decision, such as operations shutdown to forestall catastrophic 
failure”, interviewees in the oil and gas organisations, and the manufacturing 
organisations, accepted that while the procedure might clearly empower everyone to 
shutdown to forestall potential catastrophic failure; executing such procedures could 
potentially lead to loss of jobs. One of the respondents cited the case of a shutdown due 
to potential catastrophic threat that was later found to be a false alarm. The employee 
that initiated the emergency shutdown was victimized, considered incompetent, and 
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later released from the organisation. As a result, people would rather wait for clear 
instruction from management to initiate a shutdown, even in the face of potentially 
catastrophic failures.  
 
In summary, the oil and gas organisations appeared to be more sensitive to operations 
than the manufacturing organisations, which in turn appeared to be more sensitive to 
operations than the restaurant chains. The schism in perspectives between the 
management and frontline staff over their perception of reality, as observed in the other 
HRO principles, is also clearly evident in assessing sensitivity to operations.  
 
4.4.4. Assessing Commitment to Resilience 
At about 96%, the respondents from organisation A consider their organisation to be 
strongly committed to resilience. The interviews in this organisation described how in 
the face of a potentially catastrophic spill that discharged about 100,000 litres of heavy 
crude and diluent into the river, the clean-up of which cost the organisation almost 
$110M, the organisation remained resilient. The organisation mindfully pulled human 
and material resources together, worked with existing regulations, created new 
relationships, and collaboratively managed the catastrophe, learnt from it, and 
repositioned for better competitiveness.  
 
About 69% of respondents in organisation B, the international oil and gas organisation 
agreed with the assessing commitment to resilience statements. The number reduced to 
between 42% and 29% in the local oil & gas organisations and the manufacturing 
organisations. 60% and 77% of respondents in organisations G and H respectively, the 
restaurant chains, disagreed with the assessing commitment to resilience statements.  
 
Table 4.9 – Responses with respect to assessing commitment to resilience 
 
A B C D E F G H Average
Strongly Agree 95.63 30.63 5.00 16.39 13.50 6.33 0.17 0.48 168.12 21.01
Partially Agree 2.50 37.92 28.33 15.28 28.17 22.33 13.33 5.83 153.69 19.21
Neither Agree nor Disasgree 1.46 21.25 41.94 36.11 39.50 25.17 26.00 16.67 208.10 26.01
Partially Disgree 0.42 8.33 17.50 26.11 18.17 29.00 34.67 37.14 171.34 21.42
Strongly Disagree 0.00 1.88 7.22 6.11 0.67 17.17 25.83 39.88 98.76 12.34
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
COMMITMENT TO RESILIENCE
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As observed in the other HRO principles, the difference between the organisations’ 
performance as viewed by the management staff and the frontline was also clearly 
evident. A common thread during the interviews was the fact that although the 
procedures and plans may be well defined, most people may not be aware due to poor 
effort by management to cascade them and inspire people to own the procedures and 
plans. This corresponds with the responses from the questionnaires. For instance, in 
responding to the statements “we have well defined emergency response plans”, and 
“most people are aware of the details of the emergency response plans”, respondents in 
organisation H that chose option 3 in the former, would choose option 2 in the later. 
This was also evident in the statement “we have well defined contingency plans”, and 
“most people are aware of the details of the contingency plans”.  
 
The oil and gas organisations mostly agreed that they conduct regular drills to enhance 
their preparedness in case of unexpected problems, whereas all the other organisations 
mostly disagreed. All the respondents in the restaurant chains disagreed to the statement 
“we conduct regular drills to enhance preparedness in case of unexpected problems” 
with almost 60% disagreeing strongly. Some respondents interviewed in these 
organisations claimed to never having experienced an emergency drill, with some not 
having heard the term “emergency drill” before.  
 
In summary, the oil and gas organisations appeared to be more committed to resilience 
than the other organisations. The restaurant chains appeared to be the least committed to 
resilience among all the organisations surveyed.  
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4.4.5. Assessing Deference to Expertise 
Apart from organisation A where about 97% of the respondents strongly agreed, only 
organisation D, the new indigenous oil and gas organisation had above 7% of the 
respondents strongly agree to the deference to expertise statements. The interviews 
showed that organisation D employed the bulk of its employees from the highly 
experienced personnel from the international oil organisations that had just retired, were 
approaching retirement, or were at the peak of their careers. This suggests that expertise 
for emergencies could be potentially readily available and the organisation could 
potentially leverage on the experience pool than on rank to steer them through their 
formative stages. However, in all of these organisations, including D, more than 50% of 
respondents disagreed to the assessing deference to expertise statements. The numbers 
were as high as 76% and 66% in the restaurant chain organisations H and G 
respectively, 54% and 57% in the manufacturing organisations E and F respectively, 
and 51%, 67%, and 60% in the oil and gas organisations D, C, and B respectively.   
 
Table 4.10 – Responses with respect to assessing deference to expertise 
 
 
Similar to the other HRO principles discussed, the schism between the managers’ 
perspectives and perspectives of people on the shop floor remains wide. While most 
managers continued with their mostly positive perspective about the organisations’ 
deference to expertise, the most responses from people on the shop floor were mostly 
negative. Generally however, responses from most people across all the organisations 
were generally negative with respect to expertise over rank. For instance, almost all 
respondents in organisation B disagreed to the statement “people in the organisation 
value expertise and experience over rank”, and “we are encouraged to take expert 
decisions irrespective of hierarchy”, and “in an emergency, the most experienced in 
A B C D E F G H Average
Strongly Agree 96.88 6.25 1.67 11.25 4.00 6.75 0.50 0.00 127.29 15.91
Partially Agree 3.13 15.63 12.08 17.08 16.50 17.75 11.25 1.61 95.02 11.88
Neither Agree nor Disasgree 0.00 17.81 19.17 20.83 22.50 21.75 22.75 22.50 147.31 18.41
Partially Disgree 0.00 25.31 26.25 23.75 24.75 23.75 26.00 32.50 182.31 22.79
Strongly Disagree 0.00 35.00 40.83 27.08 32.25 30.00 39.50 43.39 248.06 31.01
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
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that emergency takes the lead”. The same response was observed in all the other 
organisations.  
 
The results from the interviews conducted helped to understand the reasons behind 
some of the results. Responding to the statement “people respect the nature of one 
another’s jobs”, the most respondent in management positions across the organisations 
except the restaurant chains mostly agreed. The people on the shop floor however 
mostly disagreed. The people interviewed cited a class distinction between graduate 
positions and low level shop floor positions. A security man or a driver is made to feel 
inferior to the engineer or the supervisor, despite the fact that all the roles contribute to 
the overall output of the organisation. The manager would therefore not yield to the 
security man during a security emergency, and would be expected to take charge despite 
obvious lack of experience on security issues. Similarly, most interviewees across the 
organisations conceded that they are only committed to doing their jobs to the extent 
that it is their major source of livelihood. They have not been inspired to become 
committed to their jobs, rather are kept in check by fear of job loss and annual 
appraisals.  
 
In summary, most of the respondents and the interviewees agreed that decisions during 
emergencies are based mostly on hierarchical positions rather than on expertise. This 
was a common theme across the organisations.  
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4.5. Chapter Summary 
This chapter has described the results obtained from the surveys and the interviews. It 
compared and contrasted the results obtained from organisations with respect to each of 
the five HRO principles. It concluded that there was a dichotomy between the 
perceptions of people in different strata of the organisation with regards to how their 
organisations perceive the high reliability organisation behaviours. It also observed the 
same schism among the various experience categories within the organisation. It 
assessed the behaviours of the organisations in terms of HRO principles and described 
the reasons behind some of those behaviours. 
 
The next chapter shall use these results to develop the framework for measuring the 
reliability of the organisations. It shall introduce the organisational reliability maturity 
model and the organisational reliability framework. It shall describe how to use the 
model and the framework to assess organisations. Furthermore, the chapter shall 
describe how to use the framework and model to compare and benchmark 
organisations.  Finally, the chapter shall develop improvement processes based on the 
organisational reliability maturity model and framework.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
Organisational Reliability Maturity Model (ORM
2
) and Framework (FORM) 
 
5.1  Introduction 
Chapter four presented the results obtained from the data collection process. It 
described how the low response rate from the initial online survey instrument made it 
revert to the conventional hard paper survey. It proposed some possible reasons for the 
initial low response rate and described how these were overcome using the paper 
surveys to obtain an eventual 93.75% response rate. Furthermore, the chapter discussed 
the demographic information of the various categories of respondents. The demographic 
information included the gender spread among the various respondents in the different 
organisations, their roles and responsibilities, and their years of experience within their 
respective industries. The chapter compared the various organisations and industries 
with respect to the different demographic information. This was done in order to 
attempt to gain some perspectives about the influence of organisational and industry 
diversity on the nature of responses. Finally the chapter grouped the results into the five 
HRO principles and analysed how the organisations and industries perceived the 
different HRO behaviours. It concluded by analysing how these HRO behaviours were 
influenced by the different demographic divisions.  
 
Chapter five shall discuss the results, and them to develop a framework for measuring 
the reliability of organisations in answer to the first research question “… can the 
reliability of organisations be measured?” Having answered this question, the chapter 
shall attempt to answer the second research question “can these measurements help 
diverse organisations become more mature?” It shall describe how the framework for 
measuring organisational reliability could be used to assess the health of organisations 
in terms of organisational reliability maturity. Additionally, Chapter 5 shall describe 
how the framework could be developed to compare and benchmark organisations 
against desired organisational reliability standards or against recognized industry 
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standards. Finally, the chapter shall illustrate how the framework could be developed to 
help organisations improve their maturity in terms of organisational reliability. 
 
5.2  Introducing the Organisational Reliability Maturity Model (ORM
2
) 
The first research question aims to investigate the extent to which the reliability of 
organisations can be measured. A lot has been said and written about high reliability 
organisations and a number of organisations have attempted to organise themselves for 
reliability with varying degrees of successes and failures. At this point, those 
perceptions of successes and failures are at best subjective. Each organisation has 
operated in silos and there has been no coordinated effort to standardize the expected 
criteria towards organising for reliability. There has also been no effort to develop a 
standardized stepwise approach towards achieving organisational reliability. The gains 
of organising for reliability have been highlighted in earlier chapters and cannot be 
overstated. However, as stated earlier in chapter one, “you can’t manage what you can’t 
measure”, or as some others choose to put it, “you can’t improve what you can’t 
measure”. For an organisation to begin to take steps towards improvement, it must first 
develop a framework for measuring and understanding its prevailing statuses. It must 
establish a baseline from which it could launch its improvement or sustainability 
initiatives.  
 
The Organisational Reliability Maturity Model (ORM
2
) has been designed to provide 
baseline measurement for organisations to assess their current statuses in terms of 
organisational reliability maturity. It is a five stage maturity model similar to Crosby’s 
(1979) quality management maturity model. The five levels are silent, starter, stable, 
sustain, and summit, with silent being the lowest maturity level (level 1) and summit 
being the highest maturity level (level 5). This could also be referred to as the 5S model 
of organisational reliability maturity since all the letters from each of the 5 maturity 
levels begins with an “S”. ORM2 comprises of 25 boxes, with each box containing 25 
sets of organisational reliability behaviours. The maturity levels are on the x-axis with 
incremental maturity behaviours as the boxes progress towards the right hand side. The 
y-axis represents the five HRO principles. This means that for each HRO principle, 
206 
 
there are five sets of organisational reliability behaviours, with incremental 
improvements as the levels increase from level 1 (silent) towards level 5 (summit).  
 
The organisational reliability behaviours used in ORM
2
 leverages on four major 
sources. The first source is the work of Weick & Sutcliffe (2007; 2015), that identified 
some behaviours expected from high reliability organisations. The second source is the 
experience of this researcher, obtained from over twenty years working in the petroleum 
and manufacturing industries. The third source is the combined experiences of the 
research supervisors, which includes over sixty years working across diverse industries 
including the academia, oil and gas industry, manufacturing, nuclear, automobiles, and 
the aeronautics industries. The final source is the combined experiences of the some 
industry experts interviewed during the course of research design.  
 
ORM
2
 is designed to track the maturity of organisations through five levels of maturity. 
It begins with a “silent” period (level 1), a passive period characterised by lack of 
standardized processes, poor communication, inadequate procedures, combative and 
punitive relationships, and a false sense of safety and security – an “if it ain’t broke, 
don’t fix it mentality”. Considering the preoccupation with failure HRO principle, the 
level 1 (silent) behaviours are characterised by a deep blame culture where people 
would be punished for causing incidents, and as a result, near misses and failures are 
not reported for fear of the punitive measures. There is usually a blind optimism that 
incidents would not occur, and when they do, the perception would be that it must have 
been caused by someone. The blame culture is also highlighted in the reluctance to 
simplify principle, where scepticism is frowned upon and people who challenge the 
norm are regarded as disruptors and are victimized. Table 5.1 shows ORM
2
 in details. 
Each maturity level is shown on a different column and the rows indicate the 
corresponding HRO principles.   
 
As the organisation begins to realise the dangers of remaining in a “silent” period, it 
begins to develop some processes. It also begins to take steps towards improving 
communication, developing procedures, trainings, and competence development 
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exercises. It begins to encourage near miss and incident reporting. The organisation at 
this stage is considered a “starter” and is said to have begun its teething process. They 
begin to develop the awareness that skeptics and people who report near misses and 
incidents should not be punished. They begin to understand the need to develop 
meetings, documentations, reports, procedures, and standardized processes. They begin 
to recognise the need for competence development and trainings. It must be pointed out 
that although the organisations in level 2 start to recognise and sometimes start to 
develop these processes, the implementation at this point is lethargic at best.  
 
As the organisations progress through the maturity cycle, they would get to a point 
where their processes and procedures become fully developed. At this point, everyone 
understands and works with the processes with near mechanical precision. Assessments 
of level 3 would mostly be to check how “stable” the organisations are: the availability 
of the processes, the robustness of the processes, and the extent to which people are 
following the processes. People comply because they have to, and failure to comply 
would often attract severe consequences. In most cases, the organisation would have 
slogans such as “if you decide not to comply with the process, you have decided not to 
work with us”. The emphasis is clear: comply or be sacked, and people are therefore 
compelled to comply. Employees would attend meetings at regular times because they 
have to, attend trainings because they have to, and participate in appraisals because they 
must. The organisations would be considered to be at a “stable” stage, with fully 
standardized processes, and the people working with clockwork efficiency. 
 
At level 4, “sustain”, the people are no longer compelled to follow the laid out 
procedures and processes, but would begin to understand and agree with the reasons for 
the processes and procedures and actually begin to take the initiatives to own the 
process. They begin to see themselves as stakeholders to help sustain the process. An 
emergency drill would no longer be seen as a necessary burden to please the leaders, but 
as a necessary tool towards personal and organisational resilience. People begin to own 
their learning and development and would begin to see feedback as a positive process 
for organisational and personal improvement. The organisation would begin to 
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proactively feed lessons learned back into the process to improve it. The organisations 
begin to value and reward sceptics and those that think outside the box, and meetings 
would begin to become useful avenues for improvement discussions. The key word in 
the “sustain” level is “proactive”: people begin to take proactive initiatives to sustain 
the processes.  
 
The final level is the “summit”, a stage where the relationships between the leaders and 
the led, and among the people in the organisation becomes very respectful, people 
actively seek 360 degrees feedback and accept the objective feedback as a performance 
improvement opportunity. People are mindful of the operations and take proactive 
decisions to safeguard and improve the process. Everyone works proactively without 
coercion, with a common purpose to improve and sustain the organisation.  The key 
word with this level is “ownership”: people begin to own the processes, which enhances 
further proactive actions. A process operator would “own” the plant and would 
passionately perform his operator rounds, diligently seeking out “potential hot spots” 
for proactive actions.  
 
Table 5.1 spells out the key behaviours in each of the five maturity levels for each of the 
five high reliability organisations principle. The next subsection shall introduce the 
Framework for Organisational Reliability Maturity (FORM).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
209 
 
Table 5.1: Organisational Reliability Maturity Model (ORM
2
) – The 5S Model 
 
Level 1 (Silent) Level  2 (Starter) Level 3 (Stable) Level 4 (Sustain) Level  5 (Summit)
Preoccupation 
with Failure
Failure/Near Misses are not reported. 
Punishment for people that cause incidents. 
Management difficult to approach. 
Continuous mindset that failure will not 
happen. If a failure occurs, someone is always 
to blame.
Failure/Near misses sometimes reported and 
rectified. Root causes may not be identified.  
People that cause incidents are perceived as 
incompetent but may not be punished. Some 
communication with a few people.
Failure/Near misses reporting process exists and 
is generally enforced. Root causes identified. 
People often blamed. Superiors communicates 
with frontline to give clear instructions. 
Failure/Near misses reported. Root causes identified and 
people not blamed. Clear and open communications. 
Worst case scenarios considered in planning.  Lessons 
learned documented.
Failure/Near Miss identified, categorized, documented. 
Root causes identified. Root causes resolved with no 
blame on people. Lessons learned reviewed periodically 
and used to improve the system. People that report near 
misses/failure are actively rewarded. Superiors actively 
seek out bad news. Clear and open communication 
between superiors and front line staff. Planning 
considers worst case scenarios. Continuous reviews to 
seek out hot spots. 
Reluctance to 
Simplify
Skeptics and people that challenge the norm 
are mostly victimized and punished as 
disruptors. 
Skeptics and people who challenge the norm 
may not be punished, but may be viewed 
negatively 
A process for challenging the process exists. It  
is ok to challenge the norm. Implementation 
may be delayed by layers of bureaucracy. 
Views from skeptics and out of the box thinkers are 
respected and often implemented by management. 
Management actively creates forums for people to 
challenge the norm and out of the box thinkers are 
rewarded. 
Sensitivity to 
Operations
Meetings are rare without quality:  no focus 
on long/short term team/organization. 
Leaders are unaware of frontline issues. 
People generally do not understand jobs 
outside their specialty. Feedback is viewed as 
a process of negative reinforcement. There is 
no feedback process. People are generally 
overworked and stressed out. Complaints are 
viewed as insubordination and could be 
punished 
Occasional meetings with no defined terms of 
reference. Leaders request for and receive 
reports as desired. People may understand jobs 
outside their competencies, but rarely get 
involved. People generally do not care about 
feedback. Might receive one during annual 
appraisal. There are occasional breaks to relieve 
work stress
Regular Meetings with defined terms of 
reference. A clearly defined work report 
process exists and is enforced. A formal process 
exists and is generally enforced for people to 
learn jobs outside their competencies and get 
involved. A feedback process exists and is 
generally enforced. There is a process to 
manage workloads
Regular Meetings are regular with defined terms of 
reference and individual roles/responsibilities. Leaders  
generally get involved in the frontline day to day 
activities and therefore receive first hand reports.  
People are generally willing to get involved in jobs 
outside their competencies and the opportunities exist 
for them to do so. People generally give and receive 
feedback at defined times without coercion. Leaders 
continuously monitor workloads and add resources as 
required.
Meetings are regular with defined terms of reference and 
individual roles/responsibilities. It  is clear how 
everyone's roles fits into the  big picture. Frontline and 
leaders are generally free with one another and interact 
freely in day to day operations.  People are rewarded for 
getting involved in jobs outside their competencies. 
People actively seek feedback, and perceive 360* 
feedback as constructive exercises. Leaders continuously 
work with staff to monitor workloads and would 
collectively determine need for additional resources. 
Commitment to 
Resilience
The company does not organize/sponsor 
trainings. Competencies and skills are not 
assessed. There are no emergency response 
and contingency plans. 
Trainings exist, but only used to reward favoured 
staff. Individual leaders assess competencies and 
skills in their own way. There are emergency 
response and contingency plans but people are 
generally not aware of them. Drills are regarded 
as nuisance. 
There is a formalized training and 
competence/skills assessment for all staff and 
the plan is generally enforced. Emergency drills 
are done and people are mandated to 
participate. People are generally mandated to 
understand the emergency 
response/contingency plans
Leaders and staff work together to identify training and  
development gaps and close them. Competence 
assessment is an ongoing process and feedback is 
constructive. People actively seek to  understand and 
review emergency response and contingency plans. 
People regard drills as ways to potentially save lives
People generally have more than enough skills for their 
jobs and to act during emergencies. Competence and 
skills assessment is a proactive process. Emergency 
response and contingency plans are robust and 
implementation is a shared responsibility among all 
staff. Everyone trusts one another and relies on one 
another during emergencies.  
Deference to 
Expertise
In an emergency, the most senior person 
takes responsibility irrespective experience. 
It  is difficult to know who has the most 
expertise for each emergency. 
People generally know who has the most 
expertise during an emergency. Hierarchical 
rank takes precedent during emergencies. The 
most senior person feels insulted if not in charge 
during emergencies. 
There is a formal process to determine who 
takes responsibility during each emergency. 
The most senior person yields responsibility to the 
person with the most expertise for during each 
emergency. The expert accepts the responsibility 
professionally and yields back after the emergency. 
Expertise for all emergencies is readily available
There is a mutual respect for one another's jobs. No job 
is considered more important than the other. People are 
encouraged to take expert decisions irrespective of 
hierarchy during emergencies. People feel responsible 
until problems are resolved.
ORGANIZATIONAL RELIABILITY MATURITY MODEL
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5.3  Introducing the Framework for Organisational Reliability Maturity 
(FORM) 
 
This research has developed the Framework for Organisational Reliability Maturity 
(FORM) to track the responsiveness of the organisations with respect to each of the five 
HRO principles. The framework performs four basic functions. First, it is a health check 
that assesses the current maturity level of organisations. Secondly, the framework could 
use the current organisational reliability behaviours to predict the future direction the 
organisation could potentially go. This could indicate if the organisation would improve 
or retrogress. The third function is the ability of the framework to benchmark 
organisations against desired maturity standards, either internally or externally. The 
final function lies in the ability of the framework to be used in conjunction with the 
organisational reliability maturity model to enhance organisational learning, and suggest 
improvement enhancing behaviours, as well as potential improvement limiting 
behaviours.  
 
To develop the Framework for Organisational Reliability Maturity (FORM), a survey 
must first be conducted in the target organisations using the ORM
2
. The questionnaire 
in appendix 3 and the interview questions in appendix 4 have been developed for use in 
this survey. They have been field tested in eight different organisations with similar 
trends and are therefore validated. This could be scaled or modified to suit the 
organisational context. This research was conducted using purposive sampling method. 
Results from the survey is analysed and summarised into the FORM table as shown in 
table 5.2 below.   
 
Table 5.2: Framework for Organisational Reliability Maturity (FORM) 
 
Level
Preoccupation with 
Failure
Reluctance to 
Simplify
Sensitivity to 
Operations
Commitment to 
Resilience
Deference to 
Expertise
Average 
Score Pull
5 7.56 0.28 8.48 5.00 1.67 4.60 0.14
4 20.44 16.94 24.85 28.33 12.08 20.53 0.62
3 38.44 30.00 35.76 41.94 19.17 33.06 0.00
2 22.22 35.83 25.15 17.50 26.25 25.39 0.77
1 11.33 16.94 5.76 7.22 40.83 16.42 0.50
COMPANY C (OIL &GAS))
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Table 5.2 shows the summarised FORM table for company C. The five HRO principles 
are mapped against five levels that correspond with the five maturity levels on the 
Organisational Reliability Maturity Model (ORM
2
). Level 1 is the least mature, while 
level 5 is the most mature. All numbers under the HRO principles are percentages 
obtained from the average scores in the survey. For instance, the table shows that an 
average of 7.56% of all the respondents in company C selected options that indicate 
their organisation to be at level 5 in preoccupation with failure. The average score 
column is a simple average of responses from the five HRO principles in each maturity 
level. For instance, 4.6% is a simple average of the respondents that selected level 5 
behaviours in all the five HRO principles put together.  
 
For the sake of this research, the principles have been given equal weighting. Future 
research might explore different weighting scales for different organisations in specific 
industries in line with prevailing priorities within those industries or organisations.  The 
maturity of the organisation is determined by the level with the highest average score. 
In Table 5.2, 33.06% is the highest average score; therefore company C is considered to 
be at maturity level 3 (stable). The performance of the organisation in each of the five 
principles will give an indication of how much resources should be committed to one 
principle over the others to achieve improvement. Company C performed the least in 
the deference to expertise and reluctance to simplify HRO principles. It would therefore 
invest more to improve these two principles than the other three in its drive to improve 
the overall organisational maturity. 
 
The last column on the table is the pull, and it indicates the maturity level where the 
organisation has the most probability of slipping into given prevailing conditions. Pull 
(P) is a simple probability: 
   𝑃 = 1 − (𝑅 − 𝑅𝑖)/𝑅                                                  (2) 
 
R is the highest average score: the score for the assigned maturity level, while Ri  is the 
average score for the maturity level under consideration and is unique for each maturity 
level. For Table 5.2 above, the organisation is at maturity level 3 (Stable) with the 
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highest average score at 33.06%; R is therefore 33.06. Considering maturity level 5 
(summit), the average score Ri is 4.6%. Substituting R and Ri the pull calculation above, 
the pull towards level 5 (summit) will be 0.14. The same process is applied to the other 
maturity levels to obtain their pull. From these calculations, the pull is highest towards 
maturity level 2 (starter) at 0.77. This means that the organisation has the highest 
probability of slipping into level 2 (starter) from its current maturity level 3 (stable), 
given its prevailing organisational reliability behaviours. There is an equally strong pull 
towards level 1(silent) at 0.50 and organisation must be careful not only to slide into 
level 2 (starter), but could potentially move further down towards level 1(silent). 0.5 is 
considered the low pull, while 0.77 is considered the high pull. The framework shows 
that the higher the pull, the more the probability of the organisation to move towards 
that maturity level.  
 
In addition to applying the pull to the entire organisation, it can be applied to each 
individual HRO principle to determine its potential risk factors to the organisation.  
 
Table 5.3: Framework for Organisational Reliability Maturity (FORM) for 
individual HRO principles using Company C 
 
 
In table 5.3 above, the pull is applied to the preoccupation to failure and the 
commitment to resilience principles. Company C is at maturity level 3 (stable) on both 
principles but is being pulled differently on both. It is strongly pulled at 0.58 down 
towards level 2 (starter) in preoccupation to failure, and at 0.68 up towards level 4 
(sustain) in commitment to resilience. The pull in this instance could help the 
Level
Preoccupation with 
Failure Pull
Commitment to 
Resilience Pull
Average Pull for 
all 5 Principles
5 7.56 0.20 5.00 0.12 0.11
4 20.44 0.53 28.33 0.68 0.60
3 38.44 0.00 41.94 0.00 0.00
2 22.22 0.58 17.50 0.42 0.77
1 11.33 0.29 7.22 0.17 0.50
FRAMEWORK FOR ORGANISATIONAL RELIABILITY MATURITY
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organisation prioritize resources to achieve a higher maturity level. The sum of all the 
values in each HRO principle, as well as the sum of the average scores should always 
be 100%. All numbers, except the pull, are percentages of responses. The next four 
sections shall discuss how the framework for organisational reliability maturity could be 
used by organisations to understand their current maturity levels; predict their potential 
future maturity levels given current behaviours given current practices; benchmark 
against desired standards; and improve themselves.  
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5.4  Applying the Framework for Organisational Reliability Maturity (FORM) 
to assess organisations.  
 
Table 5.4 shows company H to be at maturity level 2 (starter) with an average score of 
38.85%. It also shows the individual strengths and weaknesses of the company H with 
respect to each of the five HRO principles. For instance, it shows that although the 
company is at maturity level 2 (starter), it is at level 1 (silent) in preoccupation with 
failure, commitment to resilience, and deference to expertise behaviours. The 
framework therefore helps organisations to perform a health check. Company H could 
at a glance, understand that there is a very thin line between its level 2 and level 1 
positions and as such could easily slide from one to the other. It would also understand 
that performances in preoccupation with failure, commitment to resilience, and 
deference to expertise are driving the organisational reliability down.  
 
Table 5.4: Framework for Organisational Reliability Framework (FORM) for 
Company H 
 
 
Table 5.5 below shows the framework table for company E. From the table, company E 
would understand that it is currently on maturity level 3. It would also understand that 
the pulls towards level 2 and level 1 are quite high at 0.82 and 0.77 respectively. This 
would suggest to company E that although they are on maturity level 3 (stable), their 
current practices and behaviours could see them potentially slide towards level 2 and 1. 
The framework would also tell company E it is stable in its commitment to resilience 
and sensitivity to operations, and reluctance to simplify behaviours, but very poor in its 
preoccupation with failure and deference to expertise behaviours.  
  
Level
Preoccupation with 
Failure
Reluctance to 
Simplify
Sensitivity to 
Operations
Commitment to 
Resilience
Deference to 
Expertise
Average 
Score Pull
5 0.00 0.00 0.91 0.48 0.00 0.28 0.01
4 0.76 3.33 7.14 5.83 1.61 3.74 0.10
3 9.52 27.98 26.88 16.67 22.50 20.71 0.53
2 40.67 43.93 40.00 37.14 32.50 38.85 0.00
1 49.05 24.76 25.06 39.88 43.39 36.43 0.94
FRAMEWORK FOR ORGANISATIONAL RELIABILITY 
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Table 5.5: Framework for Organisational Reliability Framework (FORM) for 
Company E 
 
 
Armed with this knowledge, the organisations could therefore begin to develop 
improvement measures. It is only organisations that can measure and understand their 
current position that can use these understanding as a pedestal upon which to seek 
organisational learning and performance improvement.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Level
Preoccupation with 
Failure
Reluctance to 
Simplify
Sensitivity to 
Operations
Commitment to 
Resilience
Deference to 
Expertise
Average 
Score Pull
5 2.80 2.83 8.73 13.50 4.00 6.37 0.22
4 7.33 23.00 23.82 28.17 16.50 19.76 0.69
3 17.33 32.83 28.18 39.50 24.75 28.52 0.00
2 24.80 27.17 24.91 18.17 22.50 23.51 0.82
1 47.73 14.17 14.36 0.67 32.25 21.84 0.77
COMPANY E (BEVERAGE MANUFACTURING)
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5.5  Applying the Framework for Organisational Reliability Maturity (FORM) 
to Predict the Future  
 
Being able to predict the future is the elusive crystal ball that all have desired and few 
have achieved. This framework leverages on the organisational reliability maturity 
model (ORM
2
) and the identified current position of the organisation, to predict how the 
organisation could potentially behave in future given current operating conditions.  
Perhaps, understanding such future behaviour could potentially become the key to 
incident prevention.  
 
Company G is a relatively new restaurant chain with operations in over 20 locations and 
is a popular destination for young families and children. Catastrophic failures could 
result through batch food poisoning and playground equipment failure. Using company 
G as an example, the organisation currently on maturity level 2 (starter), could 
potentially slide down to maturity level 1(silent) if it continues with its current 
behavioural trends. The pull of 0.91 towards level 1 (silent) is very strong and would 
more likely tilt the organisation towards level 1 than improve towards level 3 where the 
pull is 0.69.  
 
Table 5.6: Framework for Organisational Reliability Framework (FORM) for 
Company G 
 
 
This predictive feature is much more useful when utilized at the level of the individual 
HRO principles. The organisation is already at the lowest level in its preoccupation with 
failure and deference to expertise. This means that near misses and incidents are not 
reported, and that the communication line between management and frontline is very 
difficult at best. It also means that expertise is often sacrificed on the altar of hierarchy. 
Level
Preoccupation with 
Failure
Reluctance to 
Simplify
Sensitivity to 
Operations
Commitment to 
Resilience
Deference to 
Expertise
Average 
Score Pull
5 0.00 0.00 0.18 0.17 0.50 0.17 0.00
4 2.53 3.67 6.91 13.33 11.25 7.54 0.21
3 13.73 28.50 31.45 26.00 22.75 24.49 0.69
2 37.47 41.00 38.36 34.67 26.00 35.50 0.00
1 46.27 26.83 23.09 25.83 39.50 32.30 0.91
COMPANY G (RESTAURANT CHAIN)
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Combining these behaviours suggests that a disaster could be imminent. The potential 
for food poisoning or equipment failure is not only very high; the ability of the 
organisation to manage the disaster when it occurs is very low. On the other hand, the 
organisation could potentially improve in their reluctance to simplify, sensitivity to 
operations, and commitment to resilience. It could be predicted to improve level 3 
(stable) in its reluctance to simplify, sensitivity to operations, and commitment to 
resilience. The pull towards levels 3 and 1 in commitment to resilience are too similar 
that the correct prediction might be too close to call between improving towards level 3, 
and retrogressing towards level 1. In such instance, it would be safe to assume a worst 
case scenario.  
 
The same process could be applied to each of the organisations to predict their potential 
future positions. Company C is an indigenous oil and gas company established within 
the last 3 to 10 years. It has substantial interests in land and swamp oil and gas fields 
and production facilities, and is considered to be a major player in the oil and gas sector. 
Oil spills and gas leaks are major sources of disasters that could result in catastrophic 
events such as explosions, fire, and environmental pollution.   
 
Table 5.7: Framework for Organisational Reliability Framework (FORM) for 
Company C 
 
 
Company C is currently on maturity level 3 (stable), and could potentially slide down to 
maturity level 2 (starter) if it continues with its current behavioural trends. The pull of 
0.77 towards level 2 (starter) is very stronger than the others and would more likely tilt 
the organisation towards level 2 than improve towards level 4 where the pull is 0.62. 
Besides that, there is also an increased pressure towards a decline with an additional 
Level
Preoccupation with 
Failure
Reluctance to 
Simplify
Sensitivity to 
Operations
Commitment to 
Resilience
Deference to 
Expertise
Average 
Score Pull
5 7.56 0.28 8.48 5.00 1.67 4.60 0.14
4 20.44 16.94 24.85 28.33 12.08 20.53 0.62
3 38.44 30.00 35.76 41.94 19.17 33.06 0.00
2 22.22 35.83 25.15 17.50 26.25 25.39 0.77
1 11.33 16.94 5.76 7.22 40.83 16.42 0.50
COMPANY C (OIL &GAS))
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pull of 0.5 towards level 1 (silent). This would indicate that company C could 
potentially decline if improvement actions are not taken.  
 
The organisation is already at the lowest level in its deference to expertise, which would 
suggest that the organisation either does not have the expertise to respond to 
catastrophic failures or does not defer to the expertise available during emergencies. 
The organisation is at level 2 in its reluctance to simplify but is in a good position to 
improve towards level 3. This means that although sceptics and people who challenge 
the norm are increasingly no longer being punished, negative perceptions about them 
still widely exist. The organisation however is beginning to standardize the processes 
for challenging the processes and procedures. Furthermore, the organisation is at level 3 
(stable) in its preoccupation with failure, sensitivity to operations, and commitment to 
resilience. Given the current behaviours, company C could be predicted to improve 
towards level 2 (sustain) in its commitment to resilience, while it would be predicted to 
potentially regress to level 2 (starter) in both its preoccupation with failure and 
sensitivity to operations. Level 2 behaviours mean that there is no standardised process 
for incident and near miss reporting, root causes are not identified and people are still 
blamed for failures and could sometimes be punished or mostly victimized. It also 
means that formalized trainings, competence development and competence assessment 
are not available. Furthermore, it means that people are not generally aware of 
emergency response and contingency plans and are therefore not equipped to respond to 
emergencies. Combining these also would predict that disasters could occur, and when 
it does, the organisation would neither be able to contain it nor be resilient enough to 
reorganise for future competitiveness.  
 
Without previous data, it might be challenging to show if the pull is towards 
improvement or away from improvement. For instance, the average pull of 0.91 in 
company C could indicate that the current reliability behaviours are pulling the 
organisation down towards level 1. However, if an earlier study had shown a pull of 
0.99 towards level 1and a lower pull of 0.61 towards level 3, the organisation could then 
be said to be actually improving towards level 3. This means that for an effective 
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prediction, the baseline measurements must be established. This baseline would become 
the benchmark to use in gauging the improvements or decline of the organisation. The 
next section shall discus this baseline measurement and its importance in benchmarking. 
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5.6  Applying the Framework for Organisational Reliability Maturity (FORM) 
to Benchmark Organisations  
 
Another important feature of the framework for organisational reliability maturity 
(FORM) is the ability to benchmark organisations internally and externally. It could be 
used by organisations to benchmark against a desired maturity level at each point in 
time; against HROs; against organisational peers; or for internal benchmarking. For 
benchmarking to be effective, baselines must be established. A good way to do this 
would be to use the best in class behaviours expected from high reliability 
organisations. These behaviours are found in the maturity level 5 on the organisational 
reliability maturity model (ORM
2
). Using the framework as described in section 5.4, 
organisations deploying this for benchmarking purposes would first establish their 
current position based on behaviours identified in their survey. It must be noted that the 
methods of data collection is not only limited to surveys as adopted by this research. 
Other methods of data collection such as case studies and action research could be 
adopted by organisations based on their organisational realities. As soon as the current 
position is established, it would be documented to form their baseline behaviours. The 
success or failure of the adoption and implementation of the framework would 
thereafter be determined by variance in the behaviours at the baseline, and at each point 
in time. Organisations might choose periodic time frames of 6 months, 1 year, 2 years, 
or 5 years as desired; or could choose periodic time frames as could be stipulated by 
organisational standards for conducting health checks.  Having established their 
individual baseline behaviours, the organisations would thereafter identify a standard to 
benchmark against. This could be against level 5 behaviours, against identified HROs, 
against peers, or against its previously identified behaviours, and against itself in 
interdepartmental benchmarks.   
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5.6.1. Benchmarking against best in class organisations 
This discussion assumes that company A is a high reliability organisation based on its 
behaviours on all the HRO principles. Table 5.8 gives a visual comparison of the 
maturity levels and the individual pull for the 8 organisations surveyed. The values were 
extracted from the summary of surveys for each of the organisation. This is a high level 
benchmark using the average maturity behaviours. 
 
Table 5.8: High level comparison of organisational maturity 
 
 
Black coloured boxes represent the current average maturity level, while grey coloured 
boxes represent the high pull. For instance, company B has a stable organisational 
reliability maturity (level 3) with a pull of 0.95 towards level 4 (sustain). Similarly, 
companies C, D, and E have stable maturity levels (level 3) but with pulls of 0.77, 0.88, 
and 0.82 respectively towards level 2 (starter).  On the other hand, companies F, G, and 
H are on maturity levels 2, with pulls of 0.88, 0.91, and 0.94 respectively towards level 
1 (silent).  
 
This is also represented by the graph in figure 5.1. The blue curve represents the current 
maturity level for the organisations and it corresponds with the black boxes on table 5.8. 
The red curve represents the strong high pull, which corresponds with the grey coloured 
boxes in table 5.8. The companies are represented on the x axis while the maturity 
levels are represented by numbers 1 to 5 on the y axis.  
ORGANIZATIONS SILENT STARTER STABLE SUSTAIN SUMMIT LEGEND
COMPANY A
COMPANY B 0.47 0.68 ML 0.95 0.59 ML CURRENT MATURITY LEVEL
COMPANY C 0.59 0.77 ML 0.62 0.14 HIGH PULL
COMPANY D 0.56 0.88 ML 0.77 0.39
COMPANY E 0.77 0.82 ML 0.69 0.22
COMPANY F 0.88 ML 0.76 0.49 0.14
COMPANY G 0.91 ML 0.69 0.21 0
COMPANY H 0.94 ML 0.53 0.1 0.01
COMPARING THE MATURITY OF THE ORGANIZATIONS
222 
 
 
Figure 5.1 – A graph showing a high level comparison of the organisations 
 
The graph makes it easy to visualize the maturity levels of the organisations as well as 
the pull. It also makes comparisons easy. For instance, it is easier to see that company A 
is more mature than B, and B is more mature than C. It is also easier to see that 
companies C, D, and E are on the same maturity level, while F, G, and H are on the 
same maturity levels.  
 
Table 5.8 and Figure 5.1 consider only average maturity levels of organisations with no 
consideration to the complexities of individual behaviours in each of the HRO 
principles. Each of the organisations would continuously monitor their maturity levels 
as it continues to tend towards the benchmark (company A). The measure of their 
success or failure would be the extent to which the behaviours deviate from the 
benchmark behaviours. In addition to benchmarking the organisations at a high level 
using their average maturity behaviours, the framework could be used to provide 
detailed benchmarking with a detailed consideration of the behaviours in each of the 
five HRO principles. This would help the organisations achieve clear understandings 
and indications of the variance between specific behaviours and the desired standard 
behaviour. For instance, considering, preoccupation with failure, the detailed review 
would clearly indicate the variance between the level one behaviour of incidents not 
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being reported for fear of punishment, and the level five behaviour of the management 
seamlessly working with the frontline staff to actively identify potential hotspots.   
Table 5.9 gives a detailed comparison of the organisations with consideration given to 
each of the HRO principles.  
 
Table 5.9: Detailed comparison of organisational maturity 
 
 
Using company A as the benchmark, all other organisations would compare their 
performances in each of the individual HRO principles against company A’s 
performance. Clearly, none of the organisations come close to the maturity of company 
A in each of the HRO behaviours. Each of the organisations would however clearly see 
the variance between their current individual behaviours and the corresponding 
behaviour in the identified best in class organisation.  
 
ORGANIZATIONS SILENT STARTER STABLE SUSTAIN SUMMIT
COMPANY A
Preoccupation with failure 0.00 4.67 9.83 11.33 74.17
Reluctance to Simplify 0.00 0.00 0.00 8.54 91.46
Sensitivity to operations 0.00 1.82 2.27 9.09 86.82
Commitment to resilience 0.00 0.42 1.46 2.50 95.63
Deference to expertise 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.13 96.88
COMPANY B
Preoccupation with failure 15.50 17.50 33.67 25.83 7.50
Reluctance to Simplify 6.67 24.79 30.21 22.71 15.63
Sensitivity to operations 5.00 15.68 32.50 27.05 19.77
Commitment to resilience 1.88 8.33 21.25 37.92 30.63
Deference to expertise 35.00 25.31 17.81 15.63 6.25
COMPANY C
Preoccupation with failure 11.33 22.22 38.44 20.44 7.56
Reluctance to Simplify 16.94 35.83 30.00 16.94 0.28
Sensitivity to operations 5.76 25.15 35.76 24.85 8.48
Commitment to resilience 7.22 17.50 41.94 28.33 5.00
Deference to expertise 40.83 26.25 19.17 12.08 1.67
COMPANY D
Preoccupation with failure 13.33 26.22 35.78 23.56 1.11
Reluctance to Simplify 21.11 28.89 25.56 18.89 5.56
Sensitivity to operations 10.61 16.97 20.30 32.12 20.00
Commitment to resilience 6.11 26.11 36.11 15.28 16.39
Deference to expertise 27.08 23.75 20.83 17.08 11.25
COMPARING THE MATURITY OF THE ORGANIZATIONS
COMPANY E
Preoccupation with failure 47.73 24.80 17.33 7.33 2.80
Reluctance to Simplify 14.17 27.17 32.83 23.00 2.83
Sensitivity to operations 14.36 24.91 28.18 23.82 8.73
Commitment to resilience 0.67 18.17 39.50 28.17 13.50
Deference to expertise 32.25 24.75 22.50 16.50 4.00
COMPANY F
Preoccupation with failure 40.80 38.93 16.93 3.07 0.27
Reluctance to Simplify 23.83 32.83 28.00 12.83 2.50
Sensitivity to operations 22.55 28.55 24.91 18.36 5.64
Commitment to resilience 17.17 29.00 25.17 22.33 6.33
Deference to expertise 30.00 23.75 21.75 17.75 6.75
COMPANY G
Preoccupation with failure 46.27 37.47 13.73 2.53 0.00
Reluctance to Simplify 26.83 41.00 28.50 3.67 0.00
Sensitivity to operations 23.09 38.36 31.45 6.91 0.18
Commitment to resilience 25.83 34.67 26.00 13.33 0.17
Deference to expertise 39.50 26.00 22.75 11.25 0.50
COMPANY H
Preoccupation with failure 49.05 40.67 9.52 0.76 0.00
Reluctance to Simplify 24.76 43.93 27.98 3.33 0.00
Sensitivity to operations 25.06 40.00 26.88 7.14 0.91
Commitment to resilience 39.88 37.14 16.67 5.83 0.48
Deference to expertise 43.39 32.50 22.50 1.61 0.00
COMPARING THE MATURITY OF THE ORGANIZATIONS
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The beauty of this framework is its flexibility and ability to be adapted to suit 
organisational needs. An organisation might wish to perform a detailed benchmarking, 
and compare the performance of the organisation or business units in each of the HRO 
principles, against other organisations or business units. Using the data already 
available in table 5.9, the organisation could generate more tables or graphs to achieve 
this. Figure 5.2 show a comparison of all the eight organisations in terms of their 
preoccupation with failure. 
 
 
Figure 5.2 – A graph showing a comparison of the organisations in terms of their 
preoccupation with failure. 
 
As in table 5.1, the blue curve represents the current maturity levels of the 
organisations, this time with respect to their preoccupation with failure. The red curve 
represents the high pull for each with respect to their preoccupation with failure. Again 
it is easy to visualize the similarities and differences between the organisations. All the 
graphs included in this section would follow the same format and legend. The maturity 
levels would be represented on the y – axes, while the organisations would be 
represented on the x – axes. The red curve will represent the pull, while the blue curve 
will represent the maturity level for that organisation.  
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Figure 5.3 is a graphical representation of the comparison between the organisations 
with respect to their reluctance to simplify.  
 
 
Figure 5.3 – A graph showing a comparison of the organisations in terms of their 
reluctance to simplify. 
 
From the graph, company C, D, F, G, and H on maturity level 2 are more mature than B 
and E on maturity level 3 with respect to their reluctance to simplify. However, while B 
and E are showing signs of improving towards level 2, the rest are showing signs of 
retrogressing towards level 3. The graphs could therefore not only be used for 
benchmarking, but also for predicting the potential for improvement or retrogression. 
 
Figure 5.4, figure 5.5, and figure 5.6 show the comparison of the organisations with 
respect to their sensitivity to operations, commitment to resilience, and deference to 
expertise respectively. They all follow the same format and legends as in the last three 
figures in this section.  
 
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
RELUCTANCE TO
SIMPLIFY LEVEL
RELUCTANCE TO
SIMPLIFY PULL
M
at
u
ri
ty
 L
ev
el
 
226 
 
 
Figure 5.4 – A graph showing a comparison of the organisations in terms of their 
sensitivity to operations. 
 
 
Figure 5.5 – A graph showing a comparison of the organisations in terms of their 
commitment to resilience. 
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Figure 5.6 – A graph showing a comparison of the organisations in terms of their 
deference to expertise. 
 
5.6.2. Benchmarking against peers 
Companies A and B are both international oil and gas organisations and therefore could 
be considered as peers. Companies C and D are both oil and gas companies formed 
within the same time frame, operating within the same region, with similar operational 
challenges, and therefore could be considered as peers. Companies E and F are 
considered peers to the extent that they are operating within the same industry and could 
be benchmarked as such. In reality however, while company F is a relatively new and 
localised organisation, company E is a relatively much older organisation, and a 
subsidiary of an international organisation with globalized brands. Both would however 
be treated as peers for the sake of this research. Companies G and H would be given the 
same considerations as E and F. They would also be considered peers as both are 
operating in the same industry.  
 
Table 5.10 shows the comparison of companies A and B. Company B obviously lag 
company A widely in all the HRO behaviours. Company B at maturity level 3 is 
improving towards level 2 and would need to implement a lot of improvement 
initiatives to reach the best in class standard of its peer, company A.  
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Table 5.10: Comparing companies A and B 
 
 
A high level comparison of companies C and D shows both organisations to be close on 
the average high level behaviours (table 5.11). They are both on the same maturity level 
3 with higher pulls towards level 2. There are also fairly being pulled strongly towards 
level 4 at 0.62 and 0.77 respectively.  
 
Table 5.11: High level comparison of companies C and D 
 
 
A closer look at the detailed comparison (fig 5.11) would however highlight the key 
differences between both organisations. Both organisations exhibit similar behaviours in 
preoccupation with failure, reluctance to simplify, and deference to expertise. In their 
sensitivity to operations, company C is at maturity level 3 with fairly even pulls towards 
levels 2 and 4. The pull towards level 2 is slightly higher thus the organisation is said to 
be pulling towards level 2. Company D on the other hand is at level 4 with fairly even 
pulls towards levels 3 and 5. The pull towards level 3 is slightly higher than the pull 
towards level 5, thus the organisation is said to be pulling towards level 3. Company D 
is therefore considered to have performed better than company C in their sensitivity to 
operations.  
Level
Preoccupation with 
Failure
Reluctance to 
Simplify
Sensitivity to 
Operations
Commitment to 
Resilience
Deference to 
Expertise
Average 
Score Pull
5 7.50 15.63 19.77 30.63 6.25 15.95 0.59
4 25.83 22.71 27.05 37.92 15.63 25.83 0.95
3 33.67 30.21 32.50 21.25 17.81 27.09 0.00
2 17.50 24.79 15.68 8.33 25.31 18.32 0.68
1 15.50 6.67 5.00 1.88 35.00 12.81 0.47
Level
Preoccupation with 
Failure
Reluctance to 
Simplify
Sensitivity to 
Operations
Commitment to 
Resilience
Deference to 
Expertise
Average 
Score Pull
5 74.17 91.46 86.82 95.63 96.88 88.99 0.00
4 11.33 8.54 9.09 2.50 3.13 6.92 0.08
3 9.83 0.00 2.27 1.46 0.00 2.71 0.03
2 4.67 0.00 1.82 0.42 0.00 1.38 0.02
1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
COMPANY B (OIL &GAS)
COMPANY A (OIL &GAS)
ORGANIZATIONS SILENT STARTER STABLE SUSTAIN SUMMIT
COMPANY C 0.59 0.77 ML 0.62 0.14
COMPANY D 0.56 0.88 ML 0.77 0.39
COMPARING THE MATURITY OF THE ORGANIZATIONS
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Table 5.12: Detailed comparison of companies C and D 
 
 
Both organisations are on the same maturity level 3 in their commitment to resilience. 
Company C is however pulled strongly towards level 4 while company D is pulled 
towards maturity level 2. Company C is therefore considered to have performed better 
than company D in their commitment to resilience. 
 
Similarly, a high level comparison of companies E and F (table 5.13) indicates company 
E to be performing better than company F. Whereas company is E at maturity level 3 
with a strong pull of 0.82 towards level 2, company F is at maturity level 2 with a strong 
pull of 0.88 towards level 1.  
 
Table 5.13: High level comparison of companies E and F 
 
 
A closer look at the detailed comparison (table 5.14) would highlight the key 
differences and similarities between the behaviours of companies E and F in each of the 
five HRO principles. The performances are similar in their preoccupation with failure 
and deference to expertise. Considering their reluctance to simplify, company E is at 
maturity level 3 with a strong pull towards maturity level 2. It is also fairly pulled 
towards level 4. Company F on the other hand is at maturity level 2 with a strong pull 
ORGANIZATIONS SILENT STARTER STABLE SUSTAIN SUMMIT
COMPANY C
Preoccupation with failure 11.33 22.22 38.44 20.44 7.56 LEGEND
Reluctance to Simplify 16.94 35.83 30.00 16.94 0.28
Sensitivity to operations 5.76 25.15 35.76 24.85 8.48 ML CURRENT MATURITY LEVEL
Commitment to resilience 7.22 17.50 41.94 28.33 5.00 HIGH PULL
Deference to expertise 40.83 26.25 19.17 12.08 1.67
COMPANY D
Preoccupation with failure 13.33 26.22 35.78 23.56 1.11 LEGEND
Reluctance to Simplify 21.11 28.89 25.56 18.89 5.56
Sensitivity to operations 10.61 16.97 20.30 32.12 20.00 ML CURRENT MATURITY LEVEL
Commitment to resilience 6.11 26.11 36.11 15.28 16.39 HIGH PULL
Deference to expertise 27.08 23.75 20.83 17.08 11.25
COMPARING THE MATURITY OF THE ORGANIZATIONS
ORGANIZATIONS SILENT STARTER STABLE SUSTAIN SUMMIT
COMPANY E 0.77 0.82 ML 0.69 0.22
COMPANY F 0.88 ML 0.76 0.49 0.14
COMPARING THE MATURITY OF THE ORGANIZATIONS
230 
 
towards level 3. It is also fairly pulled towards level 1. Company E is therefore 
considered to have performed better than company F in their reluctance to simplify.  
 
Table 5.14: Detailed comparison of companies E and F 
 
 
Considering their sensitivity to operations, company E is at maturity level 3 with a 
strong pull towards level 2. It is also pulled fairly towards level 4. On the other hand, 
company F is at a maturity level 2 with a strong pull towards maturity level 3. It is 
however also being pulled fairly towards level 1. Company E is therefore said to have 
performed better that company F in their sensitivity to operations. Finally, considering 
their commitment to resilience, company E is at maturity level 3 with a strong pull 
towards level 4, while company F is at maturity level 2 with a strong pull towards level 
3. Again, company E is said to have performed better than company F.  
 
Finally, a high level comparison of companies G and H (table 5.15) indicates that both 
companies exhibit similar behaviours. Both competitors are at maturity levels 2 with 
high pulls towards level 1 and low pulls towards level 3.  
 
Table 5.15: High level comparison of companies G and H 
 
 
COMPANY E LEGEND
Preoccupation with failure 47.73 24.80 17.33 7.33 2.80
Reluctance to Simplify 14.17 27.17 32.83 23.00 2.83 ML CURRENT MATURITY LEVEL
Sensitivity to operations 14.36 24.91 28.18 23.82 8.73 HIGH PULL
Commitment to resilience 0.67 18.17 39.50 28.17 13.50
Deference to expertise 32.25 24.75 22.50 16.50 4.00
COMPANY F
Preoccupation with failure 40.80 38.93 16.93 3.07 0.27 LEGEND
Reluctance to Simplify 23.83 32.83 28.00 12.83 2.50
Sensitivity to operations 22.55 28.55 24.91 18.36 5.64 ML CURRENT MATURITY LEVEL
Commitment to resilience 17.17 29.00 25.17 22.33 6.33 HIGH PULL
Deference to expertise 30.00 23.75 21.75 17.75 6.75
COMPARING THE MATURITY OF THE ORGANIZATIONS
LEGEND
ORGANIZATIONS SILENT STARTER STABLE SUSTAIN SUMMIT
COMPANY G 0.91 ML 0.69 0.21 0 ML CURRENT MATURITY LEVEL
COMPANY H 0.94 ML 0.53 0.1 0.01 HIGH PULL
COMPARING THE MATURITY OF THE ORGANIZATIONS
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Company G however has a less high pull (0.91) towards maturity level 1 than company 
H (0.94), and a stronger low pull (0.69) towards maturity level 3 than company H. 
Company G is therefore considered more mature than Company H.  Table 5.16 shows 
the detailed comparison of the behaviours of companies G and H in terms of the 
individual HRO principles.  
 
Table 5.16: Detailed comparison of companies G and H 
 
 
 
Both organisations appear to have very similar behaviours in all HRO principles except 
commitment to resilience where company G is at maturity level 2 and a high pull 
towards maturity level 3. Company H on the other hand is at maturity level 1 tending 
towards maturity level 2. In order to dig further into the individual difference between 
both organisations in the four HRO principles in which their behaviours appear to be 
very similar, a simple pull calculation would be required as demonstrated in section 5.3. 
In addition to benchmarking against peers and against best in class, this framework 
could be adopted by organisations to benchmark internally against its various 
departments or business units. The process would be the same as described in the 
preceding sections. The key thing would be to obtain data that is accurate and robust 
enough to reflect the true organisational realities.   
 
The next section shall describe how this framework could be used in organisational 
learning and performance improvement.  
 
ORGANIZATIONS SILENT STARTER STABLE SUSTAIN SUMMIT
COMPANY G
Preoccupation with failure 46.27 37.47 13.73 2.53 0.00 LEGEND
Reluctance to Simplify 26.83 41.00 28.50 3.67 0.00
Sensitivity to operations 23.09 38.36 31.45 6.91 0.18 ML CURRENT MATURITY LEVEL
Commitment to resilience 25.83 34.67 26.00 13.33 0.17 HIGH PULL
Deference to expertise 39.50 26.00 22.75 11.25 0.50
COMPANY H
Preoccupation with failure 49.05 40.67 9.52 0.76 0.00 LEGEND
Reluctance to Simplify 24.76 43.93 27.98 3.33 0.00
Sensitivity to operations 25.06 40.00 26.88 7.14 0.91 ML CURRENT MATURITY LEVEL
Commitment to resilience 39.88 37.14 16.67 5.83 0.48 HIGH PULL
Deference to expertise 43.39 32.50 22.50 1.61 0.00
COMPARING THE MATURITY OF THE ORGANIZATIONS
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5.7  Applying the Framework for Organisational Reliability Maturity (FORM) 
in performance improvement.   
 
The route organisations would choose to improve their organisational reliability would 
be determined by the amount of resources they are willing to commit. For best results, a 
wholesome implementation is suggested. The improvement actions would normally be 
in a stepwise manner, in which case, the organisations would take incremental actions 
to improve their maturity one level at a time. This could potentially pose some 
challenges in cases where the pull towards a higher maturity level is very high. A pull 
of 0.9 from level 1 towards level 2 indicates that the organisation already exhibits a lot 
of level 2 behaviours. A smarter decision in this case would therefore be to begin to 
implement level 3 behaviours instead of committing resources on level 2 behaviours. 
For simplicity, this research recommends a pull of 0.7 as the level gate, beyond which 
the organisation should begin to implement behaviours of the maturity level above. In 
the example above, the organisation would begin to implement behaviours of level 3 
instead of level 2. Where the organisation has reached a maturity of level 5, it would be 
expected to sustain the maturity by continuously assessing its behaviours against the 
level 5 behaviours. 
 
Where an organisation is unable to the commit resources required to implement all 5 
HRO principles at the same time, it could chose to commit more resources to its 
weakest principle(s) as a means of boosting the average maturity level. This route is 
however a bit tricky and must be used in conjunction with an organisational risk 
analysis. This research assumes an equal weighting for all the 5 HRO principles. An 
organisational risk analysis might recommend a different weighting for the principles 
due to the prevalent risk factors. Company B might for instance, consider preoccupation 
with failure as most important, and could chose to commit resources to it, rather than in 
deference to expertise where it scored the least. Company H, a service oriented 
organisation, on the other hand might choose to give a higher weighting to sensitivity to 
operations. A future research could identify a standardized weighting process for 
organisations in similar industries.  
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The Organisational Reliability Maturity Model (ORM
2
) must be used in conjunction 
with the Framework for Organisational Reliability Maturity (FORM) to propose 
organisational improvement behaviours. Having attained best in class, company A 
might be tempted to relax its efforts. This could prove a costly mistake as retrogression 
could occur within a short period. What the company had spent years to build could be 
lost within a few months of laxity. For such organisation, it must continue to encourage 
the behaviours that made it best in class, and at the same time must continuously 
evaluate itself against its benchmark to enhance the sustainability of the best in class 
behaviours. Furthermore, it must realize that it did not score 100% in any of the HRO 
principles. This means there is room for improvement. A score of 74% in preoccupation 
with failure means that there is a 26% room for improvement, in addition to the 
sustainability initiatives it would adopt. Similarly, there is 9% room for improvement in 
reluctance to simplify; 13% room for improvement in sensitivity to operations; 4% 
room for improvement in commitment to resilience, and a 3% room for improvement in 
deference to expertise. Table 5.17 shows the FORM table for company A. 
 
Table 5.17: Framework for Organisational Reliability Framework (FORM) for 
Company A – Applying ORM2 
 
 
Table 5.18 shows the FORM table for company B. The organisation is at maturity level 
3 and with a high pull of 0.95 towards maturity level 4. The organisation is therefore 
either improving towards level 4 or has retrogressed from level 4 based on the earlier 
baseline data that is not available for the purpose of this research. Whether improving or 
retrogressing, the organisation clearly needs to learn from the best in class organisations 
and develop initiatives aimed at organisational improvement. To achieve this, it must 
identify the individual reliability behaviours it must focus improvement initiatives on. 
Level
Preoccupation with 
Failure
Reluctance to 
Simplify
Sensitivity to 
Operations
Commitment to 
Resilience
Deference to 
Expertise
Average 
Score Pull
5 74.17 91.46 86.82 95.63 96.88 88.99 0.00
4 11.33 8.54 9.09 2.50 3.13 6.92 0.08
3 9.83 0.00 2.27 1.46 0.00 2.71 0.03
2 4.67 0.00 1.82 0.42 0.00 1.38 0.02
1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
COMPANY A (OIL &GAS)
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Table 5.18: Framework for Organisational Reliability Framework (FORM) for 
Company B – Applying ORM2 
 
 
Its worst performance was in deference to expertise, where it performed at maturity 
level 1. From ORM
2
, level 1 behaviour in deference to expertise includes unavailability 
of expertise within the organisation, people generally not aware of who has the most 
expertise for specific emergencies and a strong reliance on hierarchical authority during 
emergencies instead of expertise. Applying the pull calculation 𝑃 = 1 − (𝑅 − 𝑅𝑖)/𝑅 to 
deference to expertise, where R is 35 and Ri is 25.31, the high pull would be 0.72 
towards level 2. There is also a low pull of 0.51 towards level 3. This suggests that the 
organisation may have already started exhibiting some level 2 and 3 behaviours. Using 
the heuristic method developed earlier in section 5.7, where a stage gate of 0.7 was 
adopted for improvement actions, company B would therefore develop organisation 
improvement actions for level 3. A pull of 0.51 is also relatively high and the 
organisation might begin to introduce level 4 behaviours while auditing only for level 3 
at this point.  
 
The high number of respondents that chose level 3 suggests that there had been some 
standardisation efforts that were not sustained, or that the organisation is currently 
implementing some standardization initiatives. The audits must be to ensure all the 
standardization required for level 3 are in place and being implemented by the 
organisation. At level 4 in deference to expertise, there is expertise available for most 
emergencies and people generally know who the experts are or how to access the 
expertise during emergencies. It also means that the hierarchical leader under normal 
operation would normally yield authority to the expert during emergency, and that the 
Level
Preoccupation with 
Failure
Reluctance to 
Simplify
Sensitivity to 
Operations
Commitment to 
Resilience
Deference to 
Expertise
Average 
Score Pull
5 7.50 15.63 19.77 30.63 6.25 15.95 0.59
4 25.83 22.71 27.05 37.92 15.63 25.83 0.95
3 33.67 30.21 32.50 21.25 17.81 27.09 0.00
2 17.50 24.79 15.68 8.33 25.31 18.32 0.68
1 15.50 6.67 5.00 1.88 35.00 12.81 0.47
COMPANY B (OIL &GAS)
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expert would normally yield back authority to the hierarchical leader as soon as the 
emergency is over and normal operation resumes. The organisation would therefore 
initiate improvement processes to enhance these level 4 behaviours to improve its 
organisational reliability maturity.  
 
The organisation is at maturity level 3 in its reluctance to simplify. Applying the pull 
calculation to this principle, the high pull will be 0.82 towards level 2. There is a low 
pull of 0.75 towards level 4. Based on the heuristic method developed earlier, the 
improvement actions should be level 5 improvement actions. However, the high pull of 
0.82 is strongly pulling the organisation down towards level 2, and as such, level 5 
improvement actions may be asking too much. The organisation in this instance would 
therefore develop or reemphasize level 4 behaviours for its improvement initiatives. 
Level 2 behaviours in reluctance to simplify include actions that discourage scepticism 
and challenge of processes and norms. Level 3 behaviours involved standardised 
processes and procedures to encourage scepticism and challenge of processes and 
procedures. Implementation is however often delayed by layers of bureaucracies and 
bottlenecks. Level 4 behaviours to be implemented by the organisation would include 
initiatives to ensure the opinions of skeptics and people who think outside the box are 
respected, and given its due merit.  
 
The organisation is also at maturity level 3 in both preoccupation with failure and 
sensitivity to operations with high pulls towards level 4 on both. The organisation 
would therefore develop improvement actions to achieve level 4 behaviours. Being on 
level 3 means that there are standardized process. Level 4 behaviours for preoccupation 
with failure include near misses and incidents are being reported, root causes are 
identified for failures and near misses, and people are not blamed for causing incidents. 
There is clear and open communication among team members, and between team 
members and management, worst case scenarios are considered during all plans, and all 
lessons learned are itemized and documented for each incident and near miss identified. 
Level 4 behaviours on sensitivity to operations include conducting regular meetings 
with clearly defined terms of reference, leaders getting involved in day to day front line 
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activities, and front line staff giving first hand reports for day to day activities. It also 
involves people generally willing to get involved in jobs outside their core 
competencies, opportunities being made available for people to get involved in jobs 
outside their core competencies, feedbacks given and received with little prompts, and 
leaders continuously monitoring workloads and optimizing resources in line with those 
workloads.   
 
Finally, company B is on maturity level 4 in its commitment to resilience with a high 
pull towards level 5. Improvement initiatives would clearly be geared towards level 5 
behaviours.  At level 4, the leaders and staff are already working together to identify 
learning and development gaps and close them. Competence assessment is already 
being done willingly at specified times, emergency drills are no longer regarded as 
necessary evils, but useful ways to potentially save lives and protect the environment. 
Processes for level 5 would therefore be developed such that competence and skills 
development becomes a proactive process, emergency response and contingency plans 
become robust and implementation becomes a shared responsibility among all staff and 
management. People would also generally have more than enough skills for their jobs 
and for responding to emergencies. Finally, everyone would trust one another and rely 
on one another during emergencies.  
 
The same process used above could be used for all the other organisations studied. For 
instance, considering Company G and H, both organisations are at maturity level 2 with 
high pulls towards level 1. From ORM
2
, and considering preoccupation with failure, 
both organisations do not report near misses or incidents, neither is there a process in 
place to manage incidents. They consider failure to be the result of someone’s error and 
there are punishments for people found to cause a failure. The managements are 
considered as being difficult to approach. Both organisations pull strongly towards level 
2 at 0.81 and 0.83 respectively, meaning that a large percentage may have already 
started to report some incidents or near misses, but there is no defined process to 
manage incidents, neither is there a formal communication channel with management. 
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Table 5.19: Framework for Organisational Reliability Framework (FORM) for 
Company G and Company H – Applying ORM2 
 
 
A smart recommendation would therefore be for the organisations to begin to 
implement level 3 behaviours. Such behaviour would include developing and 
implementing a formalised incident management process, communication process, and 
rewards process. A robust incident management process would include a feedback 
process to improve future process design, modify existing process or implement cultural 
change. 
 
Both organisations are also on maturity level 2 in their reluctance to simplify with high 
pulls of 0.70 and 0.64 respectively. Again, the smart recommendation would be to 
implement level 3 behaviours that aim at process standardisation. In both organisations, 
there are strong pulls towards level 1, which suggests that gains made to attain level 2 
or 3 could easily be eroded and the organisations could easily slide down to level 1.  
Both organisations follow the same pattern in their sensitivity to operations as in their 
reluctance to simplify. The smart recommendation would also be to adopt level 3 
behaviours which primarily centre on standardisation of the processes. Such behaviours 
would include meetings at regular intervals with clearly defined terms of reference, 
clearly defined work reporting process, percentage of work outside employees’ key 
competences, formalised feedback process, and formalised work load management 
process. When the organisation has gotten used to the straight jacket formalised 
Level
Preoccupation with 
Failure
Reluctance to 
Simplify
Sensitivity to 
Operations
Commitment to 
Resilience
Deference to 
Expertise
Average 
Score Pull
5 0.00 0.00 0.91 0.48 0.00 0.28 0.01
4 0.76 3.33 7.14 5.83 1.61 3.74 0.10
3 9.52 27.98 26.88 16.67 22.50 20.71 0.53
2 40.67 43.93 40.00 37.14 32.50 38.85 0.00
1 49.05 24.76 25.06 39.88 43.39 36.43 0.94
Level
Preoccupation with 
Failure
Reluctance to 
Simplify
Sensitivity to 
Operations
Commitment to 
Resilience
Deference to 
Expertise
Average 
Score Pull
5 0.00 0.00 0.18 0.17 0.50 0.17 0.00
4 2.53 3.67 6.91 13.33 11.25 7.54 0.21
3 13.73 28.50 31.45 26.00 22.75 24.49 0.69
2 37.47 41.00 38.36 34.67 26.00 35.50 0.00
1 46.27 26.83 23.09 25.83 39.50 32.30 0.91
COMPANY H (RESTAURANT CHAIN)
COMPANY G (RESTAURANT CHAIN)
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processes, they could then begin to implement behaviours in level 4 that will help the 
people to perform their work mindfully without coercion.  
 
While Company H is at level 1 in commitment to resilience with a high pull of 0.93 
towards level 2, Company G is at level 2 with a high pull of 0.75 towards level 3. 
Company H would therefore be smart enough to begin to encourage level 3 behaviours, 
while Company G would encourage level 4 behaviours. Level 3 behaviours in 
commitment to resilience include design and implementation of formalised trainings and 
competence assessment process. Competence and skills assessment is done at specific 
times across the organisation. It also includes formalised emergency response and 
contingency plans, where people are mandated to learn and adopt. People however still 
regard the drills and emergency response plans as necessary burden to please the 
employer. At level 4, the people begin to get involved mindfully, and would often get 
together with the leaders to identify training and development gaps and mutually agree 
on plans to close the gaps. Competence and skills assessment is an ongoing and 
continuous process in level 4, and people actively give and receive feedback at 
predetermined times. The people at this point begin to see the potentials of drills and 
emergency response plans to save lives, preserve assets, and preserve the environment. 
 
Both organisations are at level 1 in their deference to expertise and exhibits similar 
behaviour in the principle. While Company H has a high pull of 0.75 towards level 2, 
Company G has a high pull of 0.68 towards level 2. Company H is additionally being 
pulled strongly at 0.52 towards level 3, while Company G is additionally being pulled 
strongly at 0.58 towards level 3. The smart choice would therefore be to begin to 
encourage level 4 behaviours in both organisations. At level 4, the expected deference 
to expertise behaviour includes sacrificing hierarchy on the altar of expertise. The most 
senior would normally yield responsibility to the most experienced people during an 
emergency. The emphasis is on yield, as the process is intentional and not out of 
coercion. The experienced people accept the responsibility professionally and yield the 
responsibility back after the emergency. In level, 4, expertise for all emergencies is 
readily available.  
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Companies C and D are peers within the oil and gas industry. Catastrophic failures 
could result from behaviours that are not mindful in any of the five HRO. The failure to 
report a leak (not preoccupied with failure); or casually categorising it as a “minor” leak 
that does not require urgent attention (over simplification); or disregarding the potential 
interrelationship between that “minor” leak with the other processes (not sensitive to 
operations) could result in the “minor” leak escalating into a full blown catastrophe. The 
“minor” leak could potentially result in an explosion and fire, multiple fatalities and 
asset destruction, and environmental damage. This catastrophe could result to a full 
blown disaster if the organisation is unable to manage the emergency response 
(commitment to resilience), or the people with the expertise are not given full authority 
to manage the emergency. Chapters two and three described numerous cases where this 
industry witness catastrophes resulting from one or more lapses in the HRO behaviours. 
The organisations must therefore develop improvement initiatives to improve maturity.  
 
Table 5.20 shows the FORM table for companies C and D. Both are at maturity level 3 
with high pulls down towards maturity level 2. Looking at the big picture, both 
organisations are being pulled strongly down towards level 2 and would therefore 
initiate improvement actions that ensure they not only sustain level 3, but begin to 
improve towards maturity level 4.  
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Table 5.20: Framework for Organisational Reliability Framework (FORM) for 
Company C and Company D – Applying ORM2 
 
 
Applying the same process applied to companies B, G and H, companies C and D must 
implement level 4 behaviours while ensuring that they sustain level 3 behaviours in 
their preoccupation with failure. As done in companies B, G, and H, the behaviours 
would be developed using the organisational reliability maturity model (ORM
2
). 
Considering their reluctance to simplify, both companies C and D are on maturity level 
2 with high pulls at maturity level 3. Applying the pull calculation, there is also a pull of 
0.73 towards level 1 in company D and pulls of 0.47 towards levels 1 and level 4 in 
company C. This indicates that both organisations have more potential to improve 
towards level 3 from maturity level 2.  
 
With a further pull of 0.73 towards level 1, company D could potentially slide down 
towards level 1. Again improvement actions would be developed from ORM
2
 not only 
to sustain level 2 maturity in their reluctance to simplify, but additionally to improve to 
level 3. Considering sensitivity to operations, company D is at maturity level 4 with 
almost equal pulls towards levels 3 and 5. The organisation could potentially improve 
towards level 5 or slide down towards level 3 given current behaviours. A wise decision 
would be to sustain level 4 behaviours while implementing policies that would help 
them develop level 5 behaviours.  
 
Level
Preoccupation with 
Failure
Reluctance to 
Simplify
Sensitivity to 
Operations
Commitment to 
Resilience
Deference to 
Expertise
Average 
Score Pull
5 1.11 5.56 20.00 16.39 11.25 10.86 0.39
4 23.56 18.89 32.12 15.28 17.08 21.39 0.77
3 35.78 25.56 20.30 36.11 20.83 27.72 0.00
2 26.22 28.89 16.97 26.11 23.75 24.39 0.88
1 13.33 21.11 10.61 6.11 27.08 15.65 0.56
Level
Preoccupation with 
Failure
Reluctance to 
Simplify
Sensitivity to 
Operations
Commitment to 
Resilience
Deference to 
Expertise
Average 
Score Pull
5 7.56 0.28 8.48 5.00 1.67 4.60 0.14
4 20.44 16.94 24.85 28.33 12.08 20.53 0.62
3 38.44 30.00 35.76 41.94 19.17 33.06 0.00
2 22.22 35.83 25.15 17.50 26.25 25.39 0.77
1 11.33 16.94 5.76 7.22 40.83 16.42 0.50
COMPANY C (OIL &GAS))
COMPANY D (OIL &GAS)
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Company C on the other hand is at maturity level 3 with almost equal pull towards 
levels 2 and 4. Again, the organisation would be wise to use ORM
2
 to develop level 3 
sustainability initiatives to ensure it does not retrogress to maturity level 2, while 
developing initiatives to improve towards level 4. Next level target behaviours would 
therefore be level 4 behaviours. Whereas company C is at level 3 with a high pull 
towards level 4 in commitment to resilience, company D is at level 3 with a high pull 
towards level 2. This means that while company D could potentially improve, company 
C could potentially retrogress. Company C would therefore focus more on sustainability 
actions while company D would focus more on next level improvement actions. Both 
organisations are on level 1 in their deference to expertise and must therefore 
implement similar initiatives recommended for companies D, G, and H to improve their 
behaviours on deference to expertise.  
 
Finally, applying ORM
2
 to companies E and F would be similar in large parts to 
companies H and H. One of the key differences is in the overall performance. While 
company F, like G and H, is on maturity level 2 with a high pull towards level 1, 
company E is on maturity level 3 with a high pull towards level 2, and a further pull of 
0.77 towards level 1.  
 
Table 5.21: Framework for Organisational Reliability Framework (FORM) for 
Company E and Company F – Applying ORM2 
 
 
Level
Preoccupation with 
Failure
Reluctance to 
Simplify
Sensitivity to 
Operations
Commitment to 
Resilience
Deference to 
Expertise
Average 
Score Pull
5 0.27 2.50 5.64 6.33 6.75 4.30 0.14
4 3.07 12.83 18.36 22.33 17.75 14.87 0.49
3 16.93 28.00 24.91 25.17 21.75 23.35 0.76
2 38.93 32.83 28.55 29.00 23.75 30.61 0.00
1 40.80 23.83 22.55 17.17 30.00 26.87 0.88
Level
Preoccupation with 
Failure
Reluctance to 
Simplify
Sensitivity to 
Operations
Commitment to 
Resilience
Deference to 
Expertise
Average 
Score Pull
5 2.80 2.83 8.73 13.50 4.00 6.37 0.22
4 7.33 23.00 23.82 28.17 16.50 19.76 0.69
3 17.33 32.83 28.18 39.50 24.75 28.52 0.00
2 24.80 27.17 24.91 18.17 22.50 23.51 0.82
1 47.73 14.17 14.36 0.67 32.25 21.84 0.77
COMPANY F (BEVERAGE MANUFACTURING)
COMPANY E (BEVERAGE MANUFACTURING)
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Both organisations would be smart to implement level 3 behaviours: company E for 
sustainability reasons and company F for organisational improvement reasons. How 
organisations use the framework for organisational reliability maturity (FORM) and the 
organisational reliability maturity model to develop and enhance learning forms the 
next section.  
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5.8  Applying the Framework for Organisational Reliability Maturity (FORM) 
and ORM
2
 in organisational learning. 
 
Organisational learning in this instance could be learning either learning from oneself, 
learning from others, or a combination of both. When organisations develop their 
baseline measurements, they document them and use them as benchmarks to compare 
future organisational reliability performances. As they continue to perform 
improvement actions to improve and sustain organisational maturity, they accumulate 
experience which becomes embedded within the organisation. These experiences 
become the repository for organisational learning.  
 
Using FORM and ORM
2
 to develop improvement and sustainability actions, 
organisations develop and reinforce explicit and tacit knowledge. Explicit knowledge 
includes the processes, procedures, standards, and instructions that the organisations 
would develop and enforce at maturity level 3. Every member of the organisations 
would be expected to understand and work with this well documented explicit 
knowledge. Tacit knowledge on the other hand is not easily documented. They are the 
proactive and generative behaviours of level 4 and level 5 respectively that are learned 
through experience over time. It is mostly achieved through on-the-job learning, 
coaching, and continuous practice. For instance, the no-blame behaviours of maturity 
level 5 in the preoccupation with failure HRO principle, or the open and proactive 
collaborations and feedback between the employees and management personnel in the 
sensitivity to operations HRO principle are both tacit knowledge that can only be 
developed through experience and series of continuous improvement learnings.  
 
Benchmarking is another useful means of organisational learning. Organisations are 
able to observe the practices of other organisations and learn from their successes and 
their failures. For instance, when a disaster occurs, organisations could identify the root 
causes of these disasters and correlate with their own organisation. Relationships 
between the disasters and their organisational reliability maturity would form more 
input towards their organisational improvement and learning.   
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It is one thing to create knowledge, and another to retain the knowledge. An 
organisation could easily jump from organisational learning to organisational forgetting 
through a succession of unchecked behaviours. Knowledge retention is concerned with 
the organisational reliability behaviours that have become embedded within the 
organisation through implementation of the various organisational maturity 
improvement actions.  
 
Knowledge retention is achieved through the use of people as repositories. As people 
gain experience and improve their organisational reliability behaviours, they help 
transfer the knowledge through various organisational learning and development 
initiatives. Repositories are useful tools to increase retention. The use of people as 
repositories is one of the worst methods of knowledge retention. This increases the 
vulnerability of organisations to lose the information due to attrition, layoffs, and 
retirements. Furthermore, having become the repositories for the organisations 
reliability improvement knowledge, some people could hold onto the knowledge either 
to gain more relevance, or are simply not capable of knowledge transfer. As the attrition 
rate increases, the people with key knowledge continue to leave the organisation and the 
organisation could easily begin to retrogress in their maturity behaviours.   
 
Other forms of repositories include communication tools such as computers, tapes, CDs, 
and other electronic memory devices. The processes and standards set by the 
organisation is a very useful repository of knowledge.  
 
At maturity level 3, organisations develop, implement and enforce processes and 
standards to guide their reliability behaviours. At levels 4 and 5, these organisations 
become proactive and generative, no longer relying on enforcing the processes and 
standards, but with the people adopting the processes and standards as parts of their 
everyday work life. At this stage, personnel changes become insignificant as new 
employees would only have to work to fit into an existing process. Others repositories 
that could be adopted together with ORM
2
 and FORM include organisational routines, 
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networks, learning agendas, and transactive memory or group think. Different 
organisations would develop processes to aid knowledge retention and knowledge 
transfer.  
 
Finally, the ORM
2
 and FORM can be utilized to enhance individual learning, group 
learning, organisational learning, and inter-organisational learning. Individual learning 
in this instance refers to the learning by the various people within the organisation that 
would implement the improvement and sustainability initiatives. Group learning refers 
to individual team and sub divisions when there is an internal benchmarking. 
Organisational learning refers to the progressive learning by the individual organisation 
either when it learns from itself or from others. Inter-organisational learning refers to 
industry wide learning or cross industry learning. For instance, the Piper Alpha incident 
led to a lot of process safety learnings that resulted in the promulgation of Offshore 
Installations (Safety case) Regulations of 1992 ( UK Statutory Instruments, 1992). This 
is now a requirement for oil and gas industries all over the world. A benchmark against 
a best in class organisational reliability behaviour could be utilized by different 
organisations within the industry and beyond to develop their own processes and 
thereby enhance organisational learning.  
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5.9  Chapter Summary 
The research started with the aim of applying the HRO theory to improve the maturity 
of organisations. It asked two questions: 
 To what extent can the mindfulness of organisations be measured? 
 Can these measurements help diverse organisations become more mature? 
Chapter five has answered both questions. First, it developed the organisational 
reliability maturity model (ORM
2
) that identified specific reliability enhancing 
behaviours in organisations for each of the five high reliability organisation principles 
and mapped them into five levels of maturity. The levels were named silent, starter, 
stable, sustain, and summit, with silent being the lowest maturity level (level 1) and 
summit being the highest maturity level (level 5). This provided baseline measurement 
for organisations to assess their current statuses in terms of organisational reliability 
maturity. It also initiated the answer to the first question: “… can the mindfulness of 
organisations be measured?” 
 
Furthermore, the chapter introduced the framework for organisational reliability 
maturity, a framework to track the responsiveness of the organisations with respect to 
each of the five HRO principles.  
 
To fully answer the first question, the research realised that the framework must be able 
to perform a health check that assesses the current maturity level of organisations. 
Secondly, the framework must have the ability to use the current organisational 
reliability behaviours to predict the future direction the organisation could potentially 
go. Finally, the framework must have the ability to benchmark organisations against 
desired maturity standards, either internally or externally.  
 
The chapter developed the pull calculation    𝑃 = 1 − (𝑅 − 𝑅𝑖)/𝑅, where P is the pull, 
the probability that the organisational reliability maturity behaviours would either 
improve or retrogress. R is the highest average score: the score for the assigned maturity 
level, while Ri  is the average score for the maturity level under consideration and is 
unique for each maturity level. The chapter thereafter used this calculation to 
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demonstrate how the framework could be used to perform a health assessment and 
understand the current organisational reliability maturity position. Furthermore, the 
chapter described how the formula and the framework for organisational reliability 
maturity (FORM) could be used to predict the future of organisations. It could tell, 
based on current behaviours, that an organisation could potentially experience a 
catastrophic failure, or that the organisation is on a path of potential improvement in its 
organisational reliability maturity. In addition, the chapter demonstrated how the 
formula and the framework for organisational reliability maturity (FORM) could be 
used to benchmark organisations internally and externally. With these, the chapter 
demonstrated that the mindfulness of organisations can indeed be measured. 
 
Finally, the chapter answered the second question “can these measurements help diverse 
organisations become more mature?” To achieve this, the chapter used individual 
examples from the different organisations to describe in details how the framework for 
organisational reliability maturity (FORM) could be used in conjunction with the 
organisational reliability maturity model (ORM
2
) to suggest organisational reliability 
maturity improvement enhancing behaviours, as well as potential organisational 
reliability maturity improvement limiting behaviours. These are aimed at improving the 
organisations and organisational learning. This model and framework was used in eight 
different organisations and three different industries with similar results. The 
organisations, with diversities in size, age, and geographical spread were purposively 
selected to enhance data robustness and quality.  
 
Chapter six shall summarize and conclude this research. It shall outline the scope and 
limitations of this research. It shall highlight the contributions of this research to 
existing knowledge and the new knowledge it has created. Finally it shall outline the 
scope for future studies. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
 
DISCUSSION, CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
 
Chapter five used the results obtained by this research to provided answers to the 
research questions. To answer the first question “… can the reliability of organisations 
be measured?” the chapter developed the Organisational Reliability Maturity Model 
(ORM
2
) to help organisations measure their level of maturity in terms of organisational 
reliability. The chapter also demonstrated how to use the ORM
2
 to measure and track 
their level of maturity over time. To answer the second question “can these 
measurements help diverse organisations become more mature?” chapter five 
developed the Framework for Organisational Reliability Maturity (FORM) to help 
organisations in self appraisals. The chapter also demonstrated how FORM could be 
used by organisations in internal and external benchmarking, to predict future 
behaviours, and to recommend specific behaviours to adopt or eliminate in their march 
towards performance improvement. Chapter six shall summarize the research. It shall 
outline the contributions of the research to the academic world and to the society. 
Finally, chapter six shall identify the limitations of this research as well as the scope for 
future studies.  
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6.1  Discussion 
The aim of this research is to develop a harmonized framework for organisational 
reliability measurement that could be applied towards organisational maturity 
improvement. To achieve this, the research sets out to investigate if the reliability of 
organisations could be measured and if so, if the measurement could be standardized 
and applied to help diverse organisations become more mature.  
 
 This research is necessitated by the accelerated incidences of disasters over the last 
century with massive impacts on people, the environment and organisations. These 
disasters could not be predicted, but became subjects of retrospective predictability. The 
research notes that this increased incidences of disasters coincided with a period of 
exponential complex technological advancement within organisations, as well as a 
period characterised by tighter system and process coupling and interdependence. 
Despite this increased disasters, complexities in technology, and tighter 
interdependencies, the research notes that certain organisations, the high reliability 
organisations have continued to operate at top quartile level in organisational reliability 
and safety. Despite their very high potential for disasters, they continuously avoid 
failures, or are designed such that failures, should they occur, do not result in disasters. 
Should disasters occur, they are resilient enough to withstand the consequences. The 
research therefore hypothesises that developing a measurement framework for high 
reliability organisations, and extending this framework to diverse organisations could 
potentially help reduce the incidences of disasters.  
 
This research argues that by extending the behaviours of these high reliability 
organisations to diverse organisations, organisations would become more mature and 
disasters would be prevented. The research therefore set out to collect a balanced data 
set that would help it to develop a standardized organisational reliability framework. 
Using the purposive sampling technique, the research obtained data from eight 
organisations in three industries and across two continents. The organisations were 
selected such that they contrast and complement one another in terms of type, size of 
organisation, age of organisation, and its geographical spread. The respondents were 
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demographically stratified in terms of number of years of experience in the industry, 
responsibilities within their organisation and gender; the reasons for this stratification 
being to deepen the diversity of responses as much as possible.  
 
The research was conducted using a mixed method design. This methodical choice was 
informed by the pragmatist philosophy adopted by the research. To effectively answer 
the exploratory research questions that seek to uncover the extent to which 
organisational reliability could be measured, as well as of the measurement could be 
adopted to enhance the maturity of diverse organisations, delved into a positivist 
philosophy to establish objective facts. This was achieved with the help of secondary 
sources and questionnaires administered anonymously. These objective facts alone 
could not answer the research questions, neither could they capture the subjective 
realities inferred through the feelings, intuitions, experiences nuances, and individual 
world views of the social actors involved in the organisation. Interpretivism through 
interviews was therefore introduced to capture the subjective ontologies involved with 
the organisations and the members of the organisations. The interviews were designed 
to delve deeper into the hearts and minds of the respondents, to peel away their biases 
and gain better insights into the underlying causative factors and mechanisms that may 
have influenced their responses in the questionnaires. The survey was conducted with 
the same time horizon, and the sample size determined through a combination of the 
mathematical relationship between the standard deviation, confidence level and 
confidence interval all in a bid to enhance the reliability and validity of the results.  
 
The results show a similar distribution of the demographic in terms of responsibilities 
and number of years of experience in the industry among all the organisations surveyed; 
a fact that adds to the validity of the research. In most the organisations surveyed, there 
was often a sharp divide between the responses of the managers and that of the 
subordinates. This sharp divide indicates a huge schism between the different strata of 
the organisations, both in terms of communicating, understanding, and implementing 
the processes required to exhibit the high reliability behaviours. It highlights the 
differences in perspectives and world views of the people in different strata of the 
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organisations. Secondly, it justifies the need of this research to stratify the respondents 
so as to obtain a balanced and diversified set of responses. Finally, obtaining similar 
responses from diverse organisations indicates that the research has achieved one of the 
things it set out to achieve at the beginning, all enhancing the validity of this research. 
Trick questions were introduced throughout the research to further enhance validity. 
These were similar questions worded differently to test the comprehension of the 
respondents, as well as verify that the responses are true reflections of the respondents’ 
opinions. The results show that the responses from the trick questions were similar with 
the original questions and this is common across the organisations. 
 
The research used the questionnaire to develop the Organisational Reliability Maturity 
Model (ORM
2
) to assess the level of maturity of organisations in terms of 
organisational reliability, and to track their level of organisational reliability maturity 
over time.  The Organisational Maturity Model (ORM
2
) leverages on the HRO theory 
and identified specific reliability enhancing behaviours in organisations for each of the 
five HRO principles. The model, also referred to as the 5S model, maps the 
organisational reliability behaviours into five maturity levels and proposes what 
behaviours would be expected from organisations in different maturity levels.  
 
The research used the results to develop the Framework for Organisational Reliability 
Maturity (FORM) to assess organisations with respect to organisational reliability. The 
FORM is designed for use by organisations in benchmarking, to predict future 
behaviours, and to recommend specific behaviours to adopt or eliminate in their march 
towards organisational learning and performance improvement. The predictive feature 
is especially useful if disasters must be avoided. The normally retrospective 
predictability disaster causative cues would be discovered and mitigated before the 
disaster could occur. 
 
The research hopes that this work would not only expand existing knowledge in high 
reliability organisations, it would contribute to the reduction of disasters and therefore 
help to make the world safer and organisations more resilient.   
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Contributions of Research 
Although a lot of work exists in HRO theory, this research identified a number of gaps. 
First most of the works were done in single organisations; there is no empirical 
evidence to indicate the existence of research in diverse organisations to test the HRO 
theory in different environments at the same time. With most of the work performed in 
silos, there is no evidence that it could be replicated in different organisations under 
different circumstances. Secondly, most of the existing research is limited to certain 
organisations: the traditional high reliability organisations. This disregards the fact that 
most catastrophic disasters in recent times were recorded in organisations mostly 
outside the traditional HROs such as oil and gas industries. Furthermore, most of the 
existing works were reactive in nature, retrospectively studying organisations after 
catastrophic incidents have occurred, and mostly from a theoretical perspective. A 
research that could potentially predict the potential of these disasters to occur would 
benefit humanity. Finally, this research observed that there were no existing studies that 
show how to measure the reliability of the organisations, or how the organisations can 
sustain their levels of reliability or improve through the stages of maturing towards 
higher levels of reliability. Filling these gaps would contribute to the academic world, 
benefit organisations, and help preserve humanity. 
 
To fill these gaps, this research was conducted across eight different organisations in 
three different industries, in two continents and within the same time horizon to enhance 
diversity and increase the quality and validity of the assumptions and results. Expanding 
the research to diverse organisation mostly outside the traditional HROs would enhance 
the generalisability of the results, assumptions and conclusions. It would also provide 
evidence of a generalizable empirical research that addresses the concerns of Bundy et 
al (2017), Levenson et al (2009), and Bigley & Roberts (2001). They had observed the 
lack of specificity of existing research in the HRO theory, the abstract nature of the 
theory, and the need for a “comprehensive and detailed treatment” of high reliability 
organisations. This research fills these gaps and therefore expands existing knowledge 
in the HRO theory. The diversity of the organisations studied also enhances the 
generalizability of the HRO theory.  
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In addition to enhancing existing research, extending the research to organisations 
outside the traditional HROs is invaluable both to organisations and to humanity in 
general. As stated earlier, and discussed in details in sections two and three, a lot of the 
disasters over the past century has been in organisations outside the traditional HROs. 
These disasters have resulted in lots of fatalities, long and short term injuries, huge 
financial losses, and massive environmental impacts. Some organisations could not 
survive some of the disasters, and their demise meant massive job losses. Some people, 
communities, organisations, and certain habitats are still suffering from the impact of 
some of these disasters, decades after they occurred. Any research such as this that aims 
to help diverse organisations both within and outside the traditional HROs improve their 
reliability and potentially reduce disasters would therefore be invaluable both to the 
organisations, and to the society at large.  
 
The model (ORM
2
) and the framework (FORM) developed by this research filled the 
two final gaps of the retrospective predictability and the inability of previous research to 
proffer a methodical and empirical approach to the study of HROs. These are invaluable 
to the academia, organisations, and to the society. The model and the framework expand 
existing knowledge in the HRO theory and organisational learning. They also open up 
new areas for future researchers to develop further. The predictability ability of the 
framework means that organisations are better equipped to act to improve themselves 
and forestall catastrophic failures and disasters. This, by extension, means that the 
potential for disasters are reduced in organisations; the potential for fatalities, 
environmental pollution, financial loss, and organisation demise are also reduced. 
Similarly, the framework and the model help in organisational learning. Organisations 
are able to adopt a standardized and empirical method to assess their organisational 
reliability. They are also able to identify best in class behaviours and benchmark against 
those best in class behaviours. They are able to learn from highly reliable organisations 
and begin to design their organisations towards higher reliability. Considering that 
organisations with higher reliability have less potential for disasters, it therefore follows 
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that this research would potentially help reduce the incidences of disasters and help 
protect organisations, the environment, and humanity in general.  
 
Limitations of Research 
This research was conducted with special consideration to diversity in terms of 
organisational size, age of operations and geographical spread. For each large 
organisation, a smaller one was purposively sampled; for each old and well established 
organisation, a relatively newer one was purposively sampled; and for each organisation 
with international spread, a relatively localized organisation was purposively sampled. 
Despite the best intentions and high confidence level of this research, it cannot claim 
that eight organisations and three industries is an accurate representation of all 
organisations and industries.   
 
Another limitation is the inability of this research to guarantee success of similar 
research in other organisations and industries not surveyed. Although this research has 
high hopes in its ability to be replicated in different organisations and in diverse 
industries, it cannot completely guarantee that it could be seamlessly implemented in 
other industries. It cannot also guarantee that the results would be a reflection of the 
results from other industries and organisations not yet researched. This research could 
be conducted in different organisations and under different time horizons with different 
results.  
 
The concept of high reliability organisation was discussed in the questionnaire and this 
could potentially pose another limitation. Some could argue that by reading the research 
perspectives on high reliability organisations as outlined on page two of the 
questionnaire, the respondent could become biased towards those definitions and could 
therefore tailor the responses to agree with or reject the perspectives. This is however 
hard to overcome as these definitions are standard and are easily assessable in any paper 
or books about HROs. Moreover, where the definitions are not provided in the 
questionnaires, some respondents might seek definitions from the internet or books, a 
situation that could become frustrating for some respondents, thereby reducing 
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participation. Finally, the definitions enhance reliability by standardizing the meanings 
for all respondents, thereby limiting second guessing.  
 
The research made a lot of effort to describe the validity of the research. Most of this 
was done through content validity. It described validity in terms of the ability of the 
questionnaire to provide adequate coverage of the research objectives and questions. It 
also described validity in terms of the appropriateness of the pilot testing and its 
relationship with the main research. The research also described validity in terms of the 
uniformity of the responses from different strata in different organisations and 
industries. Finally, the research described validity in terms of the ability of the research 
to answer the research questions. It cited the development of the measurement 
framework and the reliability maturity model, and their successful application in eight 
different organisations as further proof of validity. A gap exists here to describe validity 
in statistical terms using methods such as factor analysis. This could potentially form a 
basis for future studies.   
 
The final limitation lies in the use of gatekeepers.  With limited access to some of the 
organisations as well as due to the logistical nightmare involved in the data gathering, 
the use of gatekeepers was the most practical means of survey distribution. The 
organisations were guaranteed anonymity in part to prevent their manipulation or 
influencing of the respondents. Anonymity means that there would be no benefits to the 
organisations for influencing the respondents: the organisations would not be associated 
with the results. Although the gatekeepers were vetted as people with integrity based on 
their organisations and positions within their respective organisations, the research 
cannot guarantee absolutely that the choice of respondents were not influenced by the 
gatekeepers or their organisations. Furthermore this research used gatekeepers to 
conform to the intended demographic spread. The demographic had been stratified to 
enhance diversity of data to reduce bias. While this research has a high confidence that 
this was done, based on the consistency of the results, it cannot guarantee that this 
stratification was implemented to perfection. These limitations present gaps in this 
study that could potentially open up opportunities for further research.  
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6.2  Conclusion 
The research had set out to answer the research questions: 
 To what extent can the reliability of organisations be measured? 
 Can these measurements help diverse organisations become more mature? 
The aim was to develop a harmonized framework for high reliability organisations and 
apply the HRO theory to improve the maturity of diverse organisations. It had hoped 
that by improving the maturity of diverse organisations, it would improve their 
reliability and safety, and therefore reduce the incidences of disasters that have 
increased exponentially within the last few decades. It also hoped that the organisational 
reliability measurement framework would have the ability to help organisations in 
assessments, benchmarking, predicting potential for improvement or regression, 
organisational improvement, and organisational learning. 
 
The research provides evidence that the reliability of organisations can be measured and 
that these measurements can be used to improve the maturity of diverse organisations 
and in doing so arrived at the following conclusions. 
 
 The reliability of organisations can be measured. By developing the 
Organisational Reliability Maturity Model (ORM
2
) also referred to as the 5S 
model, and the Framework for Organisational Reliability Maturity (FORM), the 
research demonstrates that the reliability of organisations could be measured. 
 The high reliability organisation theory can be applied to diverse organisations 
outside the industries traditionally studied by previous researchers. Researchers 
have often considered certain organisations for the application of the high 
reliability organisation theory. This research considers this mind set to be faulty 
given that most incidents and disasters in history have been in organisations 
outside these traditional high reliability organisations. By applying the theory to 
different organisations in diverse industries to achieve similar results, this 
research demonstrates the practicability of the theory in diverse organisations.  
 A measurement framework could be developed to assess the maturity of 
organisations in terms of organisational reliability. Using the results, the 
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research describes how the measurement framework could be combines the 
maturity model to assess the positions of organisations on the organisational 
reliability maturity grid. The research demonstrates that organisations could 
assess their organisational reliability behaviour and determine the extent to 
which they are reliable.  
  The measurement framework could be used in organisational benchmarking. 
Given the ability of the framework to be replicated in different organisations 
with similar results, the research therefore demonstrates the ability of the 
framework to be used to benchmark organisations internally, against peers, and 
against best in class.  
 The framework could potentially predict the probability of organisations to face 
disasters. The pull relationship developed by the research identifies the potential 
for organisations to improve or retrogress in terms of organisational reliability. 
Retrospective predictability of disasters and the penchant for the high reliability 
organisation theory to discuss disasters after the fact have been a major gap in 
the previous studies. This research closes this gap and demonstrates that these 
events could be predicted based on current behaviours of the organisations.   
 The framework could be utilized in organisational learning and to improve the 
reliability behaviours of organisations. The Organisational Reliability Maturity 
Model (ORM
2
) clearly defines behaviours expected from organisations at each 
maturity model. The organisations could therefore use this model in conjunction 
with the assessment and pull characteristics of the Framework for Organisational 
Reliability Maturity to recommend desired level behaviours to improve the 
maturity of the organisation. 
 A mindful organisation is a safe organisation; therefore applying the high 
reliability organisation theory to diverse organisations would enhance safety and 
reduce disasters. Finally the research correlated between organisational 
mindfulness and disaster prevention. The research demonstrates that most 
disasters in history have been in organisations outside the organisations 
traditionally studied as high reliability organisations. Since these traditional high 
reliability organisations have consistently avoided incidents and disasters, 
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applying the theory to diverse organisations in different industries, including 
those that have consistently witnessed incidents and disasters would reduce 
incidence of disasters. Combining the assessment, predictive and improvement 
features of the measurement framework in these organisations would therefore 
help eliminate the disasters and ultimately help make organisations, and by 
extension humanity safer. 
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6.3 Scope for Future Research 
The limitations in section 6.2 present opportunities for future studies. A future research 
could seek to enhance the diversity of this research and expand the research into more 
organisations and more diverse industries. The more the organisations and industries 
studied, the more the validity of the findings. A future research could therefore extend 
the diversity and expand the study further into more industries and organisations with 
varying degrees of complexity, coupling, size, and age. Increasing the diversity of the 
study would enhance the chances of generalizability and standardization of the 
assumptions and conclusions reached in this study. On the hand, it could also 
potentially disprove these assumptions and conclusions. 
 
Another opportunity for future study lies in the removal of gatekeepers. A more detailed 
study could be in the form of a series of action research, where the researchers would 
spend sometime within the organisations and observe the behaviours of the respondents 
first hand. The researchers would have access to the organisational structure and 
personnel information. Any research that would minimize the use of gatekeepers and 
reduce respondents’ bias would help enhance the validity and deepen the quality of the 
research.   
 
Another opportunity lies in the inclusion of more traditional high reliability 
organisations for triangulation. A future research could seek to test the applicability of 
this framework in more traditional high reliability organisation. The results could 
validate the HRO theory and form the benchmark behaviour for organisational 
reliability maturity level 5 “summit”. It could on the other hand dispel the myth of 
“traditional HROs” and show that these organisations might not be as exemplary as 
currently perceived.  
 
The final opportunity lies in the weighting scale for the high reliability organisation 
principles. This research assumes an equal weighting for each of the five HRO 
principles. It adopted this stance for the sake of simplicity and standardization. A future 
research might explore different weighting scales for different organisations in specific 
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industries in line with prevailing priorities within those industries or organisations. 
Certain organisations might consider some principles as being more important than the 
others and this might influence their choice of weighting.  
 
This research has clearly closed a lot of gaps in existing organisational research and 
opened up new areas of research. The research hopes that in coming years, some of the 
limitations and scope for future studies could be exploited to deepen the body of 
knowledge.  
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Agwu Emele Agwu 
PhD Student, Portsmouth Business School, University of Portsmouth 
Dear Agwu 
 
Thank you for submitting your documents for ethical review.  The Ethics Committee was 
content to grant a favourable ethical opinion of the above research on the basis described in the 
application form, protocol and supporting documentation, revised in the light of any conditions 
set, subject to the general conditions set out in the attached document.   
The favourable opinion of the EC does not grant permission or approval to undertake the 
research.  Management permission or approval must be obtained from any host organisation, 
including University of Portsmouth, prior to the start of the study.   
Summary of any ethical considerations 
The Ethics Committee is content to grant a favourable ethical opinion subject to:   
 One correction – that in Q7 you remove the phrase ‘and 10 from the defunct 
organisations’. 
The Ethics Committee has made two recommendations: 
 that you explain verbally to interviewees, before they sign the consent form, what the 
ability to 'withdraw at any time' actually means in practice, i.e. presumably at any time 
between the interview and whenever he starts analysing the data. 
 that on the various documents you include a Portsmouth University telephone number 
(in addition to the Nigerian number) to make it clear that you are a bona fide member of 
the university. 
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 The Committee is constituted in accordance with the Governance Arrangements set out by the 
University of Portsmouth   
After ethical review 
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The attached document acts as a reminder that research should be conducted with integrity and 
gives detailed guidance on reporting requirements for studies with a favourable opinion, 
including: 
 Notifying substantial amendments 
 Notification of serious breaches of the protocol 
 Progress reports 
 Notifying the end of the study 
Feedback 
You are invited to give your view of the service that you have received from the Faculty Ethics 
Committee.  If you wish to make your views known please contact the administrator 
***********  
   Please quote this number on all correspondence : E330 
 
Yours sincerely and wishing you every success in your research 
 
Chair 
Email:  
Enclosures:  
“After ethical review – guidance for researchers” 
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Labib [Supervisor] 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
 
Appendix 1 
After ethical review – guidance for researchers 
This document sets out important guidance for researchers with a favourable opinion from a 
University of Portsmouth Ethics Committee. Please read the guidance carefully. A failure to 
follow the guidance could lead to the committee reviewing and possibly revoking its opinion on 
the research.  
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It is assumed that the research will commence within 3 months of the date of the favourable 
ethical opinion or the start date stated in the application, whichever is the latest. 
The research must not commence until the researcher has obtained any necessary management 
permissions or approvals – this is particularly pertinent in cases of research hosted by external 
organisations. The appropriate head of department should be aware of a member of staff’s 
research plans.    
If it is proposed to extend the duration of the study beyond that stated in the application, the 
Ethics Committee must be informed. 
If the research extends beyond a year then an annual progress report must be submitted to the 
Ethics Committee. 
When the study has been completed the Ethics Committee must be notified. 
Any proposed substantial amendments must be submitted to the Ethics Committee for review. A 
substantial amendment is any amendment to the terms of the application for ethical review, or to 
the protocol or other supporting documentation approved by the Committee that is likely to 
affect to a significant degree:  
(a) the safety or physical or mental integrity of participants  
(b) the scientific value of the study 
(c) the conduct or management of the study. 
A substantial amendment should not be implemented until a favourable ethical opinion has been 
given by the Committee. 
Researchers are reminded of the University’s commitments as stated in the Concordat to 
Support Research Integrity  viz: 
 maintaining the highest standards of rigour and integrity in all aspects of research 
 ensuring that research is conducted according to appropriate ethical, legal and 
professional frameworks, obligations and standards 
 supporting a research environment that is underpinned by a culture of integrity and 
based on good governance, best practice and support for the development of researchers 
 using transparent, robust and fair processes to deal with allegations of research 
misconduct should they arise 
 working together to strengthen the integrity of research and to reviewing progress 
regularly and openly 
In ensuring that it meets these commitments the University has adopted the UKRIO Code of 
Practice for Research.  Any breach of this code may be considered as misconduct and may be 
investigated following the University Procedure for the Investigation of Allegations of 
Misconduct in Research. 
Researchers are advised to use the UKRIO checklist as a simple guide to integrity. 
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APPENDIX 2 
 
Form UPR16 – Research Ethics Review Checklist 
 
This appendix is the University of Portsmouth Form UPR16 showing the research ethics review 
checklist.  
 
 
 
290 
 
 
291 
 
APPENDIX 3 
 
Sample Questionnaire 
 
This appendix shows a sample of the questionnaire used for the research. It is a pdf 
download from sogosurvey, the online survey instrument used for the survey.  
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APPENDIX 4 
 
A sample of the Interview Questions 
 
This appendix shows a sample of the interview questions used in this researched.  
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A sample of the Interview Questions 
 
 
Towards a Harmonized Framework for High Reliability Organisations – A Ph.D Thesis 
 
Interview Questions 
SECTION 1: Demographics 
1. Gender:  
2. Industry: 
3. Organisation: 
4. Primary Responsibility: 
5. Years of Experience: 
SECTION 2: Assessing Preoccupation with Failure 
1. How does  your organisation manage near misses 
2. How does  your organisation manage incidents 
a. Follow up to confirm reporting, and perceptions about near misses and 
incidents 
b. Follow up with questions about incident database management 
3. What processes do you have in place to prevent recurrences  
a. Follow up questions analysis  
b. Follow up questions on learning from incident processes 
c. Follow up questions on using worst case scenarios during planning and 
analyses 
d. Follow up questions on actively seeking out potential hot spots 
4. Where do you focus more: successes or failures, and why? 
5. How does the organisation manage people that make mistakes? 
6. What form of communication exists between management and staff? 
7. What has been your personal experience with regards failure 
SECTION 3: Assessing Reluctance to Simplify 
1. Do you have sceptics in your organisation? How are they perceived? 
2. What is the perception and behaviour towards people that challenge the process? 
3. What would your organisation typically do to someone that disrupts operations? Why? 
4. What is the organisation’s attitude towards learning?  
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a. Follow up with deepening understanding to better challenge the process 
5. What is your impression about the level of trust between one another? 
6. To what extent are everyone’s viewpoints heard and taken into consideration? 
7. Have you taken something for granted that turned out to lead to failure? Have you seen 
it within your organisation? What happened? What was the effect? 
SECTION 4: Assessing Sensitivity to Operations 
1. What is the nature of our team meetings? 
a. Frequency, usefulness, participation, terms of reference 
2. To what level do superiors and managers intervene in daily activities? How is this 
perceived by the employees? 
3. What is the nature of your feedback process?  
4. What about field supervision? How much of this is readily available? How much can 
field leadership take decisions without deferring to management? 
5. If someone interrupts the process to forestall a catastrophic failure, what would happen? 
What if it turns out to be a false alarm? 
6. What form of communication is available between frontline and management, and 
among staff 
SECTION 5: Assessing Commitment to Resilience 
1. What emergency response and contingency processes are available?  
2. How do people respond to these processes?  
3. How much skills are available within my organisation? 
4.  How are these skills assessed? 
5. What type of emergencies have you had in your organisation? 
6. How were the emergencies managed?  
7. What were the effects? Lessons learned? 
SECTION 6: Assessing Deference to Expertise 
1. Have you experienced emergencies within your organisation? Who took the lead?  
2. In that emergency, what was the relationship between the experienced people and the 
management staff? Who was in charge? How did they resolve issues after the 
emergency? 
3. What level of expertise is available in your team? How do you spot who has the 
expertise at each time? 
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APPENDIX 5 
 
Journal paper submitted to Journal of Safety Science 
 
This appendix shows the abstract of the paper presented to the Journal of Safety Science 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
311 
 
Appendix 5: Journal paper submitted to Journal of Safety Science 
 
 
312 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
